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ABSTRACT
REMOVING THE RUST:
COMPARATIVE POST-INDUSTRIAL REVITALIZATION IN BUFFALO, 
CLEVELAND, AND PITTSBURGH
Scott Nicholas Duryea 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. David Earnest
This study seeks to understand the differences in post-industrial redevelopment 
among the cities o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Part o f the so-called “rust belt,” 
these three cities experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through the 1980s, largely 
as a result of the economic globalization o f heavy industry. Intensive manufacturing and 
output had come to a screeching halt, unemployment skyrocketed, outmigration ensued, 
and each metropolitan area faced formidable challenges to convert to service-oriented 
industries. Over the past twenty years, these cities, and the regions that encompass them, 
have begun to redevelop, although unevenly. At a glance, the Pittsburgh region appears 
to be regenerating better than Cleveland and Buffalo. How well has each city post­
industrialized? Why are there differences?
I hypothesize that differences in the dependent variable—post-industrialization— 
can be partly explained by three independent variables— regulatory burden, size of 
service sector prior to deindustrialization, and capital accumulation. These three 
hypotheses are tested using a comparative and qualitative research design informed by 
the liberal institutionalist school o f thought. The findings have implications for global 
deindustrialized cities struggling to post-industrialize.
Ultimately, I find that Pittsburgh has economically outperformed its rust belt 
counterparts because of its lower regulatory burden, more robust service sector prior to
deindustrialization, which insulated the region from the shock o f the rapid decline of steel, 
and higher availability o f venture capital.
© 2015 Scott Nicholas Duryea. All rights reserved.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation project seeks to understand the differences in post-industrial 
redevelopment among the cities of Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Part o f the so- 
called “rust belt,” these three cities experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through 
the 1980s, largely as a result of the economic globalization o f heavy industry. Intensive 
manufacturing and output had come to a screeching halt, unemployment skyrocketed, 
outmigration ensued, and each metropolitan area faced formidable challenges to convert 
to service-oriented industries. Over the past twenty years, these cities, and the regions 
that encompass them have begun to redevelop, although unevenly. At a glance, the 
Pittsburgh region appears to be regenerating better than Cleveland and Buffalo. Why are 
there differences? In this study, I test the influences of three variables on post-industrial 
revitalization: regulatory burden, service-sector path dependence, and capital 
accumulation. Ultimately, these variables correlate with post-industrial revitalization and 
partly explain why Pittsburgh is ahead o f the game. This introduction gives a statement 
o f purpose, a brief background of the decline o f American manufacturing and the rise o f 
the tertiary sector, and an outline o f the study. The next two chapters offer a literature 
review and an explanation o f the research design.
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
This study is important for two reasons. First, the reasons for the differences in 
post-industrial redevelopment have pragmatic value. The 1970s and 1980s saw massive 
unemployment in and labor outmigration from these three cities. On a personal level,
2individuals who were affected by industrial downfall can begin to understand why painful 
economic events occur and how to rise above them. Second, governments tend to learn 
from examples of success stories o f urban regeneration. These three cities are certainly 
not the only cases of industrial decline. Cities such as Detroit, Michigan; Newcastle, 
Australia; and Sheffield, England have faced similar economic havoc, and the cases of 
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Buffalo can serve as examples for other domestic and 
international governments and urban planners. This study reveals elements o f success 
and failure for post-industrial redevelopment in these cities and offer insights for 
replication in cases that are similar in context. The personal practicality and public 
policy implications make this dissertation project a meaningful endeavor.
DECLINE IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
Industrial manufacturing in the United States saw a steady decline in the latter
half o f the twentieth century, with a sharp drop in the 1980s. In the immediate aftermath
of World War II, one-third o f all jobs in the United States were in manufacturing. By the
early 1990s, that number dropped to 16%. From 1981 to 1991, 1.8 million manufacturing
jobs disappeared, a loss of nine percent.1 The vanishing of manufacturing employment
included layoffs, unemployment, declining incomes, relocation, and early retirement.
Much of the decline in American manufacturing came a result o f the business
decisions o f American transnational corporations (TNCs). By the 1980s, the United
States’ largest TNCs did not dominate the world economy as they had done in the 1960s.
The height o f TNC growth came in 1968, and since then the rate o f subsidiary formation
1 Brian Phillips, Global Production and Domestic Decay: Plant Closings in the U.S.
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), xxii.
consistently declined. Domestic activities of American TNCs slowed in the 1970s and 
1980s in favor o f greater transnationality to compete with new and rising smaller- and 
medium-sized American TNCs.2 During this time, and without adding subsidiary 
formation, large American TNCs expanded their existing operations and restructured 
their foreign networks. Between 1960 and 1988, American overseas direct investment in 
manufacturing increased by nearly $120 billion.3
The redirection of investment abroad led to an increase in overseas employment. 
In the 21-year period between 1966 and 1987, overall employment in the foreign 
affiliates of American TNCs grew from 2.4 million to 4.07 million, a 68.2% increase.4 
Among developed countries, Spain, Ireland, and Japan saw the quickest increases in 
employment rates. But, the highest rates o f employment growth occurred in developing 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. 
Employment in these countries grew five-fold over that of developed countries. As a 
result, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom declined in relative 
importance for investment.
By focusing abroad, large American TNCs saw their American plants as less 
profitable. Several industries closed manufacturing plants throughout the 1980s.
Between 1983 and 1989, layoffs caused the unemployment o f 10 million workers.5
2 Ibid., 15.
3 Rodger Doyle, "Deindustrialization: Why Manufacturing Continues to Decline," 
Scientific American May 2002, 30.
4 Peter Dicken, Global Shift (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 65.
5 John Portz, The Politics o f  Plant Closings (Lawrence: University o f Kansas Press, 
1990), viii.
4These losses were most pronounced in the industries of steel, electronics, rubber, and 
automobiles.
The persistent decline o f manufacturing employment in the United States since 
World War II can be seen in Table 1.1 below. Looking at the ten-year intervals, a steady 
decline in the percentage of manufacturing employment to total employment began in 
1949 at 30.7 percent, continued through the end o f the twentieth century at 14.2 percent, 
and fell to 9.3% in 2013. Figure 1.1 gives a graphical presentation of the share of 
manufacturing employment trend.
5Table 1.1: Manufacturing Employment per Thousand
Year Mfg. Employment Total Employment Share
1929 10,428 35,286 29.6%
1939 9,967 35,857 27.8%
1949 14,368 46,769 30.7%
1959 16,060 55,574 28.9%
1969 19,789 71,718 27.6%
1979 20,611 87,302 23.6%
1989 18,954 102,755 18.4%
1999 17,051 120,328 14.2%
2009 11,528 121,201 9.5%
2013 11,749 125,980 9.3%
(Source; U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. National 
Income and Product Accounts, tables 6.5A-6.5D)
6Figure 1.1: Share of Manufacturing Employment to Total Employment
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The rise o f manufacturing occurred in cities because o f the benefits of 
agglomeration and spillover effects. This interconnectedness o f production processes felt 
the ripple effects o f the decline of manufacturing. Accordingly, the effects o f industrial 
decline were not even across the country. Rather, they were concentrated in cities. The 
next section will look at the sectors o f the manufacturing industry most affected by plant 
closings and describe the domino effect o f steel’s downfall in the United States.
7Steel Industry
At the turn o f the twentieth century, the output and technology of American steel 
mills outpaced those o f the rest o f the world. Foreign competition from England and 
Germany led American steel companies to organize the United States Steel Corporation, 
a large holding company of over 200 subsidiaries which governed the production of 65% 
of American steel output. Because o f the large share o f total steel production held by US 
Steel, there was no need for technological improvement and modernization in steel 
making. For over sixty years, this business model was successful.6
But the late 1950s saw the rise of Japanese steel competition, which took 
advantage of inexpensive Venezuelan iron ore and invested in high-technology modem 
steel furnaces. American steel began to decline, and, by the late 1960s, companies in the 
United States began fighting labor unions in desperate attempts to lower production 
costs.7 The 1970s and 1980s saw American companies demand the federal government 
to impose import restrictions as a protectionist measure, while simultaneously move 
assets out o f steel-making and into more profitable enterprises, such as plastics, 
chemicals, shopping malls, and hotels.8 Other steel ventures often included partnering 
with their international competitors. U.S. Steel explored the possibility of signing 
contracts with Japanese steel manufacturers in a bid to update and modernize existing 
steel facilities. National Steel, the forth largest American steel producer, sold half o f its
6 David Bensman and Roberta Lynch, Rusted Dreams (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1989), 80-88.
7 Ibid.
g
Gilda Haas, Plant Closures: Myths, Realities, and Responsibilities (Detroit: South End 
Press, 1986), 23.
shares to Nippon Kokkan, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the ninth largest American steel 
company, created a joint subsidiary withNisshin Steel.9 U.S. Steel Corporation 
Chairman M. Roderick stated in 1979 that the corporation was in the business o f making 
profits, not necessarily making steel. Later that year, U.S. Steel closed thirteen steel mills, 
laying off more than 13,000 workers.10 American steel was quickly fading.
In 1981, U.S. Steel saw a slight gain in profits, but it was offset by the 
diversification purchase of Marathon Oil and later Texas Oil for a total o f $9 billion.
From 1978 to 1985, U.S. Steel revenues from steelmaking dropped from 73% to 33% of 
total revenue, and oil and gas revenues made up 53% by the middle of the 1980s." 
Accordingly, American steel companies shut down more than 20% of their productive 
capacity between 1979 and 1984, which left 150,000 workers unemployed.12 And, by the 
end of the decade, U.S. Steel alone shut down 150 plants. American steel was unable to 
recover.
Electronics Industry
The electronics industry also faced challenges from abroad. Transnationalization 
and the increased division o f the stages of production enabled capital to be increasingly 
mobile to Taiwan and South Korea. In addition, lower labor costs, fewer tariff burdens,
9 Bertrand Bellon and Jorge Niosi, The Decline o f  the American Economy (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1988), 54.
10 Scott Camp, Workers Response to Plant Closings: Steelworkers in Johnstown and 
Youngstown (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 92.
11 Portz, The Politics o f  Plant Closings, 91.
12 Bensman and Lynch, Rusted Dreams, 91.
9and weaker union structures opened the gates to internationalization for electronics 
companies. While American sales o f televisions, radios, semiconductors, and other 
electronic products doubled between 1966 and 1975, offshore production increased 
tenfold. In the same period, the American radio and television manufacturing industry 
laid off nearly 250,000 workers.13 Perrucci et al. noted, “The experiences o f this 
industrial sector provides a model of the change in the American economy that bears 
directly on plant closings and unemployment.”14 Even though consumers o f electronic 
products benefited from less expensive goods, it came at the expense o f American 
manufacturing employment.
Rubber Industry
Both internationalization and domestic reorganization affected the rubber industry. 
The primary product o f rubber manufacturing is and had been tires. At one time, Akron, 
Ohio, which was known as America’s rubber city, contained 65 rubber plants through 
which two-thirds of the country’s tires had been produced. By 1986, the rubber 
industry’s employment dwindled to 3,600, down from 37,000 in 1950. Several plants 
closed, thousands o f unionized workers lost their jobs, and tire production had come to a 
halt by 1988.15
13 Phillips, Global Production and Domestic Decay: Plant Closings in the U.S., 53.
14 Carolyn C. Perrucci et al., Plant Closings: International Context and Social Costs 
(New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1988), 29.
15 Charles Jeszeck, "Decline of Tire Manufacturing in Akron," in Grand Designs: The 
Impact o f  Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions, and Communities, eds. Charles 
Craypo and Bruce Nissen (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1993), 18-44.
10
The rubber industry’s decline came as a result of asset acquisition by foreign 
firms and the relocation o f production to greenfield sites in the southern and southwestern 
United States where employees were less unionized and labor costs were minimized. But, 
it was not that union wages were too high. The shift in ownership and location in the 
rubber industry occurred because o f the unwillingness o f corporate managers to invest in 
upgrading worker skills and technology, the failure to react to various market shifts, and 
simply the desire to escape the legalities and impediments that came with a unionized 
workforce.16 Production increased, but so too did unemployment in the Midwest rubber 
industry.
Automobile Industry
One o f the more notable industrial declines came in the automobile industry. In 
the post-World War II period, General Motors and Ford were the prime automobile 
producers in the world. In the 1960s, American automobile output equaled about half of 
the world’s production.17 By 1992, that number fell to only 20%,18 but substantial 
profits were still being made. General Motors, for instance, made a record $4.9 billion 
profit in 1994.19
Unlike other industries, however, diversification in the automobile industry did 
not account for most of the profits. Ford, in the 1990s, derived 84% of its sales from car,
16 Ibid.
17 Dicken, Global Shift, 272.
18 Standard and Poors, Industrial Surveys, Vol. 1 (October 1994), A79.
19 James Bennet, "G.M.'s Profits a Record in Quarter and Year," New York Times,
February 1, 1995.
11
truck, automobile parts, and glass operations, and General Motors derived 80% from 
automobile production. These profits, however, have come as a result o f overseas 
production and co-production and contracting agreements with foreign producers. By the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Ford produced nearly 60% of its cars outside o f the United 
States.20 And, in 1993, General Motors derived more than 90% of its net profits from its 
foreign operations.21 These included 29 plants operating in Mexico. Further, General 
Motors made foreign production agreements with firms in South Korea, a country known
y yfor suppressing trade union influence.
American workers felt the impact o f the international expansion of General 
Motors and Ford. Employment in the automobile industry dropped 25% between 1978 
and 1989 as a result o f a trend o f operational restructuring. In addition, General Motors 
cut its American hourly workforce by more than 45% from 1980 to the early 1990s.23 
Like the other industries which have internationalized, American workers were forced to 
reevaluate their labor skills and find work elsewhere.
RISE OF THE TERTIARY SECTOR
As the American manufacturing sector began to internationalize its industries and 
operations, the service, or tertiary sector, gained ground in the United States. The tertiary 
sector includes teachers, civil servants, hotel workers, lawyers, doctors, journalists,
20 Dicken, Global Shift, 290.
21 James Zajac, "Getting the Welcome Carpet," Forbes July 18, 1993, 276.
y y  • »Marc Baldwin, "Disastrous Job Losses in Michigan," Dissent (Spring 1987): 152.
23 Dicken, Global Shift, 306.
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scientists, and workers in the leisure industry, especially actors, artists, and athletes. 
Hughes and Cain attribute the rise o f the tertiary sector to increased productivity among 
developed nations. “ {T]he typical pattern o f industrial development among the advanced 
nations has been characterized by rising productivity that leads to a reduction in the 
number o f persons employed in the primary sector and a tapering off o f the proportion of 
the labor force employed in the secondary sector,” they argue. “In some sense, these jobs 
have been replaced by a massive expansion of the tertiary sector.”24 These service sector 
jobs may not completely replace manufacturing jobs, as many o f them offer lower pay 
and fewer benefits. And, it is important to remember in this study that service sector jobs 
range from highly specialized experts in the fields o f medical technology to housemaids 
and valet services. The Bureau o f Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau has only 
recently begun to differentiate the categories o f service sector employment. 
Notwithstanding, Table 1.2 details the sectoral division of the civilian labor force from 
1900 to 2013. There is a steady increase in tertiary employment and a continual decline 
in the primary sector, those industries involved in extraction and the lower stages of 
production. The secondary sector includes manufacturing employment, which decreased 
from 1950 onward. This data defines the tertiary sector in a way that only includes the 
civilian labor force. Therefore, it excludes unskilled labor, all transport workers, all 
construction workers, and the military forces. The data show the doubling o f the tertiary 
sector in the twentieth century. Real per capita income increased fourfold from 1900 to 
1990, and industrial production and agricultural output rose the same. But, employment
24 Jonathan Hughes and Louis P. Cain, American Economic History (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley, 1998), 536.
25 Ibid., 542.
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in primary and secondary production declined from around 70% to less than 30% of the 
entire labor force. Had transport and construction workers been added to the data, 
tertiary employment would be above 75% of the entire labor force. Figure 1.2 below 
gives a graphical representation o f the employment trends.
Table 1.2: Sectoral Division of the Civilian Labor Force as Percentage of Total 
Employment
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary
1900 37.5 35.8 23.6
1910 30.9 38.2 28.5
1920 27.0 40.2 31.1
1930 21.2 39.6 39.2
1940 17.4 39.8 42.8
1950 11.9 41.0 47.1
1960 6.4 39.5 54.1
1970 3.1 36.6 60.3
1980 2.8 31.7 65.6
1990 2.6 26.5 70.9
2000 2.4 23.4 74.2
2010 2.2 19.1 78.7
2013 2.1 18.4 79.5
{Source: Historical Statistics o f the United States, series D 233-682; Statistical Abstract 
o f the United States, 1995, Table 652.)
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Figure 1.2: Sectoral Division of the Civilian Labor Force
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(Source: Historical Statistics o f the United States, series D 233-682; Statistical Abstract 
o f the United States, 1995, Table 652.)
As the largest manufacturing firms in the United States diversified, internationalized, and 
closed plants in the United States, unemployed workers gradually turned to employment 
in the service sector. This pattern of industrial decline and slow tertiary sector growth 
largely occurred in a specific region of the United States, in which Buffalo, Cleveland, 
and Pittsburgh are located: the “rust belt.”
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THE RUST BELT
The rust belt, a term which gained popularity in the 1980s, describes the region 
that experienced industrial prosperity in the nineteenth and first half o f the twentieth 
centuries in the mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes region. This region bore the brunt o f 
deindustrialization in the United States in the second half o f the twentieth centuries, 
culminating in the 1980s and 1990s. Cities in the rust belt experienced economic decline, 
population loss, and urban decay as a result o f plant closings and stagnant economic 
activity.26
This area had been known as the industrial heartland o f the United States, or the 
“manufacturing belt,” where local economies specialized in large-scale manufacturing of 
medium and heavy industrial and consumer goods.27 The abundance o f paved roads, an 
extensive railroad network, and waterways such as the Great Lakes, tributaries to the 
Mississippi River, and canals made the rust belt region fertile for the growth o f industry 
in the nineteenth century. Iron ore from northern Minnesota and upper Michigan was 
linked with coal from the Appalachian region by an extensive transportation network. As 
a result, cities such as Chicago, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee, Gary, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Youngstown, and Pittsburgh developed. And they continued 
to thrive as cheap labor immigrated from south and eastern Europe. Economic boom
26 Robert W. Crandall, The Continuing Decline o f  Manufacturing in the Rust Belt 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 4.
27 David R. Meyer, "Midwestern Industrialization and the American Manufacturing Belt 
in the Nineteenth Century," Journal o f  Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989).
28 Ted McClelland, Nothin’ But Blue Skies: The Heyday, Hard Times, and Hopes o f  
America's Industrial Heartland (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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periods in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries further fueled industrial 
growth in the rust belt region.
But, as unfavorable economic and social conditions developed in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, rust belt cities found it difficult to adapt. A general decline in the 
steel and iron industry; movement of manufacturing to southeastern states with lower 
labor costs; greater innovation and a decreased need for labor in steelmaking; 
internationalization of American business; and liberalization o f trade policies as a result 
of globalization sabotaged the urban prosperity that rust belt cities enjoyed. They 
experienced population loss, brain drain, a vast reduction in local tax revenues, high 
unemployment, increased crime, declining municipal credit ratings, and deficit spending 
to attempt to regenerate economic activity and continue to supply public goods.29 These 
cities became ghost towns o f their former selves. Their capital machinery and mills had, 
in a sense, turned to “rust.”
The first part o f this chapter has discussed the general decline o f manufacturing in 
the United States and the rust belt region. To form a proper foundation for the study, the 
following summaries briefly explain the rise and fall o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh.
Buffalo, New York
The rise o f Buffalo as an industrial giant at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries had much to do with its location at the convergence 
o f Lake Erie, the Niagara River, and the Buffalo River. These water sources gave
•}Q
See Patricia E. Beeson, "Sources of the Decline of Manufacturing in Large 
Metropolitan Areas," Journal o f  Urban Economics 28, no. 1 (1990).
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Buffalo a network for trade, and Niagara Falls, situated only 30 miles away, later 
provided hydroelectric power to the metropolitan area. The construction o f the Erie 
Canal in 1825 connected Buffalo to the Hudson River in eastern New York and New 
York City. This network enabled raw materials to come to Buffalo for processing or to 
be manufactured into finished products and then to be sent to the Atlantic Ocean and 
beyond.30
Early, Buffalo’s commercial orientation was as a clearinghouse for raw products 
o f the Midwest. Different agricultural goods, mostly grain, flowed through Buffalo to the 
east, the south, and Europe. By 1910, Buffalo had become the largest grain port in the 
world. The grain trade evolved into a burgeoning brewing industry, which, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, claimed 19 independently owned breweries in the city, producing 
over 750,000 barrels o f beer per year.31 Railroads bolstered the brewing industry. As the 
second largest railroad depot in the United States at the beginning o f the twentieth 
century, Buffalo had seven direct lines which connected the city to six east coast cities, 
six direct lines to the west to Chicago, Kansas City, Omaha, and St. Louis, and two direct 
lines to Pittsburgh, the steel giant. Also by 1910, Buffalo emerged as one o f the largest 
transshipment cities in the country. The discovery o f large deposits o f iron ore on the 
shores o f Lake Superior led to the building o f larger ships and the widening o f the Sault
30 Diana Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f  
Buffalo, New York (Amherst: Prometheus, 2006), 25.
31 Mark Goldman, City on the Edge: Buffalo, New York (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 
2007), 38.
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Sainte Marie canal to accommodate the increased flow of material to Buffalo. In the 
early 1900s, Buffalo had a diversified and healthy economy.32
Because o f the confluence of raw materials at Buffalo, specifically iron and coal, 
a steel and manufacturing industry developed that soon rivaled that o f Pittsburgh. In 
1910, more than 10,000 people worked in over 150 iron and steel factories in Buffalo. 
Most o f these were small plants scattered throughout the neighborhoods. The exception 
was the Lackawanna plant, which had 6,000 workers. There were an additional 3,600 
workers in the automobile industry, 3,400 railroad car manufacturing and repair, and 
1,800 in copper manufacturing, which was a primary material in beer barrels. 
Manufacturing output was high, and unemployment was low.33
The steel and manufacturing industry in Buffalo owed much of its success to the 
power generated by Niagara Falls. With Nikola Tesla’s design, George Westinghouse 
created an illumination system for the city o f Niagara Falls in 1883. Within a decade and 
a half, Buffalo became part o f the power grid, lighting up city streets and keeping mills 
open throughout the night.34
The decline o f industry in Buffalo occurred after World War II. The military’s 
need for steel during the two world wars created an artificially high demand that abruptly 
came to an end in the late 1940s and 1950s. By the early 1960s, signals o f decline 
became evident. In the two decades between 1960 and 1980, the rate o f growth in overall
32 Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f  Buffalo, 
New York, 26.
33 Goldman, City on the Edge: Buffalo, New York, 37.
34 Ibid.
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employment in the two-county metropolitan statistical area o f Buffalo (Erie and Niagara 
counties) was only 1.3%, with a 21% loss in manufacturing jobs.35
While most observers blame the decline on the opening o f the St. Lawrence 
Seaway in 1959 and the loss o f the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s, historian Diana 
Dillaway attributes the decay to three additional developments: the loss o f home-owned 
industries and corporate headquarters; militant labor demands and high wages; and the 
destructive effects o f leading political and economic organizations’ fight for power in the 
city.36
The diversification that characterized early twentieth century Buffalo transformed 
into an economy heavily concentrated in steel and related industries by the middle o f the 
century. By the 1940s, the economy in Buffalo was susceptible to changes in the steel 
industry. The aging plants and equipment that ran Buffalo’s mills encountered 
competition from international firms, which used new and more efficient technologies.
In 1971, Bethlehem Steel laid off 9,000 workers, half o f its employees. Seven years later, 
the company cut an additional 3,300 jobs. In 1980, the Bethlehem Steel Foundry closed, 
and a year later, Bethlehem closed its 12-inch bar mill and lime plant. The final blow 
was the closing of Bethlehem’s basic steelmaking plant, leaving only 1,500 workers still 
with jobs to keep the bar and galvanizing mills and coke factory running. Republic Steel 
quickly followed, closing its South Park plant, leaving 2,500 workers unemployed. From 
1970 to 1984, Buffalo lost nearly 70,000 jobs in steel and related industries.37
35 Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f  Buffalo, 
New York, 26, 58.
36 Ibid., 26-27.
37 Ibid., 33.
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Manufacturing declined by 40.6% and the service sector gained by 58.8% in the same 
time period.
Cleveland, Ohio
Like Buffalo, Cleveland owed its industrial development to its advantageous 
geographical location. Located at the mouth o f the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie, the 
city served as a Great Lakes port as well as the northern transportation depot between the 
lake and the Ohio River. The American Civil War gave Cleveland its first production 
exercise, as war material was in high demand and the city was isolated from the
T O
battlegrounds yet connected to the North by rail. War blockade of the Mississippi River 
redirected trade to the Great Lakes, and higher taxes and the increased cost o f raw 
materials from abroad made iron-ore from Lake Superior more attractive. Employment 
in the iron industry in Cleveland grew six-fold between the beginning and the end of the 
Civil War.39 And, the city also produced other material to aid the war effort such as 
knitted goods, uniforms, meat, and produce. Civil War demand jumpstarted an industrial 
economy in Cleveland.
Industrial prominence came between 1870 and the late 1920s, when industrial 
entrepreneurs capitalized on the region’s natural resource endowments and locational 
advantage for transportation. In 1870, the city had 92,000 residents and was ranked 
fifteenth in population o f American cities. Iron manufacturing and petroleum processing
T O
Carol Poh Miller and Robert A. Wheeler, "Cleveland: The Making and Remaking o f an 
American City," in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, eds. W. Dennis Keating, Norman 
Krumholz, and David C. Perry (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1995), 31, 36.
39 Ibid., 36.
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became the center o f the industrial economy. Fourteen rolling mills produced 400 tons of 
finished iron daily, and the petroleum industry was fed by plants making sulfuric acid, 
hydrochloric acid, soda ash, and other chemicals. In 1870, thanks to the completion o f a 
pipeline linking Cleveland to oil fields in Pennsylvania, the city refined two million 
barrels o f petroleum. John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company and other refining 
firms sprung up across the city. Further diversifying the Cleveland economy were 
industries such as lumber and woodworking, railroad machinery and repair, wire, 
clothing, engines, paper, and shipbuilding, which expanded rapidly in the 1880s and 
rivaled only Philadelphia in the industry.40
The turn o f the twentieth century saw Cleveland as one o f the world’s leading 
manufacturing centers. Population growth fueled the growth o f iron and steel mills, 
foundries and machine shops, meat packing plants, and automobile, clothing, and paint 
and varnish factories. Largely as a result o f immigration from southern and eastern 
Europe, the city’s population nearly doubled in the decade between 1900 and 1910, from 
381,768 to 560,663.41 And until 1930, the increased population helped the automobile 
industry blossom.
By 1930, Cleveland had become the sixth largest urban area in the United 
States 42 But the year marked the beginning of the end of Cleveland industry. The onset 
o f the Great Depression forced Cleveland’s economy into a fight for survival. In just
40 Edward W. Hill, "The Cleveland Economy: A Case Study of Economic Restructuring," 
in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, eds. W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and 
David C. Perry (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1995), 37, 39; Miller and Wheeler, 
"Cleveland: The Making and Remaking of an American City," 56.
41 Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 40.
42 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 56.
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over a year, the hurting economy left over 100,000 workers without jobs. Tax revenues 
dried, and individuals demanded simple goods such as food, clothing, and shelter. World 
War II gave the declining economy a temporary respite. Factories found use in making 
planes, tanks, trucks, artillery, bombs, binoculars, and telescopes for the war effort. The 
region also enjoyed a renewed diversification in the production o f machine tools, 
electrical goods, and metal products. Economic conditions seemed to be rebounding.43
It was not long after the war ended, though, that the region’s economy would 
continue on its declining path. The central business district and city neighborhoods were 
crumbling and crime was worsening. Residents began moving out o f the city in favor of 
the suburbs. The exodus would continue consistently for another half century. Between 
1960 and 1970, the city lost more than 125,000 people. The early 1970s saw a yearly 
drop of over 20,000 residents. With the population went economic activity. Nearly 
130,000 jobs left the city from 1958 to 1977, most o f them manufacturing in heavy 
industry44 Wartime industrial activity faded into an exodus o f both residents and 
sustainable production.
The economic slide culminated in the city government’s default on its debts. On 
December 15, 1978, Cleveland became the first city in the country since the Great 
Depression to default, when it was unable to repay $14 million in short-term notes.45 
Persistent and large-scale unemployment coupled with the loss o f city residents shrunk 
the tax base, and prior efforts to increase taxes failed. The default became the beacon for
43 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 57; Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 40, 42.
44 Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 43-45.
45 Ibid., 45.
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the industrial decay that swept through the area in the following decade. Westinghouse’s 
plant, which opened in 1890, closed in 1979, and all lighting manufacturing in Cleveland 
halted in 1982. General Electric moved much of its operations offshore, closing six 
factories in the region. The Midland-Ross Company, which produced automobile 
chassis, ran 19 divisions, consisting o f 57 plants in 1969. The company was sold in 1986, 
and, the next year, its headquarters relocated. The Harris Corporation, a 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer, moved its headquarters to Florida, ending 
an 85 year connection with Cleveland. And, USX closed its Cleveland plant, and LTV 
made significant layoffs. The prominent plants and factories that kept Cleveland workers 
employed and created wealth for the region shut down or were relocated.46
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Like Buffalo and Cleveland, Pittsburgh owed its industrial beginnings to its 
geographical location. Pittsburgh’s three rivers, the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio, 
provided a network of transportation routes and a natural assembly line, where mills 
could be place strategically at different points on the rivers. The region’s natural factor 
endowments in iron ore, limestone, and, especially, coal made Pittsburgh a fertile 
location for a budding steel industry to thrive. Even though other steel cities such as 
Chicago lay closer to the iron ore fields o f Lake Superior, the low-sulfur coal necessary 
to keep Illinois mills running had to be shipped from the coke region in Pennsylvania. It 
was cheaper for Pittsburgh to import iron ore than for Chicago to ship coal.47
46 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 58, 60.
47 John P. Hoerr, And the W olf Finally Came: The Decline o f  the American Steel Industry 
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 84-85.
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But, factor endowments and transportation advantages do not in themselves 
translate into industrial growth. It took Andrew Carnegie and the men around him to 
transform Pittsburgh into the workshop of the world. By the 1870s, small mills had been 
in operation on the rivers in Pittsburgh, producing various iron products. And, Andrew 
Carnegie had already become a successful entrepreneur, owning iron furnaces and rolling 
mills. When he realized he might lose his railroad customers to producers o f steel rails, 
he joined other businessmen in building the Edgar Thomson Works, about eight miles 
south o f Pittsburgh on the Monongahela River. From there, Carnegie continued to 
expand, both internally and through buying out competitors. By building two blast 
furnaces at Edgar Thomson in the late 1870s, he was able to integrate iron and 
steelmaking processes under one roof. In 1883, Carnegie bought a small plant, two miles 
down the Monongahela River from Pittsburgh, in Homestead. The Homestead Works 
would eventually become the largest plant in the “Mon Valley.”48
Molten iron was supplied to the Homestead furnaces by several blast furnaces 
across the Monongahela at the Carrie Furnaces. Carnegie bought out a competing firm 
and acquired the newly built Duquesne Works to relieve competitive pressure on the river. 
By 1890, Carnegie had a steel chain lining the Monongahela, with Edgar Thompson, 
Homestead, the Duquesne Works, and the Carrie and Lucy Furnaces serving as the core 
of his holdings. Together with Henry Clay Frick, Carnegie eventually took greater 
advantage o f the coal fields that lay in southwestern Pennsylvania, connecting the rich
48 Jonathan Rees, "Homestead in Context: Andrew Carnegie and the Decline o f the 
Amalgamated Association o f Iron and Steel Workers," Pennsylvania History 64, no. 4 
(Autumn 1997): 514-19.
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coal supply via railroad and rivers to the largest concentration o f steel mills in the 
world.49
Through horizontal as well as vertical integration, Carnegie and Frick created a 
monolith that made Pittsburgh the most prominent manufacturing center in the United 
States. By 1911, Pittsburgh possessed an expansive railroad network, over 27 miles of 
harbor, intensive river traffic in excess of nine million tons per year, and a significant 
bulk o f American industrial output: 24% of pig iron; 34% of Bessemer steel; 44% of 
open-hearth steel; 53% of crucible steel; 24% of steel rails; and 59% of structural 
shapes.50 The height o f U.S. Steel came in the late 1940s, when the corporation 
employed nearly 60,000 workers. Including Jones and Laughlin, Pittsburgh Steel, and 
other companies’ workers, over 80,000 people in the Monongahela River valley made 
their income directly from steelmaking. Forty years later, that number would dwindle to 
a mere 4,000.51
In Pittsburgh’s Golden Age, the years between 1870 and 1920, the city’s 
population grew nearly sevenfold. The growth had much to do with large-scale 
immigration from southern and eastern Europe. Immigrants sought work in the factories, 
mills, and mines, bringing with them their traditions, languages, and cultures. Densely 
inhabited ethnic neighborhoods sprang up on hillsides and in valleys. Like Buffalo and
49 Les Standiford, Meet You in Hell: Andrew Carnegie, Henry Clay Frick, and the Bitter 
Partnership That Transformed America (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 52.
50 “Pittsburg,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, 1911.
51 Hoerr, And the W olf Finally Came, 91.
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Cleveland, a cheap labor force ensured the viability of industry in the early years of the 
twentieth century.
Also similar to the Buffalo and Cleveland cases, the world wars created 
temporary demands for steel, which kept the mills running through the 1940s. Pittsburgh 
produced 95 million tons o f steel for the Allies during World War II.53 After the war, 
Mayor David L. Lawrence teamed with banking leader Richard King Mellon to clean up 
the smoke-filled skies, eradicate environmental degradation, and organize the industrial 
jungle o f railroads and factories that had become downtown Pittsburgh.54 The Pittsburgh 
Renaissance, as it was called, cleared the skies and made the city a more livable place to 
reside. But, as soon as the paint dried on the massive urban renewal program, the steel 
industry faced serious decline. Mayor Lawrence left office in 1959, the same year that 
the first crack in the industrial shell appeared. It came in the form of a 116-day, 
industry-wide, steel strike, during which imported steel found its way onto American 
markets. Foreign steel would continue to undermine American manufacturing until 
Pittsburgh steel collapsed, bankrupting 29 companies.55
52 John Bodnar, "Immigration, Kinship, and the Rise of the Working-Class Realism in 
Industrial America," Journal o f  Social History 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1980): 45.
53 Beverly S. Bunch and Robert P. Strauss, "Municipal Consolidation: An Analysis o f the 
Financial Benefits for Fiscally Distressed Small Municipalities," Urban Affairs Review 
27, no. 4 (June 1992): 616.
54 Sabina Detrick, "The Post Industrial Revitalization o f Pittsburgh: Myths and 
Evidence," Community Development Journal 34, no. 1 (1999): 6.
55 William S. Dietrich, "A Very Brief History o f Pittburgh: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of 
the City That Built America," Pittsburgh Quarterly (Fall 2008), at 
http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Region/a-very-brief-history-of- 
pittsburgh.html.
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Pittsburgh’s mills kept producing steel after the 1959 strike, and some Pittsburgh- 
based companies were even expanding capacity. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the most 
important market was light sheet steel for appliances and automobiles. Expansion was 
better served in the Midwest rather in the Pittsburgh area. Steel fell off in the 1980s, 
when over 75% of the steel-making capacity o f Pittsburgh was shut down. In the 
Pittsburgh area, 60,000 jobs were lost in primary metals, with another 50,000 in other 
manufacturing. In the years between 1980 and 1986, the nation lost six percent of 
manufacturing jobs. Pittsburgh lost 44%.56 After 1984, most o f the damage had been 
done, but manufacturing job losses continued. The crack from the 1959 steel strike had 
broken wide open.
The reasons for deindustrialization in the Pittsburgh area are many the same as 
those for Buffalo and Cleveland: foreign competition, high labor costs, poor management, 
and the overall reduction in the demand for steel as a result of technological advance in 
plastics and other materials. The steel industry in the United States developed almost 
entirely as a domestic industry and continued to strengthen throughout the world wars 
and in export markets in reconstructing postwar Europe. Steel production increased by 
45% in the 1940s, 15% more than global production. And in 1950, almost half of the 
world’s steel output came from the United States.57 Even though wages in the United 
States were high, intense worker productivity guaranteed a low price for steel and
56 Dale A. Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice? The Politics o f  Deindustrialization in 
Pittsburgh (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 27.
57 Steel Panel Committee on Technology and International Economic and Trade Issues, 
The Competitive Status o f  the U.S. Steel Industry: A Study o f  the Influences o f  Technology 
in Determining International Industrial Competitive Advantage (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1985), 70.
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impressive returns. Further, the relationship between steel management and the United 
Steelworkers o f America solidified over a trade between periodic wage increases and a 
no-strike clause. Management kept the mills running while steel workers were able to 
enjoy a middle-class lifestyle.58
The late 1960s changed this pattern. American manufacturing, the steel industry 
in particular, gave way to internationalization and lost its hold on global markets.
Foreign steel revealed the problems associated with the high cost o f American labor. In 
1985, labor made up 25% of the cost of American steelmaking, where as in Japan, South 
Korea, and Brazil, costs were 11.7%, 5.5%, and 8.0%, respectively.59 Part o f the 
difference in steelmaking costs were offset by high worker productivity in the United 
States and the cost of shipping. But, they did not offset the costs completely, which 
resulted in cheaper steel from abroad.
Added to the burden o f high labor costs was poor management o f domestic 
manufacturing firms. The steel industry was built around a few very large companies, 
which were able to influence the price o f steel in the absence of foreign competition. The 
absence of competition allowed corporations to be less than perfect in management 
decisions. But, the American oligopoly could not prevent competition from placing 
downward pressure on prices. Until foreign competitors entered the market, steel leaders 
placed little value in modernizing manufacturing facilities. Meanwhile, foreign firms 
were building new and high-tech plants. Not until the 1970s did American companies 
realize how far behind in the modernization o f production facilities they were. By 1975,
58 Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice?, 31.
59 Ibid., 34.
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the United States still produced about 20% of its steel in open-hearth furnaces, which 
were significantly less efficient than energy-efficient continuous casters. At the same 
time, Japan was only producing 1.1% of its steel through the open-hearth method.60 
Pittsburgh steel factories began to modernize too late and were never able to compete 
effectively.
The final significant reason for steel’s downfall was changes in demand. The 
energy crisis of the early 1970s and new federal regulations sent automobile 
manufacturers to seek innovative, lighter, and alternative materials for making cars more 
fuel-efficient. Cars were designed smaller and steel was largely replaced with plastic or 
fiberglass.61 And the increased popularity in foreign automobiles shifted the demand for 
domestic steel to steel made in foreign, automobile-manufacturing, countries. 
Furthermore, small changes such as the shift from steel to aluminum cans and plastic 
bottles made large impressions on the demand for steel. Steel consumption as a 
percentage of GDP declined 45% between 1970 and 1985. Steel simply was not as
(s ')intensively used as it had been.
The three rust belt cities experienced similar rises and declines in industrial 
prowess, ultimately met by struggles to post-industrialize. The similarities in historical 
experiences make the differences in economic recovery surprising. Evaluating and
60 Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice?, 37; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological 
Transformation o f  Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 126.
61 B. Dan Kamp, John L. Crompton, and David M. Hensarling, "The Reactions of 
Travelers to Gasoline Rationing and to Increases in Gasoline Prices," Journal o f  Travel 
Research 18, no. 1 (July 1979): 37.
Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice?, 38.
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comparing these post-industrial transformations provides insights into the changing 
nature o f cities, how regional economies evolve, and the local effects o f economic 
globalization.
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This study contains eight chapters, inclusive of this introduction. Chapter two 
reviews the relevant literature on post-industrialism and globalization; local and regional 
development; economic geography; endogenous growth and entrepreneurship; and 
institutions and economic growth.
Chapter three explains the research design of analyzing the three cases and 
comparing them. This study follows the theoretical framework o f liberal institutionalism, 
which posits that production is the driver o f economic expansion. This is possible 
through liberal institutions and a free market economy. In addition, liberal institutions 
value the importance o f private property protection.
Chapter four evaluates to what extent the cases have fulfilled the characteristics of 
the post-industrial economy. These are: change from a goods-producing to service 
economy; the growing importance of human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar 
work and increase in importance of professional labor; and the centrality o f ideas in 
economic growth. Numerous indicators are examined for each characteristic, ultimately 
revealing that Pittsburgh has performed best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo has 
performed worst in most.
Chapters five, six, and seven test my three hypotheses, respectively. The first 
hypothesizes a negative correlation between the level of post-industrial redevelopment
31
and regulatory burden. The second hypothesizes a positive correlation between the level 
of post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service sector prior to 
deindustrialization. The third hypothesizes a positive correlation between post-industrial 
redevelopment and capital accumulation. Ultimately, the data show positive correlations 
between all three independent variables and the dependent variable, post-industrial 
revitalization.
Chapter eight concludes the study with a review o f the findings and implications 
for similar post-industrial cities such as Sheffield, England; Newcastle, New South Wales, 
Australia; and Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. The conclusions drawn from this study imply 
that regulatory burden, size of service sector, and capital accumulation have played 
significant roles in the post-industrialization of Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh and 
likely will have the same effect outside the United States.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
To understand the relevance o f this study and put it in its proper context, a review 
of the literature is necessary. Because o f the interdisciplinary nature o f comparative 
studies, there is a wide range o f themes that interconnect while exploring post­
industrialism in cities and regions. The following overview will address the key 
empirical investigations and theoretical discourses o f the market-driven phenomena of 
post-industrialism and globalization; local and regional development; economic 
geography; endogenous growth and entrepreneurship; and institutions and economic 
growth. Following these economic processes are studies on public policy and the role of 
local governments in urban development.
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, POST-INDUSTRIALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION
Observing the process o f post-industrialization in western economies forms the 
foundation for understanding development and regeneration. Understanding post­
industrialization is difficult without knowledge o f deindustrialization. Rowthom (1986)1 
posits three explanations for deindustrialization in Britain: the Maturity Thesis, the Trade 
Specialization Thesis, and the Failure Thesis. The Maturity Thesis involves both the 
processes o f production and patterns of consumption. Technological advance and 
increased expertise in production management have bolstered manufacturing productivity
1 Bob Rowthom, "De-industrialization in Britain," in The Geography o f  
Deindustrialisation, eds. Ron L. Martin and Bob Rowthom (London: Macmillan, 1986).
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since the 1960s. Conversely, services have seen little productivity gain apart from 
domestic technology. Purchased services remain highly labor intensive, and, in some 
sectors, particularly in biomedicine, technological advance can lead to greater labor 
intensity. Technological development in health care is especially uneven. Bio-analyses 
can now be performed by a semi-skilled technician with the help o f electronic equipment, 
instead o f skilled labor. Nursing, however, has become more complex in the areas of 
intensive care and mental health. Consumption patterns reinforce the service industries. 
With greater disposable income comes the ability to spend more on services as opposed 
to food, shelter, and manufactured goods.
The Maturity Thesis describes developed economies as evolving as a result of 
their success. Rowthom and Ramaswamy (1997) offer a description:
deindustrialization is primarily a feature o f successful economic 
development and.. .North South trade has very little to do with it.
Measured in real terms, the share o f domestic expenditure on 
manufactured goods has been comparatively stable over the last two 
decades. Consequently, deindustrialization is principally the result o f 
higher productivity in manufacturing than in services. The pattern o f trade 
specialization among the advanced economies explains why some 
countries deindustrialize faster than others.2
The Trade Specialization Thesis derives from the Ricardian model o f comparative 
advantage. The market forms an economic equilibrium from the spatial ordering o f 
productive processes. The “invisible hand,”3 in Smith’s terminology, creates situations in 
which deindustrialization occurs in one area because o f increased specialization and 
efficiency in another. Rowthom and Ramaswamy continue: “deindustrialization
2 Robert Rowthom and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization - Its Causes and 
Implications (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997), 1-2.
3 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976).
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manifestly has not occurred in a social or spatial vacuum. It is not simply a mono-causal 
economic mechanism with undifferentiated social and geographical consequences, but 
rather a diverse set o f complex processes affecting different localities in different
ways...
Closely related to the Trade Specialization Thesis is the Failure Thesis. Rowthom 
defined the Failure Thesis for the United Kingdom in terms of weak relative performance 
of the manufacturing industry against international competition from the 1960s to the 
1980s. These failures include poor manufacturing management as well as governmental 
mishandling o f the macroeconomy. British deindustrialization o f the early 1980s 
coincided with an artificial overvaluation of the pound, discouraging exports and 
encouraging imports, especially in the textile industry. These accounts of failure, 
however, speak to localized events and not to general tendencies in the international 
economy.5
The term “post-industrial” indicates a change in the nature o f employment. 
“Industrial” refers to traditional forms of wage-labor conducted in the factory system: 
namely, producing material goods.6 Although first used by Indian cultural reformer A.K. 
Coomaraswamy,7 the term “post-industrial” became popularized by Daniel Bell in 1973.8
4 Rowthom, "De-industrialization in Britain," vii.
5 Ibid., viii.
6 David Byrne, Understanding the Urban (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 28.
7 Douglas V. Shaw, "The Post-Industrial City," in Handbook o f  Urban Studies, ed. Ronan 
Paddison (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001), 285.
8 Daniel Bell, The Coming o f  the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973).
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Post-industrialism to Bell included five elements: the change from a goods-producing to 
service economy; the predominance of the professional and technical class; the centrality 
o f theoretical knowledge as the source o f innovation and policy formulation; the planning 
and control o f technology and technological growth; and the creation o f a new 
“intellectual technology.”9 The year 1956 was pivotal for Bell. “For the first time in the 
history o f industrial civilization,” he noted, the number of white collar workers had 
exceeded the number of blue collar workers. He also observed that the largest growth in 
white collar workers was in professional and technical fields, which required at least 
some post-secondary education. Behind this group were scientists and engineers, which 
bolster the new knowledge-based society that Bell posited. Bell defined the difference 
between industrial and post-industrial societies: “Industrial society is the coordination of 
machines and men for the production o f goods. Post-industrial society is organized 
around knowledge, for the purpose o f social control and the directing o f innovation and 
change; and this in turn gives rise to new social relationships and new structures, which 
have to be managed politically.”10 Bell’s formulation of the post-industrial society 
introduced a new concept to social scientific inquiry.
While many economies began to post-industrialize, the world economy underwent 
a series o f changes that had lasting effects on cities that were capable of benefiting from a 
more internationalized economic order. The late twentieth century saw a growth of 
multinational corporations, freer flow of capital between countries and regions, new 
investment instruments for facilitating this capital flow, and the movement of
9 Ibid., 14.
10 Ibid., 20.
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manufacturing from developed nations to lesser developed and peripheral areas o f the 
world, which provided lower manufacturing costs." These changes resulted in the 
expansion of economic relations beyond national borders and the reduction o f the power 
o f national governments to direct their internal economies and shape the manner in which 
domestic economies interact with each other.12
These new global patterns o f trade and investment have affected urban networks. 
Many cities faced deindustrialization in the 1970s, but those who were positioned to take 
advantage of the emerging global economic order grew in commercial importance and 
economic power. These successful urban centers, termed “global cities” by Sassen 
(1991),13 are locations in which decisions are made that affect economic and 
technological developments in far-reaching areas o f the world. The “spatially dispersed, 
yet globally integrated,” world economy that Sassen observed demanded specialized 
producer services in the fields of law, banking, and finance.14 In four ways, cities play a 
major role in the provision of these services: “first, as highly concentrated command 
points in the organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and 
for specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic 
sectors; third, as sites o f production, including the production o f innovations, in these 
leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced.”15
11 Shaw, "The Post-Industrial City," 286.
12 Ibid.
13 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991).
14 Ibid., 3.
15 Ibid., 3-4.
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Only a limited number o f urban centers were able to provide consistent work that 
a large quantity o f highly trained and highly paid specialists demanded. The post­
industrial economy increasingly demanded specialized services at “command points” 
such as New York City, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. These cities and their 
metropolitan areas experienced expansion in both corporate headquarters employment 
and in services that multinational corporations required to expand their global reach.16 
Sassen posited that the global cities of New York City, London, and Tokyo constituted a 
new form of post-industrial urban development. She predicted that cities that could adapt 
to the demands o f a new age o f service-oriented industry would develop in similar ways 
and could run counter to the domestic and international interests o f home states. These 
three cities, Sassen observed, were home to an increasing concentration o f financial 
services. These cities would only grow in importance as the global economy became 
increasingly integrated and the demand for specialized services expanded.
Sassen added that the post-industrial economy has rearranged the distribution of 
opportunity and income in global cities. Industrial cities saw middle class wages being 
paid to factory laborers, who have since been pushed into lower paying service jobs or 
completely out of the workforce. Service professionals, on the other hand, earn lucrative 
salaries, annual bonuses, and benefits. The middle class is eroding while the income gap 
widens between the well-paid and the working poor. Sassen describes this post-industrial 
urban environment as a dual city, in which the rich and poor are driven apart spatially and
16 Ibid., 19-34.
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economically. For Sassen, then, the post-industrial city contains the seeds of social 
decay.17
Whereas Sassen postulated that optimal productivity came from the shift from 
goods to services, Castells (1996)18 points to information processes. Cities like Paris and 
Tokyo will not follow the same paths as New York in London because the information 
economy does not incorporate the concept of the service economy. For Castells, the 
development of technology explains the changes in the organization o f production 
management and its effect on state institutions. The rapid development o f information 
technology coincides with the development o f the network society, consisting of 
interconnected nodes. His network society is constructed around a large network of 
global capital flows. Sassen’s “global cities” can only be identified in Castells’ analysis 
as central junctions in networks.
Castells’ technological approach distinguishes between modes o f production and 
modes o f development when relating to sources o f new social forms and processes.19 
The accumulation o f knowledge and technological development are at the core o f the 
development of information, which differs from industrialization. Industrialization 
concerns itself mostly with maximizing output. Castells posits three characteristics of 
new information technology: production output is information-based, the most important 
innovations are process-related rather than product-related, and the process-related
17 Ibid., 3-167.
1 fi Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise 
o f  the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
19 Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic 
Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
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approach causes a shift in social relations because o f greater flexibility in the 
organization o f production. This information age has coupled itself with modem 
capitalism to form a network society.
Aside from the interplay o f Sassen and Castells is Lovering’s (1997)20 
explanation o f the Simple Story, where the global determines everything. According to 
the Simple Story,
the problems of the great industrial cities are rooted in Britain’s century 
long decline from being ‘the workshop of the world.’ Industries have 
disappeared into oblivion under the impact o f technological change.. .or 
moved to cheaper workforces elsewhere...Newly industrializing countries, 
with cheaper labour and new factories, will continue to take over the 
production o f consumer goods, moving up-market from low-to-high-tech 
products. The global mobility o f capital, including the growth of multi­
national corporations, has increased this likelihood, making it easier to 
transfer work to cheaper labour areas abroad. Britain’s cities have ceased 
to be centres o f production. The more fortunate amongst them have 
become instead centres o f consumption and administration. Out with 
factories, in with offices, shopping malls and clubland.21
Lovering explains post-industrialism as a transnational and spatial organization of 
capitalist interests in cheap areas to maximize profits. Massey (1984)22 added that large 
corporations go beyond merely seeking the best locations for production. They 
systematically locate their supply chain at separate and particular places. Global cities 
are often part o f this network in which to hold the headquarters. Design engineering can 
be in another location. And mass production will be in others.
20 John Lovering, "Global Restructuring and Local Impact," in Britain's Cities, ed. 
Michael Paccione (London: Routledge, 1997).
21 Ibid., 68.
Doreen Massey, Spatial Divisions o f  Labour (London: Edward Arnold, 1984).
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Ravetz (2000) lists a number of transitions that characterize the post-industrial 
environment. The first is globalization: there exists greater integration of investment, 
production, trade, and consumption. The second is connectivity: global networks are 
achieved through information and communication technology, the media, and 
international travel. The third is post-Fordism: earlier and more stable economic, social, 
and political structures are dissolving. And the fourth is exclusion: new patterns of 
polarization, unemployment, and dependency affect large sections o f the population.
These patterns are in a state of continuous unraveling, making cities always in a state of 
becoming.
Prager and Thisse (2012)24 describe post-industrialism as the “entrepreneurial 
knowledge-based economy.” Even though manufacturing is still important, business 
services are the main drivers o f OECD economies, accounting for 60-80% of value added. 
Prager and Thisse look to high value-added services, such as banking, which no longer 
require local contact with the customer base. Instead, greater standardization is appearing, 
and these services can often be provided remotely. They add that, while economies are 
becoming more globalized, knowledge production is becoming decentralized and 
scattered among specialized entities such as firms and universities. How knowledge is 
produced, disseminated, and utilized has become increasingly scattered, and global 
knowledge networks have emerged, spreading ideas and the capital investment necessary 
to support the development o f them. Simultaneously, Prager and Thisse add, firms have
■y i
Joe Ravetz, City Region 2020: Integrated Planning fo r  a Sustainable Environment 
(London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).
24 Jean-Claude Prager and Jacques-Francois Thisse, Economic Geography and the 
Unequal Development o f  Regions (New York: Routledge, 2012), 54.
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intensified intellectual property competition between each other. Some firms build up 
patent portfolios in order to eventually produce high-technology consumer goods, which 
often require cross-licensing. Dominating a particular market or industry does not simply 
imply becoming the biggest producer. It also entails gaining control o f intangible assets 
and knowledge.
The above review focused on elements of post-industrialism and globalization as 
eras in the evolution o f western economic development. These theories form an 
important context for the case studies: Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Each 
experienced industrial decline, partly as a result o f globalization., and all exemplify the 
above characterization o f post-industrialism. The next section addresses the relevance of 
space, place, and economic geography.
SPACE, PLACE, AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Localities and regions have been historically well-placed to serve as nodal points 
in the movement o f goods and services. Port cities such as Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, 
London, Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, Tokyo, and Singapore have been channels 
through which international trade and human migration have increased the wealth of 
regions and countries. Optimal geographic location has played a large role in economic 
development because of agglomeration mechanisms complemented by effective 
institutions and favorable human capital.25
25 Ibid., 45.
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At its most basic level, economic geography deals with concepts of space and
place. Castells (1973)26 defined space in an urban context. “Space,” he observed,
is a material product, in relation with other material elements -  among 
others, men, who themselves enter into particular social relations, which 
give to space (and to the other elements o f the combination) a form, a 
function, a social signification. It is not, therefore, a mere occasion for the 
deployment o f the social structure, but a concrete expression of each 
historical ensemble in which a society is specified.27
Castells adds that space is not merely a “reflection o f society,” as many argue.28 It is at
the core o f social relationships. Space is also inherently linked to social changes and
processes. “Cities, like all social reality,” Castells argues, “are historical products, not
only in their physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the
social organization and in peoples’ lives... Urban is the social meaning assigned to a
particular social form by a historically defined society.”29 Unlike Castells’ more abstract
notions o f space and place, Lapple (1992)30 refers to place as part o f global space but not
completely included within it. At the local level, place is the actual operations, specific
conditions, and location o f specific social processes in a particular area. Space, then, has
social relevance and thus economic importance.
Economic activity occurs in space. And, a branch of economics deals specifically
with the question o f how economies organize their use o f space: economic geography. In
Manuel Castells, La Question Urbaine (Pans: Maspero, 1973).
27 Ibid., 302.
28 Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), 311.
29 Ibid., 302.
30 Dieter Lapple, "Essay iiber den Raum," in Stadt und Raum, eds. Hartmut Haufiermann, 
Detlev Ipsen, and Thomas Kramer-Badoni (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1992).
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1826, Von Thiinen (1966)31 pioneered this branch with his imagined model o f an isolated 
town supplied by farmers in the surrounding countryside. Two assumptions 
characterized the farms: crops differ in both their yield per acre and their transportation 
costs, and crops were produced at different intensities o f cultivation. His questions, then, 
were how should the land around the town be allocated to minimize the combined costs 
o f producing and transporting a given supply of food to the town, and how will the land 
be allocated if there is an unplanned competition among self-interested farmers and 
landowners?
Von Thiinen concluded that land rent would be higher at closer proximities to the 
town and lower at farther proximities. At farther proximities, however, transportation 
costs increase. Thus, there is a trade-off between land rents and transportation costs. He 
showed that a pattern o f concentric circles of farms around the town would result because 
transportation costs and yields differ among crops. The equilibrium point in von 
Thiinen4 s model is thus where demand meets the supply o f crops produced. The model 
reveals that, even if no farmer knows what any other farmer is going to grow, the result is 
spatially and economically efficient. With each farmer seeking to maximize income, the 
unplanned competition minimizes transportation and production costs. Von Thiinen’s 
model reappeared in the 1960s in Alonso’s (1964)32 work on modem cities, substituting 
commuters for farmers and a central business district for the isolated town. He reached 
the same conclusion as von Thiinen, and Alonso’s “monocentric city model” remains an
31 Johann Heinrich von Thiinen, Der Isolierte Staat in Beziehung a u f Landtschaft und 
Nationaldkonomie (von Thiinen's Isolated State), trans. Carla M. Wartenberg (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1966 [1826]).
32 William Alonso, Location and Land Use (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
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important theoretical framework. Even though the models are clear about land 
distribution, von Thiinen and Alonso simply assume prior existence o f a town or business 
district. Their models have limited use, however, for determining the endogeneity and 
agglomeration of towns or cities themselves.
Theories o f agglomeration find their roots in the concept o f external economies, 
first introduced by Marshall (1920).33 Marshall argued that producing in an industrial 
district was advantageous for three reasons: first, a geographically concentrated industry 
could support specialized local providers o f inputs; second, a concentration of firms 
employing the workers o f the same type would homogenize the labor market, making it 
easier for laborers to find employment and employers to find laborers; and third, 
geographic proximity would promote the spread of information. Marshall’s approach 
outlines the efficiency of industrial concentration. Krugman (1998)34 agrees that 
geographic proximity is crucial to transmit knowledge. “It would not be surprising,” he 
explained,
if it turns out that the market-size effects emphasized by the current 
generation of new geography models are a less important source of 
agglomeration, at least at the level of urban areas, than other kinds o f 
external economies. It is, for example, a well-documented empirical 
regularity that both plants and firms in large cities tend to be smaller than 
those in small cities; this suggests that big cities may be sustained by 
increasing returns that are due to thick labor markets, or to localized 
knowledge spillovers, rather than those that emerge from the interaction o f 
transport costs and scale economies at the plant level.35
•j
Alfred Marshall, Principles o f  Economics, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920).
34 Paul Krugman, "Space: The Final Frontier," Journal o f  Economic Pespectives 12, no. 2 
(1998).
35 Ibid., 172.
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Henderson (1974)36 has constructed a model o f the urban system as a collection of 
cities, seeking to explain the sizes and types of urban areas. Expanding upon the work of 
Mills (1967),37 which discussed the tension between the benefits o f geographic 
concentration o f industry within a city and the costs o f commuting in and around a large 
city, Henderson assumed that cities would be o f optimum size to reflect the equilibrium 
of concentration of industry and transportation costs. He adds, hypothetically, that if  a 
city were too large or there were not enough cities, a profit-making opportunity would 
present itself for entrepreneurs to begin to build a new one in a different location. 
Henderson also explains the differing sizes o f cities. He notes that while external 
economies tend to be specific to particular industries, diseconomies o f scale are largely 
dependent on the size o f a city. There are two consequences to these tendencies. First, 
the diseconomies o f city size make it less advantageous to put industries without mutual 
spillovers in the same city. Henderson contends, then, that each city should specialize in 
a limited number o f industries which generate external economies of scale. And second, 
particular industries create varying levels of external economies, making the size o f each 
city dependent on its role. For Henderson, cities find their optimal sizes by the extent to 
which they create external economies of scale for a particular industry.
Henderson’s analysis speaks to the concepts o f competitive advantage and
38clusters as postulated by Porter (1990; 1998). He posits that competitive advantage in
36 John Vernon Henderson, "The Sizes and Types o f Cities," American Economic Review 
64(1974).
37 Edwin S. Mills, "An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan 
Area," American Economic Review 57 (1967).
38 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f  Nations (New York: Free Press,
1990); Michael E. Porter, On Competition (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 1998).
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sophisticated industries is rarely dependent upon a single variable. If a nation, region, or 
city gains advantages in more than one determinant, self-reinforcing conditions arise in 
which firms can succeed internationally or intra-nationally. This success often occurs 
because o f clustering. Clusters are “geographic concentrations o f interconnected 
companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and 
associated institutions (for example, universities, standards agencies, and trade 
associations) in particular fields that compete but also cooperate.”39 Firms outside of 
clusters fail to take advantage o f spillover effects, which allow firms to more rapidly 
understand buyer needs, new technology, transportation innovation, and actions o f other 
firms. These flows of information within the cluster help to grow business and thus the 
economy by increasing productivity, spurring innovation, and strengthening the cluster. 
Clusters do not necessarily need to be in close physical proximity, but they tend to be. 
Porter adds, “Anything that can be efficiently sourced from a distance, however, has been 
essentially nullified as a competitive advantage in advanced economies. Information and 
relationships that can be accessed and maintained via fax or email are available to 
anyone... Paradoxically, then, the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy 
are often heavily local.”40
In a similar light, Storper (1995)41 sought to explain the reasons that firms and 
economic activity are located in certain places over others. He argued that there was
39 Porter, On Competition, 197-98.
40 Ibid., 236-37.
41 Michael Storper, "The Resurgence o f Regional Economies, Ten Years Later: The 
Region as a Nexus o f Untraded Inter-dependencies," European Urban and Regional 
Studies 2 (1995).
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more to the story than just reduced transaction costs through agglomeration. This new 
era o f value-added and knowledge-driven capitalism requires innovation and information 
to adapt to new consumption patterns. Fordism produced mass quantities for mass 
consumption. Knowledge capitalism involves myriad choices o f brands, colors, sizes, 
and personalities o f consumer products. Storper observes that the specialists in science, 
marketing, production engineering, finance, and human resources drive innovation. The 
knowledge that these innovators possess is often gathered from various channels inside 
and outside the firm, rather than being traded or bought formally. It is territorialized in 
local worlds o f production. These untraded interdependencies among firms and 
innovators, for Storper, are more important than reduced transaction costs. The end 
product must meet the specific designs and demands o f the consumer. Florida (1995)42 
calls these areas of knowledge creation and sharing “learning regions.” These are where 
knowledge and ideas concentrate and form the foundation for regional economic and 
technological organization. Regional competitiveness in the post-Fordist economic era, 
thus, is reliant on knowledge and innovation.
Porter (1980)43 examined the ways firms in cities use this knowledge to compete. 
Specifically, he sought to understand the varying profitability o f different industries and 
discovered that industry structure determines the competitive nature o f the industry. The 
industry structure comes down to five forces: threat o f new entrants; intensity o f rivalry 
among existing competitors; threat o f substitute products; bargaining power of buyers; 
and bargaining power o f suppliers. He also sought to understand how variations in
42 Richard Florida, "Toward the Learning Region," Futures 27, no. 5 (1995): 257.
43 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques fo r  Analyzing Industries and  
Competition (New York: Free Press, 1980).
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profitability within industries come about. His answer is that firms have different ways 
o f assessing the sources o f the five forces and thus have different defenses against them. 
Three general strategies set firms apart from the rest: cost leadership, product 
differentiation, and focus. Porter (1985)44 determined that firms put these strategies into 
practice by creating a unique value to the consumer. For instance, if  a firm provides a 
cost leadership strategy, then the value to the consumer is a lower price. And, for 
differentiation, a unique product is the value. The challenge for the firm is discovering 
the value to the consumer that the firm wants to achieve and relaying this value to the 
consumer. These are the ways in which knowledge, and the transfer o f it, plays a key 
role in economic activity.
Further, Scott (1988)45 outlined three types o f New Industrial Spaces that typify 
modem economic growth. First, New Industrial Districts are dense agglomerations of 
specialized small- and medium-sized firms. Second, High Technology (sunbelt) Areas 
are Silicon Valley-type complexes that house a diverse range of technologies and firms. 
Third, Flexible Production Enclaves are distinct areas o f economic productivity that have 
replaced old industrial areas, such as the film industry o f Los Angeles and the fashion 
industry o f Paris. These three areas have developed, according to Scott, because o f the 
re-agglomeration of production. Flexibility and customization o f products is now driving 
geographic economies o f scale. Producers must continually seek to improve products, 
processes, and methods in developing high value goods in what he labeled the
44 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance (New York: Free Press, 1985).
45 Allen J. Scott, New Industrial Spaces: Flexible Production Organisation and Regional 
Development in North America and Western Europe (London: Pion, 1988).
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“transaction costs thesis.” Rather than firms attempting to meet the demands o f
continuous innovation “in-house,” Scott observed that many firms work together by
expanding their input-output activities. The relationships with other firms must be in
close proximity: “The greater the spatial dispersion of producers,” Scott explained,
the more onerous these costs will be. The immediate consequence is that 
selected sets o f producers with particularly elevated intragroup interaction 
costs will tend to converge around their own geographical centre of 
gravity and thus to engender definite nodes o f economic activity on the 
landscape... Hence, via the play o f centripetal locational adjustment, 
external economies of scale (a non-spatial phenomenon) are eventually 
transmuted into and consumed in the specifically spatial form of 
agglomeration economies.46
As a result of this process, New Industrial Spaces, as economic nodes of
production, appear within the globalizing production system.
Universities also play a role in the interactive learning and innovation process in
these types o f industrial spaces. Brinkhoff, Suwala, and Kulke (2012)47 examine the
significance of proximity in the character of science parks. They offer examples of the
relevance of geographical proximity between universities and business. They find that
geographical location alone is not sufficient to institute strong interdependencies between
universities and businesses. There are four dimensions of proximity that are important:
First, personal relationships between entrepreneurs and scientists are 
fundamental (social proximity). Second research and training at the 
universities must correspond to the businesses’ activities (cognitive 
proximity). Third, the universities have to embody their role as 
“entrepreneurial universities” by adapting to the private sector’s work
46 Ibid., 177.
47 Sascha Brinkhoff, Lech Suwala, and Elmar Kulke, '"What Do You Offer?': 
Interlinkages o f Universities and High-Technology Companies in Science and 
Technology Parks in Berlin and Seville," in Universities, Cities and Regions: Loci fo r  
Knowledge and Innovation Creation, eds. Roberta Capello, Agnieszka Olechnicka, and 
Grzegorz Gorzelak (New York: Routledge, 2012).
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culture (institutional proximity). Finally, support schemes and 
intermediaries also spur the inter-organizational knowledge transfer 
(organization proximity).48
To fulfill these dimensions, the authors recommend that universities adapt their 
work culture, research, and training to their designated entrepreneurial role, as 
well as ensure the convergence of university research and industry clusters.
Location has played an important role in the economies o f Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. The strategic geographic proximity to waterways 
made industrial development successful. These cities must determine the future 
role o f their respective locations and how space and place play into post­
industrialism. The next section will outline the roles of knowledge, innovation, 
and entrepreneurship in spurring development and economic expansion.
THE ROLES OF KNOWLEDGE, INNOVATION, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Knowledge and innovation play key roles in urban development. And, 
endogenous growth theory, which argues that economic growth primarily occurs as a 
result o f endogenous rather than external forces, is a prominent explanation for this 
development. Investment in human capital, innovation, and knowledge play a role in 
economic growth by producing positive externalities and knowledge spillover effects. 
Endogenous growth theory goes beyond neoclassical growth theories by accounting for 
technological change in its models. Schmookler (1966)49 explained that the pace and 
direction o f industrial innovation is largely determined by the expected profitability of
48 Ibid., 140.
49 Jacob Schmookler, Inventions and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1966).
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inventive activity. Thus, modeling technological progress is exceedingly useful. Romer 
(1990)50 pointed out, however, that endogenous models are deficient in their assumption 
that the entire stock o f technological knowledge is a public good. He observed in simple 
daily empirical evidence that new technological knowledge can become partially 
excludable through patenting. Only until Judd (1985)51 was modeling economic growth 
within imperfect competition possible. Romer built off of Judd, which was based on the 
Dixit-Stiglitz model o f monopolistic competition,52 in formulating the first model of 
endogenously determined technical change with imperfectly competing firms. Firms that 
develop new technological knowledge have market power and earn monopoly profits 
through innovation. Romer’s analysis was central to the establishment o f the “new 
theory o f economic growth.”
The new growth theory perceived technological knowledge as a non-rival, 
partially excludable good,53 which deviated from the neoclassical interpretation as an 
entirely public good. Knowledge is characterized as non-rival, because its use by one 
agent does not limit its use by another. In this way, knowledge differs from capital 
equipment, which can only be used in one place at a time. The excludability of 
knowledge speaks to the technological and legal implications o f its use. Patenting 
particular designs or simply keeping secrets limits the use of knowledge. Arrow (1962),
50 Paul M. Romer, "Endogenous Technical Change," Journal o f  Political Economy 98 
(1990).
51 Kenneth Judd, "On the Performance o f Patents," Econometrica 53 (1985).
52  • • •Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity," American Economic Review 67 (1977).
53 Buchanan called non-rivalrous, but excludable goods “club goods.” See James M. 
Buchanan, "An Economic Theory o f Clubs," Economica 32, no. 125 (1965).
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however, explained, “With suitable legal measures, information may become an 
appropriable commodity. Then the monopoly power can indeed be exerted. However, 
no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity o f 
something so intangible as information. The very use o f information in any productive 
way is bound to reveal it, at least in part.”54 But, if  knowledge is only partially 
excludable, research and development produces at least some technological spillover. 
According to Grossman and Helpman (1991), spillovers occur when “firms can acquire 
information created by others without paying for that information in a market transaction, 
and the creators or current owners of the information have no effective recourse, under 
prevailing laws, if  other firms utilize information so acquired.”55 Spillovers can occur 
between highly skilled personnel in different firms or through open labor markets, which 
incite entrepreneurship and innovation. They also tend to occur in the areas that are 
absent o f bureaucratic constraints. In these ways, knowledge is a partially non­
excludable good, which can be both transferred and protected in concentrated commercial 
areas such as cities.
Even if knowledge was an entirely public good, it would be difficult for 
individuals to access it, even in cities. Hayek (1945)56 formulated a model o f the market 
economy as naturally imperfect. No two individuals share the same knowledge or
54 Kenneth Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation o f Resources for Invention," in 
The Rate and Direction o f  Inventive Activity, ed. Richard Nelson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962), 615.
55 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 16.
56 F.A. Hayek, "The Use o f Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35 
(1945).
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information about the economy at any single point in time. This fact ensures that 
knowledge is diffused throughout the economy and is not available to everyone. It is the 
limitability of knowledge that makes profit making opportunities possible and which 
form the basis o f prices as signaling devices. Two entrepreneurial insights can be gained 
from Hayek’s findings: first, opportunities for the production o f goods and services in the 
future is only possible because of the dispersion o f information. Second, this same 
dispersion presents difficulties for taking advantage o f the profit-making opportunity. 
Shane and Vekataraman (2000) explain, accordingly, that the study o f entrepreneurship 
“seeks to understand how opportunities to bring into existence ‘future’ goods and 
services are discovered created, and exploited, by whom and with what consequences.”57 
Cities, especially, provide opportunities for profit-making and are fertile locations 
for entrepreneurs. These opportunities are always available, whether entrepreneurs are 
aware of them or not, because markets are generally inefficient. These inefficiencies are 
always in need o f improvement. Kirzner (1973)58 articulated this point. He recognized 
that entrepreneurial insights are profit-making opportunities that had previously gone 
unnoticed. The consumer is the ultimate beneficiary because the economy becomes more 
productive and individuals’ wants and needs are met more efficiently. Another 
interpretation o f these opportunities comes from Schumpeter (1942),59 who described a 
situation where innovation makes previous methods of production more efficient. This
57 Scott Shane and S. Venkataraman, "The Promise o f Entrepreneurship as a Field of 
Research," Academy o f  Management Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 218.
Israel M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1973).
59 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1942).
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most commonly applies to computer technology replacing manual labor in the production 
process. Machines create short-term unemployment, which frees up labor to contribute to 
the ongoing innovation process by creating more products that consumers want and need. 
This “creative destruction” helps to expand the economy.
Entrepreneurial activity is based on the assumption that change is a fact o f life. 
With this change comes a continuous supply o f profit-making opportunities and 
individuals seeking them. Acs (2002)60 identifies four classes o f entrepreneurial 
opportunities: first, imperfect and asymmetric information; second, the emergence of 
changes in social, political, demographic, and economic forces; third, developments in 
the accumulation o f knowledge in society; and fourth, inventions and discoveries which 
produce new knowledge. Acs further points out, “opportunity discovery is a function of 
the distribution o f knowledge in society. Opportunities rarely present themselves in neat 
packages. They almost always have to be discovered and packaged. Thus, the nexus of 
opportunity and enterprising individuals is crucial to understanding entrepreneurship.”61 
Entrepreneurial opportunities exist, but individuals must discover where they are, and 
how to capitalize on them.
Entrepreneurship implies risk-taking. Entrepreneurs make investments in the short 
term in hopes o f reaping rewards in the long term. The task o f venture capitalists, for 
example, is to discover new economic knowledge to create future goods and services. 
Venkataraman (1997) explained,
60 Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation and the Growth o f  Cities (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2002), 12.
61 Ibid.
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The significant point is that despite the existence o f adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, some individuals are able to successfully 
overcome these hurdles and achieve success. Thus, the ability to 
overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems varies among 
individuals, and these differences matter for explaining successful 
enterprises. The interesting issue is not that such problems exist, but that 
in spite o f them, some individuals are able to secure resources from 
different resource controllers, often at very favorable terms, whereby 
considerable risk is shifted from the entrepreneur to other stakeholders.62
Especially in the post-industrial city, innovation is crucial to redevelopment. And,
the firm is the starting point for most theories of innovation. The firm is assumed to be
exogenous, and its role in technological advance is assumed to be endogenous because of
methods o f research and development. Griliches (1979)63 formulated the knowledge
production function, where an exogenous firm pursues new knowledge as an input into
the process o f innovation. Knight (1921)64 pointed out that asymmetries in economic
knowledge exist across agents both between and within firms. Because information is
uncertain, Knight argues, the main task of the firm is to process imperfect information to
reach a decision. Moreover, Audretsch (1995) underscored the role o f asymmetric
information:
Combined with the bureaucratic organization o f incumbent firms to make 
a decision, the asymmetry o f knowledge leads to a host o f agency 
problems, spanning incentive structures, monitoring and transaction costs.
It is the existence o f such agency costs, combined with asymmetric 
information that not only provides an incentive for agents with new ideas 
to start their own firms, but also at a rate that varies from industry to
62 S. Venkataraman, "The Distinctive Domain of Entrepreneurship Research, In 
Advances in Entrepreneurship," Firm Emergence and Growth 3 (1997): 126.
63 Zvi Griliches, "Issues in Assessing the Contribution o f R&D to Productivity Growth," 
Bell Journal o f  Economics 10 (1979).
64 Frank H. Knight, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1921).
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industry, depending upon the underlying knowledge conditions o f the 
industry.65
Asymmetric information is thus at the core of entrepreneurial opportunity for the 
individual as well as the firm.
Firms and individuals generate technological progress in two ways. First, 
incremental innovation is a learning process which occurs in the manufacturing chain, 
depending on the existing industrial structure, human capital, and the stock o f knowledge 
already incorporated in the supply chain. Second, radical innovation are more prevalent 
among individual entrepreneurs. This type is not often seen in areas where long-standing 
business activity exists, since it is difficult for large firms to adjust to swift technical 
progress. These two types of technological progress bring attention to the economic 
structure and diversity o f regions. To accommodate both types o f innovation in the 
entrepreneurial knowledge-based economy, regions must diversify. Cross-fertilization of 
ideas from different technological and scientific fields increases adaptive capacity and 
raises long-term growth prospects.66
Advances in human capital can be achieved through the presence o f universities. 
Human capital can be defined as “the sum of the personal skills and knowledge 
accumulated by individuals.”67 Education, on-the-job experience, and continuing 
education and training are ways to generate human capital. Greater human capital
65 David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 
50.
66 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f  Regions, 64.
67 Ibid., 56.
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generally produces better performance at work. Glaeser (2004)68 has demonstrated that 
abundant human capital results in the emergence of new ideas, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation, making it central to productivity growth. Further, Barro (2001) has found,
“an additional year o f schooling (roughly a one-standard-deviation change) raises the 
growth rate on impact by 0.44% per year. A possible interpretation o f this effect is that a 
workforce educated at the secondary and higher levels facilitates the absorption of 
technologies from more advanced foreign countries.”69 Universities and the presence of 
higher education plays into the accumulation o f human capital and development.
Human capital is important in what Florida (2002)70 calls the “rise o f the creative 
class.” This creative class can be broken into two categories: a super-creative core of 
highly educated professionals in fields such as science, engineering, research, and such 
creative industries as arts, design, and media; and, creative professionals in healthcare, 
business, finance, law, and education. Successful cities in the coming years will only be 
successful if  they attract individuals from the creative class. These individuals are 
interested in places that possess the three Ts: talent, tolerance, and technology. Talented 
people are highly mobile and in high demand. They also want to live in interesting 
places. Cities, thus, must focus on urban assets that are unique to the city.
68 Edward L. Glaeser and Albert Saiz, "The Rise of the Skilled City," Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Urban Affairs 5 (2004).
69 Robert J. Barro, "Education and Economic Growth," in The Contribution o f  Human 
and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-Being, ed. John Helliwell 
(Paris: OECD, 2001), 21.
70 Richard Florida, The Rise o f  the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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This section has outlined how individuals, firms, and entrepreneurs use 
knowledge in society. In the macroeconomy and urban economy alike, the use of 
knowledge conveys information throughout the market that is crucial for the allocation of 
resources. Entrepreneurs in post-industrial cities must recreate value in depleted regions. 
The next will look at the relationships among agglomeration, technological advance, and 
the patterns of path dependence within urban and regional economies.
PATH DEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
By its nature, economic development is rooted in history. The historic paths
economies follow have influences on future developmental success. Likewise, path
dependence seeks to understand the “long-term historical development o f distinctive
patterns o f technological and industrial forms, and how, once established, particular
trajectories o f technological and industrial development become self-reinforcing via
various forms o f externalities and increasing returns effects.”71 This section will use the
definition provided by Martin and Sunley (2006).72 Path dependence is
a probabilistic and contingent process: at each moment in time the suite of 
possible future evolutionary trajectories (paths) o f a technology, firm or 
industry is conditioned by (contingent on) both the past and the current 
states o f the system in question. The past thus sets the possibilities while 
the present controls what possibility is to be explored.73
71 James Simmie, "Path Dependence and New Technological Path Creation in the 
Economic Landscape," in Re-framing Regional Development: Evolution, Innovation and 
Transition, ed. Philip Cooke (New York: Routledge, 2013), 164.
79  •Ron Martin and Peter Sunley, "Path Dependence and Regional Economic Evolution," 
Journal o f  Economic Geography 6, no. 4 (2006).
73 Ibid., 402.
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Cities, as locations of economies o f scale, assume cumulative and circular 
developmental trajectories. Hirschman (1958)74 observed a recursive pattern of 
development in production locations. The process unfolds as follows: new capital 
investment follows increasing returns, employment increases, the increased availability 
o f local labor attracts even more capital investment, and the intensification o f increasing 
returns initiates a new round of capital investment. This process continues in round after 
round o f path dependent urban expansion.
Expansion in the postindustrial economy particularly focuses on technological 
innovation. Traditional path dependence theory posits that new technologies alter the 
nature o f economies through windows o f locational opportunity (WLO), spinouts, 
localization economies, and technological enclaves. Windows of locational opportunity 
finds its roots in the California School o f economic geography in the late 1980s, with 
Scott and Storper (1987)75 and Storper and Walker (1989).76 New industries, they argue, 
could theoretically take root in numerous similar geographic locations with equal chances 
of success. They contend that the locations chosen by firms for their new upstarts are 
based on chance. Thus, random historical events often decide the locations o f industries 
which create increasing returns.
74 Albert Otto Hirschman, The Strategy o f  Economic Development (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958).
nc
Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, "High Technology Industry and Regional 
Development: A Theoretical Critique and Reconstruction," International Social Science 
Journal 112 (1987).
76 Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist Imperative, Territory, Technology 
and Industrial Growth (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
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Later, in the 1990s, Arthur (1994)77 formulated two models to explain why firms 
pick particular locations for their industries. The first was the spinoff model, and the 
second focused on localization, or agglomeration, economies. The spinoff model details 
an entrepreneur who began in one firm in the same industry and “spins o f f ’ into creating 
a new firm with new ideas and technology. Arthur sought to explain the creation o f new 
industries or firms in close proximity to other industries. His second model assumes that 
firms do not spinoff from existing firms, but start up independently. Rather than the new 
firm being located in close proximity to the parent company, the new firm’s location is 
decided by the entrepreneur based on personal preference. This model does not, however, 
identify causal or contextual processes that determine the entrepreneurial choice of 
location.
Arthur (1994)78 then argued that technological innovation has a path dependent 
nature because of increasing returns. In other words, the greater the productivity, the 
greater the profits, and the greater the ability for firms to gain a competitive advantage 
over other firms. Those who adopt new technologies first have an advantage in 
developing increasing returns for four reasons: large setup costs serve as barriers to entry 
and imply that average costs decrease when production increases; learning effects from 
gaining experience in working with new technology; positive network externalities from 
the use o f the same technology; and, adaptive expectations, or self-fulfilling expectations 
that widespread technologies will generate coordination effects.
77 W. Brian Arthur, Industry Location Patterns and the Importance o f  History, Increasing 
Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 
1994).
78 •W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
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More recently, a second wave of theories have improved Arthur’s models by 
introducing the concepts o f product life cycles and related variety. Klepper (2001,
792002) combined Arthur’s concept of spatial concentration as a result of spinoffs with 
the product life cycle model. Klepper argues that spinoffs are more likely to succeed if 
they inherit the routines o f more successful parent companies. The new firms can select 
the routines from successful enterprises that are most likely to be effective. Since 
spinoffs tend to be located near parent companies, the distinctive knowledge and routines 
are diffused locally, giving each region productive capacities that differ slightly from 
others. Klepper combines a path dependency concept with a Darwinian economic 
evolutionary approach o f the survival o f the fittest.
Boschma and Frenken (2003, 2006)80 further develop this Darwinian approach. 
They assume that firms practice routine forms o f behavior, which represent the collective 
knowledge bases o f the firms. They argue that a key determinant o f the economic 
pathways within regions is the intensity of knowledge spillovers among firms.
Knowledge spillovers are more likely to be more intense when the technologies 
employed by firms are similar. This results from the cognitive proximity o f related 
knowledge, as opposed to unrelated. From this knowledge spillover, branching may 
occur, where, “A new sector may grow out o f an old sector... [or] A new sector may be
79 Steven Klepper, "The Capabilities of New Firms and the Evolution of the US 
Automobile Industry," Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (2001); Steven Klepper, 
"Evolution o f the US Automobile Industry and Detroit as its Capital," in 9th Congress o f  
the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society (Gainsville, FloridaMarch 2002).
80 Ron A. Boschma and Koen Frenken, "Evolutionary Economics and Industry Location," 
Review o f  Regional Research 23 (2003); Ron A. Boschma and Koen Frenken, "Why is 
Economic Geography not an Evolutionary Science?," Journal o f  Economic Geography 6 
(2006).
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the outcome o f a recombination o f competences coming from different sectors.”81 
Routines are often passed from generation to generation o f firms at the regional level, 
because knowledge transfer mechanisms have a local bias. The Boschma and Frenken 
branching thesis attempts to take into account new path creation from preexisting 
industries. It does not however explain how entirely new pathways emerge.
Other researchers have sought to find the source of new pathways. Kline and 
Rosenberg’s (1986)82 chain-linked model argues that innovation is the source of new 
pathways. Innovation, for Kline and Rosenberg, is the result o f iterative processes which 
involve research, knowledge generation, and iterations between potential markets and 
inventors. Further, Garud and Karnoe (2001)83 argue that new theories o f path creation 
should consider the role o f entrepreneurial “mindful deviation” from established paths. 
Entrepreneurs do not simply follow the locked-in developmental trajectories already 
established. They are creative and knowledgeable individuals who seek ways to defy 
social rules and technological paradigms to innovate.84 Puffert (2000)85 goes further, 
arguing that deviation from traditional pathways is symptomatic of entrepreneurial
81 Boschma and Frenken, "Why is Economic Geography not an Evolutionary Science?," 
6 .
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Stephen J. Kline and Nathan Rosenberg, "An Overview o f Innovation," in The Positive 
Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology fo r  Economic Growth, eds. Ralph Landau and 
Nathan Rosenberg (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986).
83 Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe, "Path Creation as a Process o f Mindful Deviation," in 
Path Dependence and Creation, eds. Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe (London: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 2001).
84 Ibid., 2.
85 Douglas Puffert, Path Dependence, Network Form and Technological Change 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
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activity. The very nature of entrepreneurship is to seek alternative and innovative ways 
o f production. In this way, new pathways develop.
This section has explored path dependence in agglomeration and technological 
innovation. In many ways, path dependence processes helped Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh industrialize. Similar processes are at work in their post-industrial forms. The 
next section will take a look at the role o f institutions, formal and informal, in economic 
development, paying particular attention to public-private partnerships, universities, and 
heritage policy.
INSTITUTIONS AND REDEVELOPMENT
Institutions are the full range o f political, economic, and social rules o f a society. 
Socioeconomic factors, market operating rules, property rights, contract guarantees, 
political institutions, and social and cultural traditions fit into this realm. Institutions 
provide structure, stability, and incentives to economic agents, making them particularly 
relevant to regional development. For example, entrepreneurs generally benefit from 
better protection of intellectual property rights, thus spurring innovation. Conversely, 
regions and countries with unstable institutions tend to dissuade entrepreneurs and 
innovation and attract rent-seeking activity. It is easier for these detrimental policies to 
occur in larger cities with larger bureaucracies than in smaller cities with smaller, and 
more accountable, governments.86 Thus, healthy institutions, both formal and informal, 
are important.
86 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f  Regions, 60.
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Cities that have undergone deindustrialization have previously experienced
development and are struggling to redevelop or regenerate. Roberts (2000) defines
sustainable urban regeneration as a “comprehensive and integrated vision and action
which leads to the resolution o f urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting
improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition o f an area
that has been subject to change.”87 The phrase “lasting improvement” is particularly
important since short-term advances do not provide increases in standards o f living.
Sustainability is at the heart of regeneration goals.
Two opposing views suggest the roles of government in development processes.
The first prescribes government intervention to remedy so-called “market failures.” This
welfare-economics view assumes that governments are knowledgeable, benevolent, and
effective at organizing economic activity in a way that enhances the social welfare of
individuals in a way that the market is unable to accomplish. Socialism is the most
extreme form of this viewpoint, while milder forms are prominent in countries such as
France, Italy, and Germany and to a lesser extent the United States and United Kingdom.
Some o f these government interventions include:
provision o f resources for domestic investment and making the region 
attractive to international investment; investment in education and 
continuing training; direct or indirect financing of research and 
development; the design o f legal and tax environments favorable to 
entrepreneurship; financial aids to investment as well as venture capital 
support; supplying technological infrastructure, such as science parks, 
business incubators, and technology centers; connecting economic agents 
in order to intensify knowledge and business interactions; establishing 
public agencies or service brokers to assist spinoff firms in universities 
and/or private firms’ research centers; [and] aids to innovation, notably via
87 Peter Roberts, "The Evolution, Definition and Purpose o f Urban Regeneration," in 
Urban Regeneration: A Handbook, eds. Peter Roberts and Hugh Sykes (London: Sage, 
2000), 17.
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advice for small and medium enterprises, and to local diffusion of 
knowledge and transfer knowledge from higher education institutions.88
If local government can be advantageous in the development process, there are
innumerable ways intervention can proceed.
The second perspective argues that governments are inherently unable to shape
Q Q
economic activities in beneficial ways. Hayek (1945) demonstrated that governments
do not possess the localized information that individuals operating in their own subjective
and self-interested ways do. This is a fundamental problem regarding the state, which
often attempts to undermine individual initiative and uses force to enact social policies.
Proponents o f this school o f thought urge governments to confine themselves to enacting
policies that allow the market to operate on its own, and “incentives should not be
provided for activities that depend on agglomeration economies or international market
access.”90 According to Savitch (1998),
The immensely decentralized composition and flexibility o f global forces 
stand in marked contrast to hierarchical and fixed behavior o f government 
institutions. Particularly acute are the contrasting modes o f operation 
between markets and governmental institutions. Markets are flexible, 
prolific, and immensely responsive to mass demands, whereas government 
institutions are steeped in formalism and routine.91
88 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f  Regions, 
100- 01 .
89 Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society."
90 World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2008), 29.
91 H.V. Savitch, "Global Challenge and Institutional Capacity: Or How We Can Refit 
Local Administration for the Next Century," Administration and Society 30 (1998): 257.
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This approach to development, therefore, encourages market solutions, rejects the notion 
o f “market failures,” and encourages governments to focus on improving political 
institutions instead o f engaging in economic intervention.
Local governments are assumed to be the main provider o f public goods. Castells 
(1977)92 introduced the term “collective consumption” to describe the way in which local 
government provided resources and systems that reproduced labor power under 
capitalism. Workers must be fed, clothed, and housed for labor productivity to continue 
and for a new workforce to be reproduced— children, for example. Castells called on the 
government to intervene to attempt to abrogate negative externalities. Berlin (1968)93 
observed that local governments provide services to legitimate the social order of 
democratic capitalism. They accomplish this through installing positive liberties such as 
rights to health, education, and a living wage.
Others such as Mises (1944)94 argued that local government must restrain itself 
from attempting to provide too many services and to attempt to direct the economy. 
Certain bureaucratic structures, for Mises, are necessary for the protection o f individual 
and property rights, even if they are inefficiently done. This inefficiency does not derive 
from personnel incompetence or overt corruption. Rather, the very structure of 
bureaucracy makes it incapable o f efficiently allocating resources. While private 
enterprises are managed on the basis o f the profit motive and thus make calculations 
based on maximizing revenue and minimizing cost, bureaucracies and government
92 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question (London: Edward Arnold, 1977).
93 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
94 Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1944).
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agencies have no signal for the efficient allocation of resources. Profit and loss are 
foreign concepts to bureaucrats because performance cannot be measured in monetary 
terms. A business that does not make profits will be deemed a failure by the market. But, 
governments have no mechanism for understanding success and failure. They will 
continue to operate with more or less little regard for efficiency. Their main limitation, 
however, is the taxing capacity of the local government. Mises’s deduction reveals that 
bureaucracies, by their very nature, are poor allocators of valuable resources and 
providers o f goods and services.
If government intervention can be beneficial, Prager and Thisse (2012)95 offer 
recommendations for local and regional governments for redevelopment in post­
industrial societies. First, agglomeration should be encouraged because o f positive 
spillover effects. Second, spatial policies should mitigate congestion effects that 
characterize large cities and provide a minimum level of public services. And third, 
policies aiming at developing a comparative advantage should avoid spatial or sectoral 
targeting and focus instead on allowing market forces to choose the most dynamic 
regions and their economic specializations. Prager and Thisse advocate a mixed- 
economy approach between spatial neutrality and excessive interventionism. They warn 
that most policies, in general, have consequences for the location of economic activity.
The task o f local governments, for Prager and Thisse, is to determine the location for 
establishing infrastructure in a large scale economy.96
95 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f  Regions.
96 Ibid., 73-74.
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Opp and Osgood (2013)97 described waves o f strategies for local economic 
development. For Opp and Osgood, wave one strategies were unsustainable, as they 
engaged in profit-making practices at the expense o f the surrounding physical 
environment. Local governments often contributed to environmental degradation by 
enticing businesses to choose particular locations for expansion or relocation and provide 
incentives to attract other businesses to the area. Wave two strategies involved providing 
incentives to existing businesses in regional spaces to retain jobs. Competition among 
cities saw jobs relocating to other cities. Instead o f attracting capital from the outside, the 
focus was on assisting growth o f existing enterprises. Wave three strategies focus on 
quality o f life aspects o f a community and the relationship it has with economic 
development. Rather than providing strictly economic incentives for businesses, regions 
seek to attract and retain businesses by having a desirable locale. This third wave seeks 
to erase the seeming positive relationship between economic development and 
environmental degradation and inequality. Social justice programs are common in this 
strategy wave.
Opp and Osgood observe all three waves o f local economic development in cities 
in the United States. The use o f different tools of economic development depends largely 
on macroeconomic conditions as well as the maturity of the local economy. In 
recessionary times, cities tend to shift policies toward first wave strategies to resolve 
unemployment and declining tax revenue. Cooke (2013)98 shares this policy prescription.
97 Susan M. Opp and Jeffery L. Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the 
Environment: Finding Common Ground (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).
98 Philip Cooke, ed. Re-framing Regional Development: Evolution, Innovation and 
Transition (New York: Routledge,2013).
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He adds that, in returning to first wave manufacturing in times o f distress, industries 
should seek greener and more environmentally friendly forms, so as to be more 
sustainable and attractive. Moreover, in more advanced economies, third wave strategies 
are often employed to increase the attractiveness o f the locale. This three wave 
framework is useful because o f its metaphor for local development evolution. Cities 
employing higher waves are typically more advanced and able to adapt to shocks to the 
economy, such as the downfall of traditional industry or macroeconomic downturns in 
the macroeconomic business cycle."
The evolution of cities is dependent on internal as well as external forces. Hall 
( 1 9 9 7 )i00 j^g argued that regeneration policies tend to focus on resolving internal 
problems and ignoring external ones. One reason for this tendency is that, instead of 
being complementary, inward-looking and outward-looking policies are sometimes 
mutually conflictual. Political, economic, and planning problems often arise. Area- 
targeted approaches often conflict with other interests within the city, which reveal the 
deficiencies in gaining city-wide support for local initiatives. Economic strategies often 
have unintended consequences, such as the inability o f economic resources reaching their 
intended beneficiaries. And, when attracting investment and planning strategically, city 
planners must not formulate outward- and inward-looking policies separately. They must 
be planned in tandem so as to avoid conflicting policies.
"  Opp and Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the Environment.
100 Peter Hall, "Regeneration Policies for Peripheral Housing Estates: Inward- and 
Outward-looking Approaches," Urban Studies 34, no. 5-6 (1997).
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Stouten’s (2010)101 empirical example o f Rotterdam is a case o f regeneration 
practices at work. In explaining the modem process o f urban renewal, Stouten argued, 
“sustainable urban renewal requires close integration o f the physical response with the 
social and economic challenges.”102 In Rotterdam, between 1975 and 1993, a tandem 
effort involving tenant groups and local authorities combated urban decay through a 
“building for the neighborhood” approach, where “tenants at the time got priority with 
regard to improvement of their housing and living conditions and were not moved out of 
the neighbourhood.”103 This plan flew in the face o f calls for privatization and market- 
driven policies, instead focusing on a socialized mode o f consumption, welfare statism, 
and institutionalized forms o f tenant participation. The Rotterdam case presents a model 
of government intervention to direct the local economy into paths it sees fit.
Local governments often attempt to partner with private enterprises in providing 
goods and services and expanding the local economy. Through building, contract, and 
leasing agreements, public-private partnerships (PPP) aim to support economic 
development and sustainability. These partnerships have the advantage o f generating 
faster results than traditional public works, reducing the amount of funding needed for 
projects, and increasing the focus on outcomes and performance-based management of 
the projects.104 However, PPPs have two significant disadvantages. First, projects 
instituted by local governments often do not reflect actual demands of the public.
101 Paul Stouten, Changing Contexts in Urban Regeneration: 30 Years o f  Modernisation 
in Rotterdam (Amsterdam: Techne Press, 2010).
102 Ibid., 11.
103 Ibid., 16.
104 Opp and Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the Environment, 132-34.
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Allocating money to useful endeavors is difficult for an organization with no profit and 
loss feedback mechanism. Second, PPP contracts often rely on political favoritism, 
which artificially favors some firms over others, even if they are not the most efficient or 
profitable. While these partnerships can provide more efficient alternatives to pure 
government planning, they still create unintended consequences.
Partnerships can also take place between governments and local universities in the 
form of so-called “collaborations.”105 These relationships involve medical, business, 
education, and public policy schools, and they often take the forms o f university-school 
district partnerships, service-learning opportunities, literacy outreach programs, 
neighborhood and community development projects, and workforce development 
initiatives. These collaborations differ from PPPs in that universities and communities 
continue to coexist with each other, giving each side a vested interest in creating 
beneficial results from the project. These are also more about weaving universities into 
the fabric o f the community, rather than being defined by contracts and legal 
responsibilities. These relationships, then, have a more colloquial nature to them than 
public-private partnerships.
These collaborations can also be useful because universities are key figures in 
knowledge creation and discovery. At least some social utility is sought when natural 
and social scientists undergo research. But, channels must be generated which move 
scientific knowledge from the university to society. In various ways, knowledge and 
discovery reach the market. These include traditional routes o f the academic disciplines 
such as field-based conferences, peer-reviewed publications, and student graduation.
105 Ibid., 154.
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These methods, however, tend to be slower than knowledge transfers via student
graduation and their subsequent entrance into the economy. Mars (2011) explains,
The underlying expectation is that such knowledge transfer effectively 
occurs when graduates apply their newly acquired expertise as 
professionals within business and industry environments... In the context 
o f economic development, the value o f graduates to local and regional 
economies is at least partially dependent on emergent experts not 
relocating to other regions.106
This advance in human capital increases the productivity o f both the workers who acquire
the college education and the workers around them. Through traditional academic
channels and student graduation with subsequent employment, universities contribute to
local economic development, triggering local governments to take active roles in creating
relationships with them.
Apart from collaborations, attracting the “creative class” to cities involves the
transformation o f physical space. Optimal use o f land is o f prime concern for urban
developers, especially transforming physical landscapes in post-industrial cities.
Gospodini (2006)107 argues that post-industrial economic activities, in tandem with
modem public policy strategies, tend to rearrange the landscapes o f urban areas. High
level financial services, technology-intensive firms, knowledge-based institutions, and
creative urban islands are situated in the inner city, where ‘“ signifying epicentres’...
introduce a ‘glocalised’ landscape of built heritage and innovative designs o f buildings
106 Matthew M. Mars, "An Innovative Vision for Economic Development in Higher 
Education: An Essay on Balancing Community Growth and Global Competitiveness," in 
Entrepreneurship and Global Competitiveness in Regional Economies: Determinants and 
Policy Implications, eds. Gary D. Libecap and Sherry Hoskinson (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 
2011), 222 .
107 Aspa Gospodini, "Portraying, Classifying and Understanding the Emerging 
Landscapes in the Post-Industrial City," Cities 23, no. 5 (2006).
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and public open spaces. Compact and dense landscapes in the inner city are combined 
with new landscapes o f ‘diffused urbanity’ in urban fringes.”108 Thus, the inner city is 
being transformed by specialized services in light of post-industrial change and industrial 
heritage.
Helbrecht and Dirksmeier (2012)109 notice a similar change in cities. They see a 
new type o f urbanity that consists o f the “new downtown.” The new downtown has four 
characteristics: first, it can be deliberately planned and designed; second, it is designed in 
a way that seeks to stand out from traditional visions o f the old downtown; third, it seeks 
to advance old forms o f the old downtown and represents the new performative urbanity; 
and fourth, it is based on a new form of centralization.110 Helbrecht and Dirksmeier 
argue that new downtowns are forming because the city center is no longer necessarily in 
high demand. World society continues to establish urban spaces and combine the global 
and the local, but centrality no longer automatically derives from the social order. 
Younger areas of development are often situated near old city centers and attract 
businesses, planners, residents, and researchers because of their historical conditions. 
“Very near, sometimes just a stone’s throw from the old city centre,” the authors explain, 
“an extraordinary process takes place on the remains of the industrial society and in the 
former warehouse districts and ports: inner-city expansion is taking place in inner-city
108 Ibid., 311.
109 Ilse Helbrecht and Peter Dirksmeier, "New Downtowns: A New Form of Centrality 
and Urbanity in World Society," in New Urbanism: Life, Work, and Space in the New 
Downtown, eds. Ilse Helbrecht and Peter Dirksmeier (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012).
110 Ibid., 1-2.
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locations using existing spaces. This is urban development under growth conditions.” 111
The new downtowns seek to remain near to old centers, but represent new trends and new
industrial centralization.
Many cities also seek to capitalize on urban heritage. Heritage as an asset has its
theoretical basis in capital theory, which indicates that certain cultural goods can be
recognized as capital assets. As such, heritage assets can contribute to the further
production o f cultural goods and services, job creation, and the general well-being of
local constituents. The valuation o f heritage capital has a close relationship to
environmental economics, which distinguishes between use and non-use values.
Licciardi (2012) lists five valuation methods for heritage valuation:
The first method is compensation, which seeks to evaluate the cost and 
benefits derived from changes in the availability or quality o f a heritage 
asset. The second method is social cost-benefit analysis, which captures 
the benefits o f an investment with large spill-over effects. The third 
method is stated preference, which is rooted in behavioral economies, and 
aims to uncover what individuals are willing to pay or accept when the 
availability o f a public good changes. There are also revealed preference 
methods, which include travel cost (fourth method) and hedonic price 
(fifth method). Travel cost is based on calculating the financial sacrifice 
that a visitor makes to travel to a city or a site o f cultural significance, but 
it has some limits, especially due to attribution and opportunity cost. The 
hedonic price method... can help gain a better understanding the value of 
heritage assets by leveraging databases having detailed information on 
transactions in the real estate market.112
Tangible forms of heritage such as buildings, historic city centers, or open public spaces,
and intangible forms such as festivals, dances, and rituals capture some heritage value
which can help provide employment, attract the creative class, improve overall well-
111 Ibid., 4.
112 Guido Licciardi and Rana Amirtahmasebi, eds., The Economics o f  Uniqueness: 
Investing in Historic City Cores and Cultural Heritage Assets fo r  Sustainable 
Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,2012), xxi.
75
being, and expand the local economy.113 Heritage, then, can give advantages to cities and 
regions over others as attractive places to live and work.
Institutions attempt to coordinate the actions and interests o f economic actors in 
redevelopment. It is important, however, that formal institutions do not interfere with 
market forces to hamper post-industrial revitalization in these rust belt cities. Local 
governments must restrain themselves to the provision of public goods and creating a 
business atmosphere conducive to economic expansion.
CONCLUSION
This review has visited the relevant literature on post-industrialism and 
globalization, local and regional development, economic geography, knowledge and 
innovation, path dependence, and institutions and economic growth. All of these topics 
play into analyzing the successes and failures o f post-industrial redevelopment o f urban 
areas in the rust belt. Now that the historical patterns that describe these processes have 
been introduced, I will explain how I will go about researching these topics. Accordingly, 
the next section will discuss the research design.
113 David Throsby, "Heritage Economics: A Conceptual Framework," in The Economics 
o f  Uniqueness: Investing in Historic City Cores and Cultural Heritage Assets fo r  
Sustainable Development, eds. Guido Licciardi and Rana Amirtahmasebi (Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), 48.
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation takes a liberal institutionalist approach to political economy. 
Production, ultimately, is the driver o f economic expansion, but only if it correctly 
reflects consumer desires. Prices and production are distorted by coercive intervention 
into the market economy: the price signals which tell producers what to produce and how 
much o f it become distorted, inefficiencies result, and some groups o f individuals benefit 
at the expense of others. This framework concludes that growth is a phenomenon that is 
driven by individuals acting in their own subjective interest. It occurs in an environment 
free o f government interference, yet with protection o f private property. Thus, the cases 
o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which were chosen because of their similarities in 
historical experience and differences in economic recovery, will be overlaid with this 
model o f political economy to determine the empirical processes at work and the 
deficiencies or advantages that each case possesses. This study will be beneficial to the 
fields o f urban studies, post-industrialism, and economic development.
QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE
For two important reasons, this dissertation employs a qualitative case study.
First, I seek to explain causes rather than effects: namely, the causes o f the differences in 
post-industrial redevelopment. This “causes-of-effects” approach explains the specific 
outcome o f particular cases, rather than the quantitative “effects-of-causes” approach,
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which, according to Mahoney and Goertz (2006), “seeks to estimate the average effect of 
one or more causes across a population o f cases.”1
Second, nuance is important. The aim of this study is to give a detailed 
comparison of cases of post-industrialism. Ambiguities in historical cases necessarily 
require explanations which statistical models cannot provide. Although descriptive 
statistics will be used, the emphasis lies in describing patterns o f employment and 
population trends. Including other post-industrial cities from around the world to 
generate a larger sample for multiple regression analysis is plausible, but each city 
possesses its own historical circumstance, rendering explanation of causal forces useless. 
Quantitative methods in this study must, then, be relegated to describing historical 
situations and trends, rather than creating a general science o f post-industrial 
development.
CASE SELECTION
The focus on cities reflects the growing importance of urban centers around the 
world. Cities have become increasingly integrated into the world system of finance and 
trade, and thus serve as loci for global governance and international decisionmaking. The 
economic, political, social, and culture activities within cities have important 
ramifications for global interaction o f individuals, governments, firms, and other 
institutions.
These three cities were chosen because they form an important core of the rust 
belt region, which had once driven the American, and arguably the global, economy.
1 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "A Tale o f Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research," Political Analysis 14 (2006): 230.
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They have differing levels o f economic redevelopment yet are similar in several respects. 
First, their heavy industrial bases began to see a steady decline after World War II, which 
coincided with population drain. The cities began the process o f deindustrialization at 
roughly the same height o f industrial prominence and reached the bottom of economic 
contraction at reasonably the same time. These similarities reflect similar rises and 
declines in industrial development, yet they experience divergent results in post-industrial 
renewal. Second, their proximities to water resources and resource endowments helped 
them industrialize, but their geographic locations are not as important as they once were. 
Third, they have similar European immigrant backgrounds, which weigh heavily on their 
local cultures. And fourth, one of the most beneficial aspects o f these three cities is 
institutional and governmental uniformity. While they have different municipal 
ordinances and state laws, they are all subject to federal laws and are, for the most part, 
equally affected by national legislation or monetary changes. While their respective 
histories are not uniform, their similarities help identify the general patterns o f post­
industrial redevelopment. It is more difficult to analyze cities that have completely 
divergent historical paths. By choosing more similar cities that face similar problems, yet 
with differing economic results, it is easier to identify causal factors without having to 
control for cultural or institutional differences. Thus, I am able to control for certain 
variables.
Conversely, international cities introduce more variables without a substantive 
return in results. Even though similarities found in such cities as Sheffield, England, 
Newcastle, New South Wales, and Hamilton, Ontario can be important, the institutional, 
cultural, and governmental differences in the cities make it more difficult to reach
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meaningful conclusions about historical trends and effective policies. The findings of the 
rust belt comparison can then be extrapolated to fit international cases o f post-industrial 
redevelopment.
That the three cities are medium-sized cities is also significant. The global cities 
literature tends to focus exclusively on large cities such as Tokyo, New York, Paris, and 
London. There is a presumption that only large cities play significant roles in 
international governance and provide useful cases for the study of political economy. But, 
large cities do not provide the appropriate historical cases for post-industrial studies that 
small- and medium-sized cities do. Whereas larger cities such as Chicago have gone 
through a post-industrial transition, its commercial diversification insulated the region 
from the devastating effects o f deindustrialization that were experienced in Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which had been reliant on heavy industry alone. Medium­
sized cities are more representative in character, size, and population o f the average city 
around the world, as well. Best practices for post-industrial redevelopment can only be 
discovered, then, through the cases of these types o f metropolitan areas. In this sense, 
these cities became “global” because of the examples they provide for international cases 
with similar economic histories as well as serving as examples o f economic dislocation 
caused by globalization.
MEASUREMENT AND INDICATORS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM
The most common way economists measure an economy’s expansion is by 
changes in the gross domestic product or gross national product. Applied to cities, the 
GDP can measure the total output produced within a city’s metropolitan statistical area
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(MSA). While GDP will be employed to partly describe patterns of growth in the three
cities, it is necessary to understand an important limitation as an indicator o f economic
well-being. The GDP measurement looks at the value o f final goods and services
produced during a particular time interval within a geographic area, usually a country.
The underlying assumption is that spending, in general, drives economic growth, rather
than savings and production. Production can only be possible if  individuals save before
they can consume, and that savings is driven by individual actions, given their time
preferences. Individuals make decisions based on their ex ante utility expectations. So, it
is necessarily misguided to assume that government spending or investment is the same
as individual spending or investment. Rothbard points this out in a methodological note
in his study on the Great Depression:
The critical assumption is the challenge to the orthodox postulate that 
government spending, ipso facto , represents a net addition to the national 
product. This is a clearly distorted view. Spending only measures value 
o f output in the private economy because that spending is voluntary for 
services rendered. In government, the situation is entirely different: 
government acquires its money by coercion, and it spending has no 
necessary relation to the services that it might be providing to the private 
sector. There is no way, in fact, to gauge these services. Furthermore, 
every government-conscripted dollar deprives the citizen o f expenditures 
he would rather have made. It is therefore far more realistic to make the 
opposite assumption... that all government spending is a clear depredation 
upon, rather than an addition to, private product and private output.2
Thus, GDP does not distinguish between the production goods that individuals desire and
those that are produced as a result o f government intervention and stimulus. The
implication is that actual economic growth is aggregated with unsustainable growth in
one measure which does not reflect consumer desires.
2 Italics are original. Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Auburn: Ludwig 
von Mises Institute, 2000 [1963]), 339.
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This limitation does not render GDP useless. But, what this means for this study 
is that it is difficult to measure economic expansion with a single indicator. Accordingly, 
to measure the patterns o f change in the MS As o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I 
will use a range o f quantitative and qualitative indicators that paint a larger picture of 
post-industrialism. These will be indicators that measure the extent to which the cities 
have fulfilled the characteristics of a post-industrial society:
1. Change from a goods-producing to service economy 
Indicators: Types o f employment
Source: Census data; American Community Survey
2. Growing importance o f human capital
Indicators: Educational attainment o f total population; percentage of total 
population enrolled in school; percentage of total population enrolled in 
college and graduate/professional school; employment-based health insurance 
as percentage o f total population 
Source: Census data; American Community Survey
3. Decline in importance of blue-collar, unionized work and growth in 
importance o f professional labor
Indicators: Blue-collar workforce as percentage o f total; Number o f STEM 
degrees awarded (science, technology, engineering, mathematics)
Source: Census data; Bureau of Labor Statistics
4. Centrality of ideas in economic growth 
Indicators: Number o f patents
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data
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These indicators, evaluated annually from 1950 to the most recent year in the available 
data, describe each city in their respective post-industrial evolutions.
HYPOTHESES
Through these statistics I am able to compare and contrast the differences in post­
industrial revitalization. But, identifying the causes of the differences among the three 
cities requires explanatory variables. While there are more than a few variables 
explaining post-industrialization in these three cities, I can at least test three hypotheses 
which may explain differences in revitalization. These following hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis 1; There is a negative correlation between the level of post-industrial 
redevelopment and regulatory burden.
Differences in post-industrial revitalization can be explained by favorable policies that 
attract firms and allow them to thrive. A more developed post-industrial city will have a 
better reputation for ease o f doing business.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between the level of post-industrial 
redevelopment and the robustness of the service sector prior to deindustrialization.
If  a region had a substantial service sector before the decline o f heavy industry, the brunt 
of deindustrialization would not be as devastating and the foundation for post­
industrialization had already been laid. The larger the service sector is in an economy, 
the easier it is to recover from industrial decline.
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive correlation between post-industrial redevelopment 
and capital accumulation.
Capital is necessary for production, which must precede consumption. Increased levels 
o f capital accumulation lead to more complex production processes and economic 
expansion.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD
Through this comparative study, I hope to contribute to the fields o f urban 
development studies as well as post-industrial economic revitalization. Ultimately the 
conclusions I reach will not only be useful for American cities, they will also be 
applicable for any region experiencing redevelopment from industrial decline. Until now, 
there have been few extensive studies, if any, on the problems o f post-industrial 
economic regeneration, especially with regard to cities. Additionally, while local 
newspapers and think tanks provide preliminary reports on rust belt cities, scholarly 
attempts that analyze the situations in a comparative way are not to be found. Attention 
tends to be focused on underdeveloped countries and larger regions. This dissertation 
will provide a foundation for further study on post-industrial cities and rust belt recovery 
from industrial decline.
CHAPTER IV
THE STATE OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM IN BUFFALO, CLEVELAND, AND
PITTSBURGH
INTRODUCTION
To varying degrees, the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan 
economies have gone from economies reliant on heavy industry to the post-industrial 
economy. This chapter examines the degree of post-industrial transformation each 
metropolitan area has experienced. This is done by comparing the cities in each o f the 
four characteristics of post-industrialism: change from a goods-producing to service 
economy; the growing importance of human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar 
work and increase in importance o f professional labor; and the centrality of ideas in 
economic growth. Numerous indicators are examined for each characteristic, ultimately 
revealing that the Pittsburgh area performs best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo 
performs worst in most. In addition, the Pittsburgh area shows the healthiest economy 
when looking at standard economic indicators, and Buffalo shows the worst. Before the 
post-industrial characteristics are analyzed, this chapter provides brief summaries o f each 
metropolitan area’s post-industrial economy.
POST-INDUSTRIALIZATION IN BUFFALO, CLEVELAND, AND PITTSBURGH 
In attempting to revitalize their respective regional economies, the cities have 
largely adopted the “meds and eds” model. Both top-down and organically, the cities 
focus on medical research and development coupled with higher education to 
successfully and sustainably revitalize the urban core. In addition, urban planners
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developed public works projects to restore formerly industrial waterfronts. These 
strategies are designed to attract high-skilled labor to the respective regions.
Buffalo
Buffalo places emphasis on its Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus (BNMC), a 
health care, life sciences research, and medical education institution covering 120 acres 
o f downtown Buffalo. A consortium that includes the State University o f New York at 
Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo) and the Roswell Park Cancer Institute initiated the project in 
2001 as one o f the city’s “Strategic Investment Areas” for urban redevelopment. By 
2017, the project is expected to yield 17,000 jobs, which nearly replaces those lost in the 
Bethlehem Steel plant closing.1 Together with Kaleida Health, the largest health care 
provider in western New York, Buffalo at least has a foothold on state-of-the-art medical 
technology and comprehensive healthcare services in hopes of greater investment and 
jobs in the immediate future.2
The BNMC was made possible by a partnership between SUNY Buffalo and 
health partners Roswell and Hauptman-Woodward Medical Research Institute as part of 
the university’s UB2020 strategic plan. The project enables technological knowledge 
transfer from the university to the private sector by renovating, revamping, restoring, and 
developing high-technology facilities. In addition, the 21 colleges and universities in the
1 Associated Press, "Buffalo Reborn? Long-Suffering Upstate NY City Sees Hope in 
Biggest Building Boom in 50 Years," Fox Business (June 22, 2014), at 
http://www.foxbusiness.eom/markets/2014/06/22/buffalo-rebom-long-suffering-upstate- 
ny-city-sees-hope-in-biggest-building/.
2 "Leading Businesses and Brands," Buffalo Niagara Enterprise (2014), at 
http://buffaloniagara.org/Doing_Business/TopBusinesses.
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Buffalo area educate 113,000 students and contribute ten percent o f the regional 
economy.3
Besides education and medical care, major contributors to Buffalo’s economy 
include banking, information technology, and other research and development. M&T 
Bank has its headquarters in Buffalo, and HSBC USA has a strong presence in the region. 
Further, IBM will soon bring about 500 jobs to the city with its new software research 
facility. Even though the State of New York is contributing $15 million to purchase a 
portion o f a vacant downtown high-rise, building it out for IBM, and spending another 
$40 million for equipment and software purchases— public officials hope the structure 
will have agglomeration effects. In addition, the motion control design firm Moog, Inc. 
and a transportation depot o f FedEx are located in Buffalo.4
To attempt to bolster these projects and attract investment, planners undertook 
various waterfront development projects, including RiverBend and Canalside. Riverbend 
is a clean energy, 200-acre brownfield reclamation site on the former grounds o f the 
Republic Steel and Donner Hanna Coke facilities. The sustainable energy firm Soraa and 
solar cell company Silevo each invested $750 million on top o f New York State’s 
contribution of $225 million for the recreation and economic project.5 Another project, 
Canalside, combines public access with private development at the mouth o f the former 
Erie Canal. Replica canals, a wharf, restaurants, a museum, and pedestrian bridges have
3 Ibid.
4 "500 New IBM Jobs to Call Nearly Vacant Key Center Building Home," The Buffalo 
News (June 4, 2014), at http://www.buffalonews.com/business/real-estate/500-new-ibm- 
jobs-to-call-nearly-vacant-key-center-building-home-20140604.
5 "RiverBend Master Plan," Buffalo Urban Development Corporation (2014), at 
http ://www. ecidany. com/budc-proj ects-riverbend-de velopment-plan.
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been built with the $250 million that already has been leveraged in private development.6 
These medical and high-technology steps toward development coupled with attempts to 
revitalize formerly industrial areas have so far been steps for the future rather than 
success in practice.
Cleveland
Cleveland’s economy follows a similar pattern. The Cleveland Clinic, one o f the 
country’s best and most renowned hospital systems, is the region’s largest private 
employer, providing over 37,000 jobs. In addition, University Hospitals of Cleveland 
and Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital are leaders in cancer treatment and neonatal 
care, respectively.7 Furthermore, partnerships between these hospitals and Case Western 
Reserve University focus on biotechnology and fuel cell research. Nearly 30 other 
colleges and universities in northeast Ohio, which award 26,000 bachelor’s degrees 
annually, contribute to the talent pool.
Other industries in the Cleveland metropolitan area include health insurance, 
high-technology, engineering, banking, and headquarters for manufacturing firms. 
Insurance firms Progressive and Medical Mutual of Ohio, private equity firms The 
Riverside Company, Kirtland Capital Partners, Resilience Capital Partners, Primus 
Capital, and KeyCorp bank all are based in the area. Other firms include Parker Hannifin 
Corporation (motion and control technologies), Sherwin-Williams paints, Travel Centers
6 Presentation by Buffalo Comptroller Mark J.F. Schroeder on March 17, 2014 to the 
Municipal Analysts Group of New York, “Buffalo: Reinventing a City.”
7 "Anchor Institutions," Rethink Cleveland (2014), at
http://rethinkcleveland.org/Strategic-Advantages/Key-Assets/Anchor-Institutions.aspx.
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of America, Cliffs Natural Resources, Aleris International (aluminum engineered 
products), RPM International holding company (specialty coatings, sealants, and building 
materials), PolyOne Corporation (polymer materials), Lincoln Electric (welding 
products), Hyster-Yale Materials (materials handling), and Applied Industrial 
Technologies (industrial machinery and parts). Many of these provide engineering, 
technological expertise, and capital for manufacturing processes.8
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh shares the focus on health care, higher education, and professional 
services. The top two employers in Pittsburgh are the UPMC health system and the 
University o f Pittsburgh, both leaders in medical technology and innovation. Allegheny 
Health System, Highmark, and Carnegie Mellon University, known for its robotics 
engineering research and development, are also top ten employers. Between Pitt and 
CMU, $1 billion in sponsored research enters the region, with Carnegie Mellon 
producing over 200 spinoff companies in the past 20 years. These two universities join 
the nearly 40 colleges and universities in the region which contribute to the knowledge 
transfer between university and private sector.9
Pittsburgh has long been a center of banking and finance and has significant 
operations in research and development. BNY Mellon has a strong presence in the city, 
as Mellon Bank had been headquartered in Pittsburgh until its merger in 2007. Similarly,
8 Ibid.
9 Justin Hopper, "Pittsburgh's Stealth Renaissance," Pittsburgh Quarterly (Winter 2010), 
at http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Region/pittsburghs-stealth- 
renaissance.html.
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PNC Financial Services was founded in Pittsburgh and has expanded into other regions 
o f the country. Together, the two financial institutions employ over 17,000 people. 
Research and development firms in Pittsburgh include Google, Apple, Intel, 
Westinghouse, Bechtel Marine Propulsion, and RAND. Major innovations also come out 
o f the Pittsburgh Technology Center, Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, and Pittsburgh 
LAN Coalition. And the information technology firms Petrosoft, Guru.com, and 
Songwhale are based in Pittsburgh.
Pittsburgh also places emphasis on developing waterfront areas. Each county in 
the seven that make up the Pittsburgh metropolitan area has a plan for land use and 
growth. Allegheny County adopted its plan in November 2008, which serves as a 
blueprint for brownfield transformation, promotion of greenways, and a diversified 
economy.10 Pittsburgh has a relatively strong tradition in waterfront access. The 1960s 
and 1970s saw Pittsburgh Renaissance I and II, which were urban regeneration and 
environmental cleanup projects that created Point State Park and began the precedent for 
situating multi-use stadiums along the north side o f the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers." 
Pittsburgh has built on those foundations and transformed formerly industrial sites, such 
as the Homestead Works and the LTV steel mills, into open-air retail and office 
complexes. In this way, waterfront property are not simply public works projects as 
much as they are profit-making enterprises.
The three cities seemingly accepted their post-industrial fate and pursued projects
10 See "Allegheny Places: The Allegheny County Comprehensive Plan," Allegheny 
County Department o f  Economic Development (2013), at
http://www.alleghenyplaces.com/comprehensive_plan/comprehensive_plan.aspx.
11 Roy Lubove, Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh: The Post-Steel Era, vol. 2 (Pittsburgh: 
University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1996), vii.
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that reflect strengths, such as university investment, health services, and waterfront 
development. The next section looks at the elements and indicators o f post-industrialism 
to determine the greatest and least post-industrial metropolitan area of the three.
THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM
Post-industrialization can be represented by four characteristics: a change from a 
goods-producing to service economy; the growing importance o f human capital; a decline 
in importance o f blue-collar, unionized work and growth in importance o f professional 
labor; and, centrality of ideas in economic growth. The remainder o f this chapter 
compares the three cities in each category o f post-industrialization and evaluates the 
extent to which each case represents a post-industrial economic model.
1. Change From a Goods-Producing to Service Economy
The first, and perhaps the most recognized, indicator o f post-industrialism is the 
change from a goods-producing to service economy. It has been demonstrated that all 
three of the cities have undergone deindustrialization from primarily goods-producing 
economies. To evaluate the service economy in each case, I trace the pattern o f types of 
employment within each metropolitan statistical area between 1950 and 2012, the most 
recent year in the available data. The expected pattern is a simple one: divergent paths of 
secondary and tertiary sector jobs.
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Buffalo
From 1950 to 2012, Buffalo saw significant change in all three sectors. Table 4.1 
lists the change of employment in different sectors between 1950 and 2012 for the 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls Metropolitan Statistical Area. In agriculture and mining, there was 
a 73% fall in employment from 8,969 to 2,494 jobs. From 1960, the year after which 
manufacturing declined, to 2012, manufacturing work declined 66.5% from 181,166 to 
60,688 jobs. In the tertiary sector, two industries saw massive growth: finance, insurance, 
and real estate and general services. In 1950, 12,968 jobs existed in finance, insurance, 
and real estate compared to 38,208, a 195% increase. In the same time frame, general 
services rose nearly 300% from 67,888 to 270,322 jobs. General trade increased 
moderately. Wholesale trade remained relatively stable while retail trade decreased 17%. 
Total employment peaked in 1990 at 542,686, experienced a two percent drop in 2000 
and has climbed back to 535,074 in 2012.
Table 4.1: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Change of Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
PRIMARY
SECONDARY
TERTIARY
Agriculture and Mining 8,969 5,886 5,073 4,762 5,545 2,418 2,555 2,494
Construction 21,353 27,388 22,048 18,991 25,981 24,236 25,205 24,752
Manufacturing 171,198 181,166 170,458 142,596 101,947 83,296 62,538 60,688
Transportation, 
Communications, and 
Other Public Utilities
40,044 35,915 33,585 35,873 36,588 40,134 36,804 35,542
Wholesale Trade 14,495 15,419 21,495 22,413 22,915 22,138 15,868 14,572
Retail Trade 76,540 69,628 85,334 90,855 101,203 63,824 63,144 63,759
Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate 12,968 16,849 20,621 26,570 35,370 33,285 38,884 38,208
Services 67,888 106,197 151,175 174,285 189,703 238,174 263,844 270,322
Total Employment 423,769 458,448 509,789 516,345 542,686 531,984 532,140 535,074
(Source: "Census of Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey,
"Selected Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.2 gives the sectoral distribution o f jobs as a percentage of total 
employment. Primary sector, extraction jobs, which were already miniscule in 1950 at 
2.1%, made up 0.5% in 2012. Secondary employment dropped nearly 30% in the same 
period, from 45.4 to 16%. And tertiary jobs made up half o f all employment in 1950 and 
rose to almost 79% in 2012.
Table 4.2: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total 
Employment, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
Primary 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Secondary 45.4 45.5 37.8 31.3 23.6 20.2 16.5 16.0
Tertiary 50.0 53.2 61.2 67.8 71.1 74.7 78.7 78.9
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
The graphical representation of sectoral distribution o f employment is shown in Figure 
4.1 below. There is a clear and wide divergence in the secondary and tertiary sectors 
over the 62-year period.
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Figure 4.1: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change 
from 1950 Value, 1950-2012
100
-20
-40 ......
-60 i
-80
1950 1960 1970 1980 2000 20101990 2012
Primary Secondary ■ Tertiary
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
Given the divergence in sectoral employment from industrial to post-industrial Buffalo, it 
is evident that Buffalo has gone from a primarily goods-producing to service-based 
economy.
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Cleveland
Like Buffalo, Cleveland’s economy witnessed sharp declines in primary and 
secondary sector employment and large gains in the tertiary sector. Table 4.3 below lists 
the change of employment in industries between 1950 and 2012 for the Cleveland 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. Agriculture and mining jobs saw a 78.3% decrease from 
20,432 to 4,426, outpacing Buffalo. Construction jobs rose 77.3% from 1950 to 2000 
but sharply declined to 45,959 in 2012. The peak of manufacturing employment in the 
Cleveland area was in 1970, when over one-third o f all workers engaged in it. After 1970, 
however, manufacturing employment dropped 57.5% from 333,772 workers to 141,825. 
Jobs in transportation, communications, and other public utilities dropped precipitously 
from 1950 to 1960 and remained relatively stable since, at nearly 60% of its 1950 level. 
General services rose steadily from 1950 to 2012 from 108,529 jobs to 464,328, a 328% 
rise. In addition, total employment in the Cleveland area peaked in 2000 after rising 
57.9% from its 1950 level. Since 2000, total employment has declined 8.9% to 963,681.
Table 4.3: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Change of Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
PRIMARY Agriculture and Mining 20,432 9,517 9,771 6,955 9,544 4,962 3,991 4,426
SECONDARY
Construction
Manufacturing
33,198
258,446
36,072
324,533
42,425
333,772
34,104
255,974
39,251
184,763
58,875
202,637
49,520
149,106
45,959
141,825
Transportation, 
Communications, and 
Other Public Utilities
104,080 56,554 60,703 59,075 57,560 76,385 65,010 60,565
Wholesale Trade 24,449 28,756 41,344 40,539 44,699 39,652 32,432 29,843
TERTIARY
Retail Trade 97,850 112,118 137,858 132,554 134,993 118,555 104,570 104,430
Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate 23,162 31,833 42,425 49,085 58,158 79,743 78,340 73,273
Services 108,529 149,997 215,950 234,972 279,309 436,897 460,180 464,328
Total Em ploym ent 670,146 811,598 923,970 843,748 839,049 1,058,402 981,485 963,681
(Source: "Census of Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey,
"Selected Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.4 below gives the sectoral distribution as a percentage o f total 
employment. Primary sector employment dropped 2.5% from three percent in 1950 to 
0.5 in 2012. Secondary sector employment fell 24% in the same period to 19.5% of total 
employment in 2012. The tertiary sector shows nearly the same difference with almost a 
24% increase in employment.
Table 4.4: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total 
Employment, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
Primary 3.0 1.2 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.5
Secondary 43.5 44.4 40.7 34.4 26.7 24.7 20.2 19.5
Tertiary 53.4 46.7 53.9 61.2 68.5 71.0 75.5 76.0
{Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
Figure 4.2 below graphs the sectoral distribution o f employment as a percentage 
o f the total. After a decrease in the tertiary sector and a slight increase of the secondary 
sector, the two sectors diverged since 1960. Cleveland, however, has a lower proportion 
of tertiary sector employment than Buffalo: 76% versus 78.9%, respectively. 
Accordingly, secondary sector employment is greater in Cleveland than Buffalo: 19.5% 
versus 16%, respectively.
98
Figure 4.2: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change 
from 1950 Value, 1950-2012
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(Source: “Census of Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
That the emphasis o f sectoral employment is increasingly placed on the tertiary 
sector qualifies the Cleveland area as meeting this first characteristic of a post-industrial 
economy.
99
Pittsburgh
The nature of Pittsburgh’s economic transformation follows similar patterns as 
Buffalo and Cleveland. Table 4.5 below details the change o f employment in different 
industries between 1950 and 2012 for the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
Agriculture and mining employed 72,328 workers in 1950 and dropped sharply by 56.6% 
in 1960 to 31,400. After 1960, these industries continued to decline, although with slight 
rises in 1990 and 2012. Between 1950 and 2012, agriculture and mining employment fell 
nearly 89%. Like Buffalo and Cleveland, as well, construction jobs increased over the 
same time period, a rise o f 29.8%. Manufacturing, as can be expected, decreased 
significantly and steadily since 1950 with a slight rise in 2012, a 65.7% difference from 
336,473 jobs to 115,328. The two industry categories with the greatest differences are 
general services and finance, insurance, and real estate. General services saw a steady 
increase from 1950 to 2012, a 303% difference from 143,719 to 579,001 jobs. In the 
same period, finance, insurance, and real estate rose 181% from 28,322 to 79,678 jobs. 
Similarly, total employment rose continuously from 922,522 to 1,139,532, a 23.5% rise.
Table 4.5: Pittsburgh MSA: Change of Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
PRIMARY Agriculture and Mining 42,328 31,400 22,441 18,473 20,192 8,048 9,129 13,177
SECONDARY
Construction
Manufacturing
49,171
336,473
48,295
343,268
53,388
313,334
62,707
254,958
64,436
162,169
65,722
132,180
62,889
108,625
63,827
115,328
Transportation, 
Communications, and 
Other Public Utilities
84,739 72,470 70,428 75,937 87,598 99,783 84,100 85,927
Wholesale Trade 28,287 30,372 37,423 41,787 49,072 38,875 34,606 31,110
TERTIARY
Retail Trade 140,916 138,176 157,074 174,362 203,043 135,533 131,169 134,673
Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate 28,322 34,953 42,217 52,319 71,561 73,469 78,406 79,678
Services 143,719 175,412 246,386 311,614 379,287 487,054 556,867 579,001
Total Employment 922,522 939,649 985,402 1,008,966 1,069,691 1,074,663 1,102,914 1,139,532
(Source: "Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey, "Selected
Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.6 below details the sectoral distribution o f employment as a percentage of 
the total for Pittsburgh. Primary sector labor made up a considerably larger proportion of 
employment in 1950 than either Buffalo or Cleveland, at 4.6%. By 2012, it made up only 
1.2% of total employment. Secondary sector employment made up 41.8% of total 
employment and declined steadily until 2010, after which it rose slightly to 15.7%. 
Conversely, tertiary sector employment rose from 46.2% in 1950 to 80.3 in 2010, with a 
slight drop in 2012.
Table 4.6: Pittsburgh MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total 
Employment, 1950-2012
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
Primary 4.6 3.3 2.3 1.8 1.9 0.7 0.8 1.2
Secondary 41.8 41.7 37.2 31.5 21.2 18.4 15.6 15.7
Tertiary 46.2 48.0 56.2 65.0 73.9 77.7 80.3 79.9
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
Figure 4.3 below gives a graphical representation of the sectoral distribution of 
employment as a percentage of the total. The same divergence of sectoral employment is 
seen in the Pittsburgh case. Secondary sector employment declined in importance as 
tertiary sector employment increased.
102
Figure 4.3: Pittsburgh MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change from 1950 
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(Source: “Census of Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
The Pittsburgh case, then, fits this first characteristic o f post-industrialism. To 
give greater nuance to the divergence in sectoral employment, the next section compares 
the patterns o f secondary and tertiary employment.
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Comparing Sectoral Employment
Figure 4.4 below compares the patterns o f secondary and tertiary jobs as a 
percentage o f total employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. In each case, 
tertiary sector jobs already made up a larger proportion o f total employment than 
secondary sector jobs in 1950. That year, the graph shows that Pittsburgh had the lowest 
proportion of secondary sector employment o f the three metropolitan areas. Buffalo had 
the greatest percentage o f secondary employment. In 2012, as well, Pittsburgh had the 
lowest proportion o f secondary sector jobs and Cleveland had the greatest. In 1950, 
Pittsburgh had the lowest proportion of tertiary sector jobs and Cleveland had the greatest. 
Just ten years later, Cleveland had the least. In 2012, however, Pittsburgh had the 
greatest.
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Figure 4.4: Comparative Patterns of Secondary and Tertiary Sector Jobs as 
Percentage of Total Employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh MS As
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
The above graph shows that, in terms of the decreasing emphasis on secondary 
sector employment and increasing emphasis on tertiary sector employment, Pittsburgh 
maintains a greater degree o f post-industrialism. The divergence between the two sectors 
is greatest in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area and least in the Cleveland metropolitan 
area. The next section analyzes the second characteristic o f the post-industrial economy:
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the importance of human capital.
2. Growing Importance o f Human Capital
The second characteristics o f the post-industrial economy is the growing 
importance o f human capital. Human capital can be described as the stock of knowledge, 
habits, and social and personality attributes that contribute to the ability to perform labor, 
which creates additional value. Human capital is particularly important in the post­
industrial society because o f the role of creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation 
required to develop the tertiary sector. It is difficult, however, to measure. The most 
common method is by examining rates of higher education, which will be done below. 
Abel and Gabe demonstrated that a one-percentage point increase in the proportion of 
residents with a college degree is associated with about a two percent increase in 
metropolitan area GDP per capita.12 The particular types o f degrees are also important, 
as different undergraduate majors provide different skills in the labor force. Florida, 
Mellander, and Stolarick discovered that knowledge about the subjects o f administration 
and management, economics and accounting, mathematics, computers and electronics, 
and telecommunications play the largest roles in regional economic development.13 
Therefore, after examining aggregate data on bachelor’s degrees, the specific fields of 
study will be compared. These figures offer a general description o f the importance of 
human capital in each metropolitan area.
1") Jaison R. Abel and Todd M. Gabe, "Human Capital and Economic Activity in Urban 
America," (New York: Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, 2010), 1.
13 Richard Florida, Charlotta Mellander, and Kevin Stolarick, "Inside the Black Box of 
Regional Development - Human Capital, the Creative Class and Tolerance," Journal o f  
Economic Geography 8 (2007).
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As economies develop, individuals attain increasingly higher levels o f formal 
education. Thus, it makes little sense to examine each case individually for increasing 
levels of educational attainment. Instead, each indicator is displayed comparatively.
Table 4.7 below details the percent o f the total populations aged 25 years and older with a 
bachelor’s degree only from 1990 to 2013. This statistic indicates the percentage of 
graduates who either stopped pursuing additional formal degrees or have not yet 
graduated with a higher degree. In 1990, Cleveland had the largest proportion o f the 25 
years and older population with a bachelor’s degree with 12.3%. Beginning in 2000 and 
continuing to the present, Pittsburgh has had the greatest, ending the period with nearly 
20%. For the entire 23 year period, Buffalo kept the lowest percentage o f the three.
Table 4.7: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a 
Bachelor’s Degree Only
1990 2000 2010 2013
Buffalo 11.3 13.7 16.1 17.4
Cleveland 12.3 14.9 17.2 18.3
Pittsburgh 11.7 15.1 18.4 19.8
{Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
Figure 4.5 below charts the pattern o f bachelor’s degree-only recipients as a 
percentage o f the 25 and older population in each respective metropolitan area. All areas 
show increasing percentages at each decade interval, but Pittsburgh’s rate o f change is 
greater than the other cities.
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Figure 4.5: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Bachelor’s Degree Only
1990 2000 2010 2013
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
The higher education trends are further elaborated by looking at the percentage of 
the 25 and older population with a graduate or professional degree, detailed in Table 4.8 
below. The trend differs from looking strictly at bachelor’s degrees. In this table, 
Buffalo maintains the highest percentage of the total population with a graduate or 
professional degree throughout the period between 1990 and 2013. Cleveland held even 
with Pittsburgh in 1990 and fell behind for the rest of the time period. While the above 
table indicated that the Buffalo area had the least percentage o f the population with
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bachelor’s degrees than the other two areas, Buffalo has a greater proportion o f 
individuals with advanced degrees. Thus, even though Buffalo lags in individuals 
achieving only a bachelor’s degree, it excels in individuals seeking graduate and 
professional degrees. This advanced degree trend of metropolitan areas is charted in 
Figure 4.6 below.
Table 4.8: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a 
Graduate or Professional Degree
1990 2000 2010 2013
Buffalo 7.5 9.5 12.2 13.1
Cleveland 6.7 8.4 10.5 11.5
Pittsburgh 6.7 8.7 10.8 12.5
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
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Figure 4.6: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Graduate or Professional Degree
1990 2000 2010 2013
® Buffalo ■ Cleveland ■Pittsburgh
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
Giving greater nuance to the analysis o f higher education in the three cases, Table 
4.9 shows the percent o f the 25 years and older population with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher. When the two measures from above are combined, it is seen that nearly a full 
third of Pittsburgh’s 25 and older population has a bachelor’s degree or more in 2013, 
followed by Buffalo at 30.5% and Cleveland at 29.8%. Prior to 2000 and going back at 
least until 1950, Cleveland had the greatest proportion of metropolitan population with at 
least a bachelor’s degree, while Pittsburgh and Buffalo traded places on the list five times
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in the entire period. These trends are graphically represented in Figure 4.7 below.
Table 4.9: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013
Buffalo 5.8 7.2 9.6 14.5 18.8 23.2 28.3 30.5
Cleveland 7.3 8.4 10.9 15.7 19.0 23.3 27.7 29.8
Pittsburgh 6.0 7.2 9.1 14.6 18.4 23.8 29.2 32.3
(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
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{Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
It has been shown above that in recent decades, Pittsburgh has had the greatest 
proportion of the population with bachelor’s degrees. Particularly important for post­
industrial economic growth, however, is that these degrees are awarded in the fields of 
Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications. Table 4.10 details 
the number of individuals 25 years and older with degrees in each field for the Buffalo 
metropolitan area between 2009 and 2013. It also shows the percentage o f the total
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population these degrees represent. The population of the Buffalo metropolitan area rose 
steadily from 771,830 in 2009 to 783,045 in 2013 and, with it, the number o f individuals 
in these fields, albeit with a decline from 2009 to 2010. Accordingly, represented as a 
percentage o f the 25 and older population, these fields made up 7.8% %in 2009, 7.7% in 
2010, and rose to 8.3 in 2013.
Table 4.10: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business, 
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total 
Population 25 Years and Older for Buffalo MSA
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Business 44,071 43,533 45,979 46,358 46,818
Computers, 
Mathematics, Statistics 8,159 8,170 8,083 8,232 8,512
Communications 8,071 7,648 9,345 9,517 9,314
Total 60,301 59,351 63,407 64,107 64,644
Bus, Comps, Math, 
Stats 60,301 59,351 63,407 64,107 64,644
25+ Population 771,830 773,793 777,039 779,253 783,045
Percentage of Total 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.3
(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
Table 4.11 below details the same statistic for the Cleveland metropolitan area.
The Cleveland area’s population slid slightly from 1,424,453 in 2009 to 1,421,809 in 
2011, then rose to 1,426,443 in 2013. Individuals holding degrees in these particular 
fields fell from 123,099 in 2009 to 120,238 in 2010, then rose steadily to 135,636 in 2013.
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The population of individuals with degrees in Business and Communications followed 
this same trend, with dips in 2010 and steady increases after. Likewise, the percentage of 
individuals with these particular degrees dipped from 8.6% in 2009 to 8.4% in 2010 and 
rose steadily to 9.5% in 2013.
Table 4.11: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business, 
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total 
Population 25 Years and Older for Cleveland MSA
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Business
Computers,
Mathematics,
Statistics
Communications
88,899
15,726
18,474
87,020
15,345
17,873
92,088
15,969
20,597
95,887
15,611
20,720
99,235
14,442
21,959
Total 123,099 120,238 128,654 132,218 135,636
Bus, Comps, Math, 
Stats 123,099 120,238 128,654 132,218 135,636
25+ Population 1,424,453 1,423,619 1,421,809 1,425,156 1,426,443
Percentage of Total 8.6 8.4 9.0 9.3 9.5
(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
Table 4.12 below shows the same statistic for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. 
The area’s total 25 years and older population fell slightly from 1,670,624 in 2009 to 
1,666,427 in 2010, then rose steadily to 1,690,558 in 2013. The number o f individuals 
with business degrees rose steadily and significantly from 97,231 in 2009 to 123,174 in 
2013. This trend is likewise seen in the total number o f individuals with degrees in 
business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and communications: 142,050 in 2009 to
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175,695 in 2013. The percentage o f the population 25 years and older also rose steadily 
from 8.5 in 2009 to 10.4 in 2013.
Table 4.12: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business, 
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total 
Population 25 Years and Older for Pittsburgh MSA
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Business 97,231 101,237 104,741 108,982 123,174
Computers, 
Mathematics, Statistics 24,763 24,964 25,767 26,643 26,394
Communications 20,056 23,955 23,631 26,188 26,127
Total 142,050 150,156 154,139 161,813 175,695
Bus, Comps, Math, 
Stats 142,050 150,156 154,139 161,813 175,695
25+ Population 1,670,624 1,666,427 1,676,173 1,682,175 1,690,558
Percentage of Total 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.6 10.4
(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
The patterns described above for each case are compared below in Figure 4.8, 
which graphs the 25 years and older population with bachelor’s degrees in these 
specialized fields of business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and communications 
for the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas. The graph indicates that 
Pittsburgh has the greatest total number of individuals with degrees in these fields and 
Buffalo has the least. Pittsburgh also has the highest level o f growth in these degree 
fields, and Buffalo has the lowest, far below Cleveland.
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Figure 4.8: Total Population 25 Years and Older with Bachelor’s Degrees in the 
Fields of Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications as for 
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
200,000
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Buffalo — Cleveland •  Pittsburgh
(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
Even though Pittsburgh has a higher rate of growth in these degree fields and a 
greater overall number, the difference is not as wide when compared to total population 
figures. Figure 4.9 shows the percentage o f the 25 years and older population of each 
metropolitan area that has a degree in business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and 
communications. As with the above indicators, Pittsburgh has a greater proportion o f 
these individuals, but only since 2010. In 2009, Cleveland had a greater percentage.
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Buffalo remains in a distant third. In addition, between 2012 and 2013, the Pittsburgh 
trajectory became steeper.
Figure 4.9: Population 25 Years and Older with Bachelor’s Degrees in the Fields of 
Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications as for Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh as a Percentage of Population 25 Years and Over
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(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
The above indicators describe the importance o f human capital in each of the 
metropolitan areas. While Buffalo has the greatest percentage of the 25 and older 
population with a graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads in the rest of the
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indicators, including greatest percentage o f individuals with a bachelor’s degree only; 
greatest percentage o f individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree; and highest 
population and percentage of individuals holding a degree in business, computers, 
mathematics, statistics, or communications. Most o f the indicators also place Buffalo a 
distant third. Given the above indicators, Pittsburgh possesses the greatest human capital, 
and Buffalo has the least. The next section examines the relative importance o f blue- 
collar and professional labor.
3. Decline in Importance o f Blue-Collar Work and Increase in Importance o f  
Professional Labor
The third characteristic o f the post-industrial economy is the decline in 
importance of blue-collar labor and an increase in the importance of professional labor. 
Blue-collar simply refers to a working class person who performs manual labor. The 
Census Bureau approximates traditional “blue-collar” jobs as the “construction, 
extraction, and maintenance” occupations.14 I included, as well, “production, 
transportation, and material moving” occupations and other “laborers” as blue-collar. 
Professional labor is characterized by the STEM acronym: science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics. In particular, most organizations in the United States refer 
to the National Science Foundation’s definition o f STEM academic subjects, which 
include chemistry, computer and information technology science, engineering, 
geosciences, life sciences, mathematical sciences, physics and astronomy, social sciences,
14 U.S. Census Bureau, "Occupations: 2000, Census 2000 Brief," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000), 4.
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and STEM education and learning research.15
To examine the importance of blue-collar labor, I use the percentage of blue- 
collar employment to total employment. Table 4.13 below shows this statistic from 1950 
to 2013. Buffalo experienced a steady decline from 1950 until 2010 from 47.9% to 
18.3%. Cleveland shares the same pattern: 45.4% in 1950 to 19.7% in 2010 and a slight 
rise to 19.8% in 2013. Pittsburgh shows a steady decline throughout the period. Buffalo 
begins the period with the highest percentage o f blue-collar jobs and ends the period with 
the lowest. Conversely, Cleveland in 1950 had the lowest percentage o f blue-collar jobs, 
and in 2013, this area had the highest percentage.
Table 4.13: Blue-Collar Jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013
Buffalo 47.9 41.4 35.3 32.7 27.6 22.6 18.3 18.8
Cleveland 45.4 39.7 34.5 31.8 27.4 24.7 19.7 19.8
Pittsburgh 46.0 42.0 37.1 32.4 27.5 22.8 19.8 19.4
(iSource: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
Figure 4.10 below graphs blue-collar jobs as a percentage of total employment.
All three metropolitan areas show steady declines in proportions o f blue-collar work to 
total employment until 2010, when the trend line levels off.
15 Heather B. Gonzalez and Jeffrey J. Kuenzi, "Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM) Education: A Primer," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, August 1, 2012), 2.
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Figure 4.10: Blue-Collar Jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010; 
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year 
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
The other half of this post-industrial economic characteristic involves STEM 
work. The nuances o f determining STEM employment make it difficult to aggregate 
effectively. The Census Bureau and the Bureau o f Labor Statistics have only recently 
begun to track specific STEM occupations. The census records occupations which can be 
interpreted as either STEM or non-STEM occupations, which makes data collection 
difficult. Further, the methods o f the Census Bureau and the Bureau o f Labor Statistics 
were designed to keep track o f industrial, rather than post-industrial, progress. These
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records are slowly being updated. Therefore, an alternative, and admittedly imperfect, 
measure for STEM jobs is the awarding o f STEM-field bachelor’s degrees. Table 4.14 
below details STEM bachelor’s degrees awarded as a percentage o f total bachelor’s 
degrees. Throughout the period, Pittsburgh had the greatest proportion o f STEM degrees 
awarded but with no general trend. In 2009, Pittsburgh institutions granted STEM 
degrees to 44.8% of graduates. The highest percentage came in 2012 at 45%. Buffalo 
had the lowest percentage in 2009 at 42.1%, and in 2013, both Buffalo and Cleveland 
were at 42.5%. There is a leveling-off period in the years 2010-2013, which is a trend to 
be following in the coming years.
Table 4.14: STEM Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded as Percentage of Total
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Buffalo 42.1 42.7 41.3 40.1 42.5
Cleveland 42.5 42.5 40.8 41.1 42.5
Pittsburgh 44.8 44.7 43.4 45.0 43.4
{Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
Figure 4.11 below graphically represents these STEM degree data. Pittsburgh 
stands alone with higher proportions o f STEM graduates, while Buffalo and Cleveland 
simply have lower concentrations.
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Figure 4.11: STEM Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded as Percentage of Total
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{Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)
Even though Buffalo had a lower percentage o f blue-collar jobs through the 
period between 2009 and 2013, Pittsburgh had the greatest proportion o f STEM- 
bachelor’s degrees awarded. The employment numbers reflect that there are more 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than 
in the other areas. The Brookings Institution reported that 9.5% of Pittsburgh’s 
workforce had a STEM bachelor’s degree, while Cleveland’s had 8.8%, and Buffalo’s
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had only 8.6 % .16 These statistics are significant. The percentage o f STEM jobs and 
STEM-educated workers affects the ability to innovate, which is explored in the next 
section.
4. Centrality o f Ideas in Economic Growth
The fourth and final characteristic o f the post-industrial economy is the centrality 
o f ideas in economic growth. To measure the production of ideas, the analysis uses 
number o f patents and university research and development expenditures. These 
measurements enable comparisons of both the private sector as well as higher education 
research.
Patents vary greatly in their value, but are significant indicators o f the role of 
ideas in regional innovation and economic growth. Rothwell et al. showed that 
metropolitan areas that produce higher numbers o f patents have a $16,000 greater GDP 
per worker. Controlling for other factors that affect productivity growth, the authors also 
discovered that a low-patenting metropolitan area would add $4,300 per worker to its 
economy each decade if it became a high-patenting area.17 Instead o f patenting by blue- 
collar inventors, as had been the norm during the industrial revolution, most patenting 
comes as a result o f training in the STEM fields, as has been detailed in the previous 
section. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions o f STEM-educated workers develop
16 "Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America," (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, February 2, 2013). Report can be found at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/metropatenting
17 Jonathan Rothwell et al., "Patenting Prosperity: Invention and Economic Performance 
in the United States and Its Metropolitan Areas," (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, February 1, 2013). Report can be found at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/patenting-prosperity-rothwell
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patents at higher rates. Patenting and STEM education, therefore, create the necessary 
conditions for post-industrial economic development.
Table 4.15 below details utility patents granted per year for each metropolitan 
area in the years 2000-2011, per 100,000 workers. In most o f the years through the 
period, Cleveland produced the most patents, and, starting in 2005, Buffalo produced the 
least. Through the entire twelve-year period, Buffalo produced 3,258 patents, Cleveland 
produced 7,778, and Pittsburgh produced 7,455. On average, Buffalo produced 272 
patents per year, Cleveland produced 648, and Pittsburgh produced 621.
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Table 4.15: Utility Patents Granted Per Year, Total and Per 100,000 Workers, 2000- 
2011
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
Total Per 100,000 Workers Total
Per 100,000 
Workers Total
Per 100,000 
Workers
2000 363 65.0 772 68.0 736 64.2
2001 354 64.4 781 69.9 664 57.5
2002 333 60.9 737 68.1 644 56.4
2003 361 66.3 699 65.1 665 58.6
2004 324 59.2 647 60.3 618 54.5
2005 218 39.9 555 51.8 492 43.4
2006 229 42.0 557 51.8 623 54.8
2007 202 36.9 523 48.8 491 42.8
2008 177 32.1 518 48.9 495 43.1
2009 204 38.0 513 51.3 571 51.0
2010 237 44.1 751 75.8 740 65.8
2011 256 47.2 725 72.4 716 62.5
Total 3258 - 7778 - 7455 -
Average 272 49.7 648 61.0 621 54.6
(Source: “Patenting in Technology Classes Breakout by Origin, Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Areas,” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2000-2011, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cls_cbsa/allcbsa_gd.htm; State and 
Area Employment— Total Non-Farm Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000- 
2011)
The pattern o f utility patents granted is graphically represented in Figure 4.12.
The trend for Buffalo metropolitan area lags behind the patent output o f Cleveland and 
Pittsburgh and had its highest patent year in 2003. Buffalo’s patent output has trended 
upward since 2008, however. Pittsburgh outperformed Cleveland in only one year, 2006.
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The two cities were closely matched in 2009. Pittsburgh’s patent output spiked in 2006 
and again in 2010. Cleveland, like Pittsburgh, peaked in 2010 and fell slightly in 2011. 
The year o f most recent available data, 2011, shows Cleveland ahead of Pittsburgh in 
patents per 100,000 workers.
Figure 4.12: Utility Patents Granted Per Year, Per 100,000 Workers
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(Source: “Patenting in Technology Classes Breakout by Origin, Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Areas,” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2000-2011, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cls_cbsa/allcbsa_gd.htm)
In 2011, the Brookings Institution ranked American metropolitan areas by patent
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output. Cleveland was ranked 23rd out of 358 areas. Pittsburgh was not far behind, at 
26th, and Buffalo was ranked 67th.18 Brookings also listed the top patenting companies in 
2011 for each metropolitan area. These are listed below in Table 4.16. Buffalo’s top 
patenting company in 2011 was Honeywell with 43, and its sixth highest was Delphi 
Technologies with 13. Cleveland’s top patenting company was Rockwell Automation 
with 90, and its sixth highest was Eveready Battery. Pittsburgh’s top patenting company 
was PPG with 69, and its sixth highest was Eaton Corporation. As the top overall 
patenting metropolitan area, Cleveland also has the largest range between its top 
patenting company and its sixth highest, at 53. Buffalo’s range is 30, and Pittsburgh’s is 
39. The next highest patenting company behind Rockwell Automation is General 
Electric, with 40 fewer patents in 2011. Creative knowledge seems to be concentrated 
and exclusive in Cleveland, whereas in Buffalo and Pittsburgh, patents are more evenly 
distributed. This statistic reveals two explanations o f Cleveland’s economy. Cleveland 
could be relying on one large company and ignoring the positive effects of competition. 
Or, Rockwell Automation could be leading the way and producing agglomeration effects 
as a way to grow the local economy. Either way, Cleveland has been producing more 
patents.
1 fi "Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America."
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Table 4.16: Top Six Patenting Companies by Metropolitan Area, 2011 
Buffalo # Cleveland # Pittsburgh #
Honeywell 43 RockwellAutomation 90 PPG
69
Praxair 38 General Electric 50 Seagate Technology 62
Greatbatch Ltd 31 Cleveland Clinic 44
University of 
Pittsburgh 42
Mattel 21 Spectrum Diversified Designs
41 Alcoa 31
SUNY Buffalo 20 Diebold 39 Kennametal 30
Delphi
Technologies 13 Eveready Battery 37 Eaton Corporation 29
{Source: “Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America,” Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/metropatenting)
Patents are only one indicator of the role of ideas in economic expansion.
Another is university research and development. Researchers in major university 
research programs innovate, train future inventors, and create companies based on their 
own inventions and collaborate with private companies. The National Science 
Foundation ranked American universities by total research and development expenditures. 
The major universities in the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas that 
made the top 300 were the University o f Pittsburgh (ranked 12th), Case Western Reserve 
University in Cleveland (ranked 49th), SUNY Buffalo (ranked 65th), Carnegie Mellon 
University in Pittsburgh (ranked 82nd), Cleveland State University (ranked 183rd), and 
Duquesne University in Pittsburgh (ranked 293rd). Among other conclusions to draw 
from this ranking, it can at least be claimed that Pittsburgh has more major universities
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engaged in more research and development.
Figure 4.13 compares expenditures per tenure and tenure-track faculty member by 
these six universities between 2003 and 2012. Between 2009 and 2012, the University of 
Pittsburgh has far outpaced the other major universities in research and development 
spending. The only year it decreased was in 2012. Before then, Carnegie Mellon spent 
more per faculty member. SUNY Buffalo spent the third most throughout the period.
The rest o f the major universities also have steadily and slowly increasing expenditures.
In the past few years, Cleveland State and Carnegie Mellon have increased research and 
development at a greater pace. Before then, Cleveland State and Duquesne spent 
relatively little per faculty member. These statistics can be explained partly by their 
general institutional focus on research and development. The Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement o f Teaching characterizes Carnegie Mellon, the University of 
Pittsburgh, and Case Western as “very high research activity” institutions. Even though 
SUNY Buffalo spends the third most per faculty member, it does not fit in the same 
category of institutions as the previous three, instead being characterized as a primarily 
master’s degree-granting institution. The Foundation listed Cleveland State and 
Duquesne accordingly as “high research activity” institutions.19
19 See “The Carnegie Classification o f Institutions o f Higher Education,” Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement o f Teaching, at 
http://classifications.camegiefoundation.org/.
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Figure 4.13: Higher Education Research and Development Expenditures by Major 
University: Spending per Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Member, 2003-2012
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{Source: “Higher Education R&D Expenditures, Ranked by FY 2012 R&D Expenditures: 
FYs 2003-12,” National Science Foundation, February 2014)20
20 Faculty data were found in university fact books: “University of Pittsburgh Factbook, 
2004-2013,” Office o f Institutional Research, University o f Pittsburgh; “Duquesne 
University Fact Book, 2004-2013,” Office of Planning, Budgeting, and Institutional 
Research, Duquesne University; Case Western Reserve University Office o f Institutional 
Research; University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Office o f Institutional 
Analysis; “Carnegie Mellon Factbook 2004-2013,” Carnegie Mellon University Office of 
Institutional Research and Analysis; “Cleveland State University Book o f Trends, 2005- 
2013Cleveland State University Office o f Institutional Research and Analysis
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These expenditures do not necessarily correlate to creative output. But, research 
and development expenditures are, if  not sufficient, at least necessary conditions for 
institutional innovation. The University o f Pittsburgh adds tremendous innovative value 
to the greater Pittsburgh economy. The Academic Performance Research Laboratory 
ranked the research of world universities for the 2013-2014 academic year by number of 
articles, citation, total document, journal impact, journal citation impact, and international 
collaboration. The University o f Pittsburgh was ranked 22nd globally. The other five 
universities were ranked as follows: Case Western, 135th; SUNY Buffalo, 225th; Carnegie 
Mellon, 234rd; Cleveland State, 1,209th; and Duquesne, 1,424th.21 The University of 
Pittsburgh, therefore, displays research and developmental value that extends 
internationally.
Patenting and research and development spending offer a picture o f the
importance o f ideas in post-industrial development in these three metropolitan areas. The
Cleveland area had produced the most patents of the three regions. Major university
expenditures on research and development show a more lopsided view. The Pittsburgh
area has three major research universities ranked in the top 300 by the National Science
Foundation. Cleveland has two, and Buffalo has just one. The University o f Pittsburgh,
in addition, outspends the other six universities in research and development and is
ranked far higher on global research performance. This university research and
development spills over into the private sector as well as the population at large as a
positive externality. All three metropolitan areas display an emphasis on ideas as the
basis for economic growth. Given the above statistics, Pittsburgh and Cleveland place
21 University Ranking by Academic Performance, “Current Ranking, 2013-2014,” at 
http://www.urapcenter.org/2013/index.php
131
greater emphasis on the importance o f ideas than Buffalo.
COMPLETING THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
The data above evaluated the extent to which the three metropolitan areas have 
post-industrialized in the purest sense. To gain a greater understanding o f the broader 
economic picture o f the regions, this section looks at the basic economic indicators. The 
indicators demonstrate that the extent to which a city has post-industrialized generally 
correlates with overall economic health. Pittsburgh tops the other cities in unemployment 
rate, real gross domestic product, median household income, poverty rates, and general 
job growth.
Table 4.18 below lists the average annual unemployment rates for the three 
metropolitan areas and the United States. The data show that Pittsburgh had the lowest 
unemployment rate between 1990 and 1992, after which Buffalo did until 1995. From 
1990 to 1995, Cleveland had higher unemployment rates than the national average. From 
1995 until 2003, Cleveland had lower unemployment rates than Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
the national average. Between 2003 and the Great Recession figures in 2009, Buffalo 
and Cleveland had higher rates than the rest o f the country. From 2007 to the present, 
Pittsburgh has had the lowest unemployment rates of the other two as well as the nation 
as a whole. The most recent data, the 2014 monthly average through August, Buffalo and 
Cleveland have higher unemployment rates than the national average. Figure 4.15 graphs 
these data, showing that despite the spike in unemployment nationally during the most 
recent recession, Buffalo, Cleveland, and especially Pittsburgh faired relatively well. 
Indeed, Buffalo and Cleveland recovered slower than the national average and Pittsburgh
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from the 2002-2003 recession. Conversely, when the 2008 recession hit, their 
unemployment figures did not drop as far as the national average. A plausible 
explanation to the relative insulation of these three cities from the 2008 recession is that 
fewer individuals had the money in the first place to buy subprime mortgages.
Table 4.17: Average Annual Unemployment Rate
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh US Avg
1990 5.3 5.9 5.1 5.6
1991 7.2 6.9 6.2 6.9
1992 7.5 8.0 7.2 7.5
1993 6.8 7.3 7.1 6.9
1994 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.1
1995 5.4 5.4 6.0 5.6
1996 5.1 4.8 5.2 5.4
1997 5.3 4.6 4.9 4.9
1998 5.4 4.1 4.6 4.5
1999 5.3 4.2 4.4 4.2
2000 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.0
2001 4.9 4.4 4.7 4.7
2002 5.6 5.4 5.7 5.8
2003 5.9 6.0 5.9 6.0
2004 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.5
2005 5.3 5.7 5.2 5.1
2006 5.1 5.5 4.7 4.6
2007 4.9 6.1 4.4 4.6
2008 5.9 6.8 5.1 oo
2009 8.4 8.9 7.2 9.3
2010 8.5 8.9 7.8 9.6
2011 8.0 7.9 7.3 8.9
2012 8.3 7.4 7.2 8.1
2013 7.5 7.5 6.8 7.4
2014* 6.6 7.4 5.8 6.3
* Average for Year Through August 2014
(Source: “Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment, 1990-2014,” Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department o f Labor)
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Figure 4.14: Average Annual Unemployment Rate
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Unemployment rates are often a reflection o f the pattern o f job growth. Table 
4.19 below shows the percentage of job growth from 2006 to 2013 for the Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas as well as the United States as a whole. 
Pittsburgh has the greatest total number o f workers, and Buffalo has the lowest. Each 
city peaked in 2008 and saw negative job growth in 2009, Buffalo and Pittsburgh at 
-3.5% and Cleveland at -5.9% . Cleveland is taking the longest to recover from the 
recession in terms o f total employment. Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and the nation as a whole
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began to see job growth again in 2011, while Cleveland grew slightly in 2010 and lost 
jobs again in 2011. In 2013, Cleveland showed the highest rate o f growth, above the 
national average, at 1.9%. Buffalo lost 0.3% of its jobs, and Pittsburgh grew slightly at
0.3%.
Table 4.18: Job Growth, 2006-2013
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh US
2006 2.1% 2.6% 1.8% 3.7%
2007 0.5% -0.4% 1.6% 0.7%
2008 3.5% 1.0% 2.4% 2.7%
2009 -3.5% -5.9% -3.5% -3.9%
2010 -0.8% 0.2% -0.8% -1.1%
2011 0.5% -0.8% 0.9% 1.0%
2012 2.2% 0.6% 2.4% 1.8%
2013 -0.3% 1.9% 0.3% 1.5%
{Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
Figure 4.16 shows total employment levels for each o f the metropolitan areas. 
Buffalo’s employment showed steady growth until 2008, after which it declined until 
2010 and increased to above its 2007 level. Pittsburgh sees a similar pattern o f steady 
growth in jobs until its peak in 2008, a decline occurred until 2010, and the level is about 
10,000 jobs short o f its 2008 level. Cleveland, on the other hand, is struggling to regain 
the jobs lost in the recession. Employment had been relatively stable until the decline
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after 2008. Since then, the employment level has remained stagnant, yet with an 
optimistic increase in 2013.
Figure 4.15: Percent Change in Employment Since 2005
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(Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
Another regional economic indicator is real gross domestic product, which is 
detailed by metropolitan area for the years 2001 to 2013 in Table 4.20. In all o f the years, 
Pittsburgh’s GDP exceeds Cleveland’s and Buffalo’s. A noticeable dip in GDP for 
Cleveland and Pittsburgh came in 2009, a recession year. Buffalo did not experience this
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temporary decline, rather it was recovering from one in 2007. There is a healthy upward 
trend since then for both metropolitan areas. Figure 4.17 graphs these data. Buffalo is 
considerably behind both Pittsburgh and Cleveland. In 2013, Buffalo’s real GDP was 
approximately $48.3 million, Cleveland’s was $114.5 million, and Pittsburgh’s was 
$122.9 million.
Table 4.19: Real Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area (Millions, Chained 
2009 Dollars)
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
2001 42,774 106,082 109,640
2002 44,601 107,860 110,469
2003 45,243 110,133 112,262
2004 46,141 112,652 113,487
2005 46,054 113,423 113,425
2006 46,568 112,902 114,140
2007 45,990 111,871 114,994
2008 46,073 111,357 114,589
2009 46,539 105,035 110,886
2010 47,124 108,304 114,802
2011 47,722 110,772 117,953
2012 48,076 113,827 120,719
2013 48,257 114,448 122,891
{Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce, 
2001-2013)
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Figure 4.16: Real Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area (Millions, Chained
2009 Dollars)
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Pittsburgh leads in terms of total real GDP. But, this could be a result of having a 
larger population. Table 4.20 details and Figure 4.17 graphs the real GDP per worker for 
the three metropolitan areas. This statistic tells a different story. Even though 
Cleveland’s unemployment rate was the worst o f the three for much o f this time period, it 
has the highest GDP per worker. There exists a significant unemployed population, but 
those who are employed, are very productive. Pittsburgh has placed second since 2001,
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when it edged out Cleveland at $95,017 per worker. All three cities declined in 2008 and 
showed general upward trends since. Cleveland showed a slight decline in 2013 while 
Pittsburgh and Buffalo showed improvements. Still, Cleveland showed a per worker 
GDP of more than $10,000 over Pittsburgh in 2013.
Table 4.20: Real GDP Per Worker by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
2001 77,870 94,928 95,017
2002 81,523 99,658 96,724
2003 83,045 102,526 98,996
2004 84,291 105,076 100,112
2005 89,035 115,677 104,181
2006 88,197 112,197 102,968
2007 86,711 111,592 102,133
2008 83,948 109,972 99,377
2009 87,909 110,219 99,698
2010 89,756 113,439 104,090
2011 90,466 116,953 106,023
2012 89,145 119,504 105,937
2013 89,784 117,915 107,533
(Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce, 
2001-2013; “Total Non-Farm Employment,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001-2013)
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Figure 4.17: Real GDP Per Worker by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
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Similar trends appear in the real GDP per capita figure. At no point during the 
2001-2013 period was Pittsburgh ahead of Cleveland. Buffalo, likewise, had the lowest 
GDP per capita throughout the period. Table 4.21 and Figure 4.18 show these trends. 
Cleveland’s GDP per capita rose from $49,530 in 2001 to $55,430 in 2013. During the 
same period, Pittsburgh’s GDP per capita rose from $45,353 to $52,053 and Buffalo’s 
rose from $36,714 to $42,550. The 2008 recession affected Pittsburgh and Cleveland 
greater than Buffalo in terms o f GDP per capita. Pittsburgh and Cleveland showed sharp
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declines from 2008 to 2009, but Buffalo’s level was largely undisturbed. In addition, 
Pittsburgh’s first peak year was in 2007 and it took until 2011 to surpass this level. 
Cleveland’s first peak came in 2006 and slowly fell until the sharp drop in 2009. It did 
not surpass its 2006 level until 2012.
Table 4.21: Real GDP Per Capita by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
2001 36,714 49,530 45,353
2002 38,393 50,492 45,869
2003 39,006 51,678 46,753
2004 39,912 53,064 47,502
2005 40,097 53,712 47,768
2006 40,788 53,778 48,282
2007 40,425 53,486 48,749
2008 40,544 53,406 48,621
2009 40,990 50,472 47,077
2010 41,497 52,169 48,710
2011 42,027 53,555 49,978
2012 42,387 55,161 51,136
2013 42,550 55,430 52,053
(Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce, 
2001-2013)
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Figure 4.18: Real GDP Per Capita by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
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Median household income is another way to measure the health o f an economy. 
Table 4.21 shows inflation-adjusted median household income for the years 2005-2013. 
Figure 4.18 shows the graphical representation o f these data. All three metropolitan areas 
had median household incomes lower than the national average for the entire period. In 
2005, Pittsburgh was at the bottom of the group with a median household income of 
$41,719, and Cleveland’s was the highest o f the three at $44,281. All three regions
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showed steady increases until the 2008 recession. Pittsburgh’s median household income 
did not decline as much as Buffalo or Cleveland, enabling it to recover quicker and 
higher than either Buffalo or Cleveland. Cleveland showed a slight decline in 2011 and is 
still behind in this regard. In 2013, Pittsburgh’s median household income was $51,291, 
Buffalo’s was $50,5489, and Cleveland’s was $49,358. The national average was 
$52,250.
Table 4.22: Median Household Income, (Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh US Avg
2005 42,315 44,281 41,719 46,242
2006 42,831 45,925 43,260 48,451
2007 44,843 48,227 45,630 50,740
2008 47,897 49,206 47,755 52,029
2009 45,811 45,395 46,349 50,221
2010 46,420 46,231 46,700 50,046
2011 47,081 45,936 48,854 50,502
2012 50,269 46,944 50,489 51,371
2013 50,548 49,358 51,291 52,250
{Source: American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
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Figure 4.19: Median Household Income, (Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
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Total wealth does not measure everything. Wide disparities in income can be a 
factor in economic underdevelopment. Table 4.22 and Figure 4.19 shows the percentage 
of families below the poverty level for each metropolitan area between 2005 and 2013. 
Throughout the entire period the poverty rate o f the Pittsburgh area remained 
significantly lower than Buffalo, Cleveland, and the national average. Currently, 
Cleveland’s poverty rate is the highest o f the three cities and even with the national 
average at 11.6%. Its pattern dipped in 2006, after which it followed the path of the
144
national average. Buffalo’s poverty rate peaked in 2006, 2009, and 2011, showing a 
staggered pattern. It has been below the national average, however, since 2010. Both 
Pittsburgh and Buffalo show decreases in poverty rates since 2011. Still, the lowest 
poverty levels for Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and the national average came in 2007 at 7.7%, 
9.6%, and 9.5%, respectively, while Buffalo’s came the year after in 2008 at 9.5%. 
Pittsburgh’s percentage o f families below the poverty level remains the lowest, at 8.5%, 
over three percentage points lower than Cleveland and the national average and two 
percentage points lower than Buffalo.
Table 4.23: Percentage of Families Below the Poverty Level
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh US
2005 9.6 11.1 8.1 10.2
2006 10.5 9.6 8.0 9.8
2007 9.6 9.6 7.7 9.5
2008 9.5 9.7 8.6 9.7
2009 10.9 11.1 8.8 10.5
2010 10.4 11.7 8.4 11.3
2011 11.4 11.8 9.0 11.7
2012 10.6 12.0 8.6 11.8
2013 10.5 11.6 8.5 11.6
(Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1- 
Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
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Figure 4.20: Percentage of Families Below the Poverty Level
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Despite the superior productivity of Cleveland, the rest o f the above indicators—  
unemployment, job growth, total employment, median household income, and poverty 
rate— suggest that Pittsburgh has the strongest economy of the three metropolitan areas.
It has the lowest unemployment rate, which is below the national average, highest total 
employment, highest median household income, and lowest, by far, poverty rate. In most 
of the indicators, Buffalo is far behind in economic comparison.
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CONCLUSION
In terms o f post-industrialization as well as general economic growth, Pittsburgh 
has generally advanced beyond its rust belt counterparts. Each o f the metropolitan areas 
demonstrate their post-industrial nature, but Pittsburgh shows a greater degree of post­
industrialization and Buffalo shows the least. First, Pittsburgh shows the greatest 
divergence in emphasis on secondary employment versus tertiary employment, showing 
the largest shift from a goods-producing economy to a service economy. Second, even 
though Buffalo shows the greatest percentage o f the 25 and older population with a 
graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads in the rest o f the human capital 
indicators, including greatest percentage of individuals with a bachelor’s degree only; 
greatest percentage o f individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree; and highest 
population and percentage of individuals holding a degree in business, computers, 
mathematics, statistics, or communications. Third, despite Buffalo having a lower 
percentage o f blue-collar jobs in recent years, Pittsburgh has had the greatest proportion 
o f STEM-bachelor’s degrees awarded. There are more science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than in the other areas, which is 
reflected in employment numbers. And fourth, Cleveland has been the leader in 
patenting in the past decade, but in terms o f major universities spending money on 
research and development, Pittsburgh leads by far, showing greater emphasis on ideas as 
a central way to grow the economy.
In comparison, the characteristics o f the post-industrial economy as well as 
standard economic indicators show Pittsburgh on top, Cleveland next, and Buffalo at the 
bottom. The question remains, then, why is Pittsburgh ahead of the game? Why are
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there such differences among the three regions, given their similar histories o f decline? 
The next three chapters seek to answer at least part o f these questions, testing the 
plausibility o f three explanations: effectiveness o f institutions in providing an effective 
business climate; size o f service sector at the time of deindustrialization; and the 
availability o f capital.
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CHAPTER V 
GOVERNING WITHOUT HAMPERING:
THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY BURDEN
All that good government can do to improve the material 
well-being of the masses is to establish and to preserve an 
institutional setting in which there are no obstacles to the 
progressive accumulation of new capital and its utilization 
for the improvement o f technical methods o f production.
- Ludwig von Mises1
INTRODUCTION
The ability for local governments to provide an institutional setting in which 
market processes can work efficiently is pivotal to economic expansion and post­
industrial development. This liberal setting includes the provision o f basic public goods 
and the strengthening of property rights. The protection of property rights presupposes 
an environment of low taxation and few obstacles to engaging in business operations. 
Liberal formal institutions open the potential for economic gains. This chapter tests the 
hypothesis that levels of post-industrial development among Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh correlate negatively with institutional regulatory burden. Since Pittsburgh’s 
post-industrial economy outperforms Cleveland’s and Buffalo’s, I expect to find that 
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden of the three. To measure the regulatory 
climates in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I create an index that examines the ease of 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, and the
1 Ludwig von Mises, Planning fo r  Freedom and Twelve Other Essays and Addresses 
(South Holland, 111.: Libertarian Press, 1974), 6.
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corporate tax burden. In addition, this chapter evaluates the individual tax burdens and 
overall cost of living as reflections o f the economic attractiveness o f each city. These 
measures describe the overall regulatory burden in each city. Ultimately, I find that 
Cleveland has the best environment for doing business, and Pittsburgh has the second 
best. Yet, Pittsburgh has the cheapest cost o f living, and Cleveland has the most 
expensive. Thus, the null hypothesis that levels of post-industrial development among 
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh do not correlate negatively with institutional 
regulatory burden can be rejected.
Before introducing the regulatory index, tax burden measures, and cost o f living 
measure, I discuss the implications of liberal institutionalism for post-industrial 
revitalization as developed by Ludwig von Mises.
GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY
Economies that have suffered shocks benefit from low regulatory burdens. 
Regulations distort production and allocate resources to relatively less productive and 
inefficient uses. All other things being equal, the lighter the regulatory burden, the better 
the allocation o f resources toward productive ends, which have been dictated by the 
wants and needs of individuals. Thus, formal institutions must curb the temptation of 
increased government intervention in favor o f market processes. This analysis interprets 
government intervention from the perspective o f the political economy o f Ludwig von 
Mises.
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On the Consequences o f Government Intervention
Liberal institutionalism holds that effective formal and informal institutions,
lower transaction costs, increase information, and create an environment conducive to
cooperation. The role o f government in the post-industrial economy, for liberal
institutionalists, therefore is limited. From the provision o f public goods to the protection
o f property rights, governmental duties are specifically limited because intervention
produces unforeseen consequences in the economy. Ludwig von Mises saw protection of
private property, which included protection from violence and aggression, as the only
legitimate function and value o f government. Mises wrote,
The social function of private ownership in the means o f production is to 
put the goods into the hands o f those who know best how to use them, into 
the hands, that is, o f the most expert managers. Nothing is more foreign to 
the essence o f property than special privileges for special property and 
protection for special producers. Any kind o f restraint such as exclusive 
rights and other privileges o f producers are apt to obstruct the working of 
the social function o f property.2
Any roles that surpass these limited operations interfere with individuals’ ability to
communicate their preferences in the market. Mises added, “Government is a guarantor
o f liberty and is compatible with liberty only if its range is adequately restricted to the
preservation of what is called economic freedom. Where there is no market economy, the
best-intentioned provisions of constitutions and laws remain a dead letter.”3 In Mises’
political economy, government’s only role is to enforce private property rights. In this
way, economic action in the market place is most efficient.
2 Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 1981), 277.
3 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1949), 285.
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From the existence o f private property rights follow four elements o f a market
society:
1. Freedom: The ability o f individuals to choose freely their roles in the frame of 
social cooperation.4
2. Peace: In the absence of violence, individuals are able to apply their minds
routinely to productive activity. In Mises’ words:
Economic action demands stable conditions. The extensive and 
lengthy process o f production is the more successful the greater the 
periods o f time to which it is adapted. It demands continuity, and 
this continuity cannot be disturbed without the most serious 
disadvantages. This means that economic action requires peace, 
the exclusion of violence.5
3. Equality: Individuals must have equal personal and political freedom under 
the law in order to fully integrate themselves into the division o f labor without 
legal restrictions.6
4. Inequality o f Wealth and Income: Material inequality is a byproduct o f each 
individual’s success in serving others in the division of labor. Income 
differences reflect the differences in each individual’s relative success in 
providing value.7
These elements are dependent upon the institution o f private property and its protection
4 Ludwig von Mises, "Liberty and Property," in Two Essays by Ludwig von Mises
(Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1991 [1958]), 34.
5 Mises, Socialism, 34.
6 Ludwig von Ludwig von Mises, "On Equality and Inequality," in Money, Method, and
the Market Process, ed. Richard M. Ebeling (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1990), 190-201.
7 Mises, Human Action, 287-88.
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through a limited governmental structure. Economic coordination and the efficient 
allocation o f resources flow from these preconditions of political economy. With these 
institutions in place, the structure o f production is free to operate according to the 
subjective valuations o f individuals.
Mises saw government as necessary to protect private property. But, additional 
governmental action, especially with regard to the economic structure, necessarily creates 
unhealthy distortions in economic activity and the structure o f production. It obscures 
communication between consumers and producers.
In an unhampered market, the actions of individuals in the division o f labor form 
prices, which are determined by competition. Likewise, changes in supply and demand 
scales are reflections of consumer preferences for various goods or producers’ ability to 
provide certain services or products to the market. Instead o f government officials, 
entrepreneurs make the decisions that drive the economy, determining which goods are 
made, which factors of production to employ, and how to use these factors in the 
production o f consumer goods.8 These entrepreneurs, however, only act according to 
their predictions and anticipations of consumer demand for various goods in the future. 
These projections are met with either profits or losses, given the judgments and 
calculations o f the entrepreneur.9
Entrepreneurs are particularly important in the post-industrial economy. 
Entrepreneurs offer and pay prices for factors of production as a reflection o f the profits
8 See Israel M. Kirzner, "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: 
An Austrian Approach," Journal o f  Economic Literature 35, no. 1 (March 1997).
9 Richard M. Ebeling, Austrian Economics and the Political Economy o f  Freedom 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Eiger, 2003), 84.
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they think they will gain in the future. Ultimately, competition among entrepreneurs 
serves as an instrument that gauges the market value for a given consumer product and 
tends toward equaling the prices and wages paid for the purchase or hire o f the factors of 
production of a consumers’ good.10 Entrepreneurs are in a continuous process of 
competition to offer consumers the products they want and to offer them on better terms 
than their competitors. Successful entrepreneurs earn profits, with which they can 
expand production. Less successful entrepreneurs suffer losses, or simply less profits, 
and are in jeopardy o f losing their ability to influence production processes. Thus, in the 
unhampered market, decision making and control over production tends to rest with those 
individuals who best produce for the wants and needs o f the consuming public.11 F.A. 
Hayek demonstrated that only individuals, rather than government bureaucracies, have 
the localized knowledge to make decisions that allocate resources efficiently.12
Mises demonstrated that government intervention interrupts this market process 
and obstructs the communication between consumers and producers, hindering 
consumption demands from being met. Intervention can be defined as “the intrusion of 
aggressive physical force into society; it means the substitution of coercion for voluntary 
actions.”13 These interventions include production restrictions and taxation.
Governments introduce production restrictions and regulations to channel
10 Ibid., 84-85.
11 Mises, Human Action, 257-397.
17 See F.A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35, 
no. 4 (1945).
13 Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles 
with Power and Market: Government and the Economy (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises 
Institute, 2009), 877.
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production processes away from the path they would ordinarily take if guided by
entrepreneurs’ predictions o f consumer wants and their estimates on the most efficient
allocation of resources. Mises explained:
Each authoritarian interference with business diverts production, o f course, 
from the lines it would take if it were only directed by the demand o f the 
consumer as manifested on the market. The characteristic mark of 
restrictive interference with production is that the diversion of production 
is not merely an unavoidable and unintentional secondary effect, but 
precisely what the authority wants to bring about... Restrictions of 
production means that the government either forbids or makes more 
difficult or more expensive the production, transportation, or distribution 
o f definite articles, or the definite modes o f production, transportation, or 
distribution... The effect o f the interference is that people are prevented 
from using their knowledge and abilities, their labor and their material 
means of production in the way in which they would earn the highest 
returns and satisfy their needs as much as possible. Such interference 
makes people poorer and less satisfied.14
For example, licenses to practice law or medicine, tax benefits for certain types of
industries or firms, and labor laws that dictate the certain type o f individuals a firm can
hire are all forms o f production restrictions.15 There are many other types o f ways
governments interfere with the production structure and most, if  not all, place higher
costs on production, limitations on innovation and technology, stress on the division of
labor, and the reallocation of resources to inefficient uses.16
Taxation, for Mises, may be a necessary evil for the funding o f limited
government functions. But, it should not exceed the minimum levels for the proper
functioning o f government. Otherwise, taxation becomes a means for extortion and
14 Mises, Human Action, 743.
15 Ludwig von Mises, Critique o f  Interventionism (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation 
for Economic Education, 1996 [1929]), 5-6.
16 Mises, Human Action, 743-48.
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wealth destruction. Taxes can be an attempt for governments to restrict consumption, to 
raise revenue, or to expropriate wealth. Import taxes or tariffs, at a modest level, can be 
effective in bringing in revenue, but in general they make goods and services more costly, 
slow the rate of capital formation, interfere with technological innovation and 
entrepreneurial activity, and reduce the benefits and potential from the international 
division of labor.17
A student of Mises, Murray Rothbard, further elucidated the Misesian perspective
on intervention and its effect on individual utility:
In the first place, intervention will have direct, immediate consequences 
on the utilities o f those participating. On the one hand, when the society is 
free and there is no intervention, everyone will always act in the way that 
he believes will maximize his utility, i.e., will raise him to the highest 
possible position on his value scale. In short, everyone’s utility ex ante 
will be “maximized” (provided we take care not to interpret “utility” in a 
cardinal manner). Any exchange on the free market, indeed any action in 
the free society, occurs because it is expected to benefit each party 
concerned. If we may use the term “society” to depict the pattern, the 
array, of all individual exchanges, then we may say that the free market 
maximizes social utility, since everyone gains in utility from his free 
actions.. .Coercive intervention, on the other hand, signifies,per se that 
the individual or individuals coerced would not have voluntarily done 
what they are now being forced to do by the intervener. The person who 
is coerced into saying or not saying something or into making or not 
making an exchange with the intervener or with a third party is having his 
actions changed by a threat o f violence. The man being coerced, therefore, 
always loses in utility as a result o f  the intervention, for his action has
1 Xbeen forcibly changed by its impact.
Intervention, accordingly, coercively gives benefits to one set o f individuals at the 
expense o f another.19
17 Ibid., 737-42.
IX Italics are original. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 878-79.
19 Ibid., 880.
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In sum, it has been demonstrated that, absent coercive intervention, the 
unhampered market always maximizes ex ante social utility and always tends to 
maximize ex post social utility as well. Governmental and political intervention, on the 
other hand, has no mechanism for maximizing individual subjective utility. “The 
political process inherently tends to delay and thwart the realization o f expected gains,” 
Rothbard explained, “So that the divergence in ex post results between free market and 
intervention is greater than in ex ante, anticipated utility.”20 Individuals act when they 
subjectively believe they will gain from such action. This anticipation can not be 
enforced, said Rothbard, “ ...the free market benefits every participant.”21
For businesses in the post-industrial economy, government intervention creates 
unnecessary hurdles to starting and operating a business. This brief look into the effects 
of government intervention sets forth a rationale for evaluating regulatory climate as an 
influence on post-industrial revitalization. The next section will compare the regulatory 
burden placed on firms within each city to measure the ease o f doing business.
REGULATORY INDEX
Start-ups and small firms form the foundation for employment growth and 
economic activity in urban areas. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) 
estimated that small firms employed almost half of all private-sector employees and 
created 64% of net new jobs from 1993 to 2010.22 Above, I discussed the implications of
20 Ibid., 891.
21 Ibid.
Brian Headd, "An Analysis of Small Business and Jobs," (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, March 2010), 10.
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government intervention into the economy. Regulations place particular strain, however, 
on small businesses because their margins of return are much smaller than those o f large 
corporations. Thus, regulations create disincentives for smaller firms and entrepreneurs. 
Where higher regulation abounds, economic activity will tend to be more restrained.
To evaluate the regulatory burden across cities, I create an index that measures 
smaller firms’ difficulties associated with different areas o f business regulation. The 
index follows the same methodological framework as the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce 
Foundation’s 2014 Regulatory Climate Index. This index, in turn, borrowed its 
structure from the World Bank’s 2014 Doing Business report, which examines the ease of 
doing business in different countries.24 The shortcoming of the Regulatory Climate Index 
is the omission o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which opened the opportunity to 
apply its methodology to the three cases. The index developed below considers four 
areas o f regulation across Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh: starting a business, dealing 
with construction permits, registering property, and paying taxes. The index measures 
these regulation areas by assessing the number o f procedures, time (in days) to comply 
with the requirement, and the costs and required fees paid to the government or providers 
of the service.
23 "Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014," U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Foundation, at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/regulatory-climate-index-2014- 
section-i.
24 World Bank Group, "Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and 
Medium-Size Enterprises," at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing- 
business-2014.
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Assumptions
Not all firms follow the same regulatory standards and pay the same fees. Thus, 
there are a number of assumptions in the areas of regulation that the index uses to 
calculate fees and requirements. These are:
Starting a Business
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to acquire 
all mandatory licenses and permits from city and state offices to 
begin operations.
Parameters: The firm is an LLC (limited liability company), which has
multiple owners, 20 employees, and provides professional services. 
First year revenues were $4 million, and the firm does not qualify 
for special economic assistance.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees
Dealing with Construction Permits
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to acquire 
all mandatory permits from city and state offices to begin 
construction of a small commercial building.
Parameters: The building is a commercial office with three floors, an area 
of 15,000 square feet, and an estimated construction cost o f $3 
million. The location o f the building is such that it does not
The Chamber o f Commerce Foundation’s Regulatory Climate Index used these same 
parameters for the representative firm. The characteristics are based on U.S. Small 
Business Administration classifications and U.S. Census Bureau data for firms. See 
"Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014."
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present a threat to wetlands, require special environmental 
precautions, or entail the rerouting o f waterways.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees
Registering Property
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to compile 
and submit mandatory documents to buy a commercial building 
and transfer the property title to the buyer’s name.
Parameters: The building does not have special regulatory requirements or 
zoning procedures, and its value is $4 million.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees
Paying Taxes
Definition: Required dollar amounts o f taxes paid and number o f
payments per year for business and employment taxes to local and 
state governments.
Parameters: The firm provides professional services, has annual revenues 
of $4 million, profits are 15%, and labor share is 20%. O f the 20 
employees at the firm, ten are single and ten are married.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% number o f payments per year; 85% the 
amount o f tax paid
These assumptions are used to determine the appropriate fees, taxes, and
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procedures in each area o f regulation. The following definitions further elucidate the 
framework of the index:
Procedure: Any mandatory interaction between the owners o f a firm and a 
government entity to fulfill a requirement. Interactions between 
government entities or between firms are not counted as procedures. 
Similarly, interactions between a firm and a third party on the behalf o f the 
firm, such as an attorney, are not counted as procedures. An interaction 
between a third party and a government entity is counted as one procedure. 
Procedures exclusive to particular industries are excluded from this 
measure.
Time: Number o f business days it takes to complete a mandatory procedure.
Each procedure counts as at least one business day. Time includes 
processing and waiting duration until the firm’s receipt o f final 
notification. If  there is a choice o f faster-processing, it is assumed that the 
firm will choose the quickest option.
Costs: Mandatory fees paid to government entities, in U.S. dollars. Legal,
professional, and other third-party service fees are not included, unless 
required by law.
Taxes: Tax amounts in U.S. dollars and number o f payments required by local 
and state governments. These taxes include corporate income tax,
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employment tax, operating tax, and license tax.26 
The next section outlines the construction of the regulatory index and normalization of 
the scores.
Calculating the Scores
This regulatory index ultimately seeks to rank the three cities by degree of 
regulatory burden. They are ranked according to the average score o f all four areas of 
business regulation in each city. The scores for each area o f business regulation are 
determined by weighing the normalized values of procedures, time, and costs. In each 
area, the cities are ranked ordinally in each component, normalized, and averaged 27 To 
normalize, each component is measured against the lowest regulatory burden with the 
following formula:
(Maximum -  Individual Performance)
100 x   --------------------   . . .  . , -----------
(Maximum — Minimum)
“Maximum” is the highest value of the component, “minimum” is the lowest, and 
“individual performance” is the value o f the individual city. At least one city will always 
receive a score o f 100, and at least one city will receive a score o f zero. The score of 
each of the four areas o f business regulation is then calculated by weighing the
26 These definitions and assumptions are adopted from the Chamber o f Commerce 
Foundation’s Regulatory Climate Index at
http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/regulatory-climate-index-2014-section-i.
27 The World Bank uses this calculation. World Bank Group, "Ease o f Doing Business 
and Distance to Frontier," (2014), at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-to- 
frontier.; "Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014."
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normalized values o f procedures, time, and costs o f regulation in each city. Next, the 
score o f business regulation in each city is calculated by averaging the scores o f each of 
the four areas o f business regulation. Finally, the scores of business regulation are ranked 
ordinally. The higher the ordinal ranking, the lower the regulatory burden is in each city.
An important point to remember about the index is its sole use as an ordinal 
ranking device. Because scoring evaluates the percentage distance from highest value, 
the index scores can not be added and subtracted as if  they are cardinal absolute values. 
Suppose, for instance, Pittsburgh’s overall regulatory score is 88.8 and Buffalo’s is 44.4. 
The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from these scores is that Pittsburgh has 
less o f a regulatory burden than Buffalo. It does not indicate that Pittsburgh is twice as 
low as Buffalo’s. The score is meant to be a ranking instrument rather than one that can 
scientifically appropriate quantitative values to units o f regulation.
Information about the procedures, time, and costs for the areas o f business 
regulation, for the most part, is available on city, county, and state websites. It does, 
however, require some searching to determine the exact requirements for business 
operations in each municipality. This problem reveals a universal problem for business 
owners, that knowledge o f the requirements necessary for doing business is esoteric and 
not widely disseminated. A precise quantitative measurement on this general difficulty is 
not included in the index, but it reveals the hurdles that firms must go through to do 
business.
Table 5.1 details general business characteristics for the cities o f Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in the year o f study, 2013. Buffalo had the lowest population 
at 254,945, and Cleveland had the highest population at 390,106. The number o f firms
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followed a similar pattern. Buffalo had 13,674 firms, and Cleveland had 26,208. 
Cleveland, conversely, had the lowest per capita income at $17,545, and Pittsburgh had 
the highest at $28,176.
Table 5.1: General Business Characteristics, 2013
City Population Per Capita Income
Number of 
Firms
Buffalo 254,945 $20,026 21,800
Cleveland 390,106 $17,545 41,408
Pittsburgh 305,838 $28,176 45,936
(Source: “Firm Size Data,” U.S. Small Business Administration, 2011; American 
Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013)
These characteristics provide a baseline for the following analysis o f the regulatory index 
for these three cities. Next, I will reveal the findings of the four areas o f regulation for 
the cases.
Evaluating the Cities
Starting a Business
The procedures for starting a business are organized into four general categories: 
reserve the company’s business name, file the company’s articles o f organization, and 
adopt the company’s operating agreement (this also includes checking the availability of 
the firm’s name and incorporating it with the state Secretary o f State); apply for an
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employer identification number (EIN) for tax and employer purposes; register as an 
employer with the unemployment insurance division o f the state’s department of labor; 
and comply with any local regulations, including registrations, licenses, and publication 
requirements.
Table 5.2 shows the procedures, time, and cost for starting a business in Buffalo. 
Seven procedures, eight days, and $1,325 are needed. It takes three procedures that take 
four days and $325 to reserve the company’s name, file articles of organization, and 
adopt the operating agreement. The application and confirmation o f an employer 
identification number takes an additional two procedures and two days, but is costless.
The biggest hurdle for starting a business in Buffalo is complying with additional 
regulations. An outdated law in the State o f New York requires, “Within 120 days, 
notice must be published once in each week for six successive weeks, in two newspapers 
of the county in which the office o f the limited liability company is located, one 
newspaper to be printed weekly and one newspaper to be printed daily.”28 This 
burdensome task requires only two procedures and two days to fill out the paperwork for 
the newspaper ads, but, it costs around $1,000 to run the ads. This barrier to entry creates 
an unnecessary burden on potential and new business owners.
28 New York LLC Law § 206, at
http://www2.erie.gov/clerk/sites/www2.erie.gov.clerk/files/uploads/LEGAL%20PUBLIC
ATIONS%20LIST.pdf
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Table 5.2: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Buffalo
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
1.1
Reserve the company's business name, 
file the company's articles of 
organization, and adopt the company's 
operating agreement
3 4 $325
1.2 Apply for EIN for tax and employer purposes 2 2 $0
1.3
Register as an employer with the 
unemployment insurance division o f the 
state's department o f labor
0 0 $0
1.4
Comply with any local regulations, 
including registrations, licenses, and 
publication requirements
2 2 $1,000
TOTALS 7 8 $1,325
(Source: New York State Department of State, at http://www.dos.ny.gov/index.html)
The next city is Cleveland. Table 5.3 shows the procedures, time, and cost for 
starting a business in Cleveland. It takes four procedures, eight days, and $125 to 
complete the mandatory steps. To reserve the company’s name, file the company’s 
articles o f organization, and adopt the company’s operating agreement, it takes two 
procedures, six days, and a $125 fee. To apply for an EIN, two procedures over the 
course o f two days are necessary, but the cost is zero. There are no further local and state 
requirements, since registering with the unemployment division is bundled in with 
registering the firm with the Ohio State Department.
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Table 5.3: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Cleveland
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
1.1
Reserve the company's business name, 
file the company's articles of 
organization, and adopt the company's 
operating agreement
2 6 $125
1.2
Apply for EIN for tax and employer 
purposes 2
2 $0
1.3
Register as an employer with the 
unemployment insurance division of the 
state's department o f labor
0 0 $0
1.4
Comply with any local regulations, 
including registrations, licenses, and 
publication requirements
0 0 $0
TOTALS 4 8 $125
{Source: “Filing Forms & Fee Schedule,” Office of the Ohio Secretary o f State, 2014, at 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/business/filingformsfeeschedule.aspx?page=251)
The case of Pittsburgh is next. Table 5.4 shows the procedures, time, and cost 
necessary for starting a business in Pittsburgh. In total, it takes six procedures, six days, 
and $140. To reserve the firm’s name, file articles o f organization, and adopt an 
operating agreement, two procedures, two days, and $140 are necessary. It takes two 
procedures and two days to apply and secure an EIN, but the cost is zero. And it takes 
one procedure and one day each to register with the state’s department of labor and 
comply with local regulations. There is no dollar cost of four of the six procedures. It is 
paid up front in registration fees with the Pennsylvania Secretary of State.
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Table 5.4: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Pittsburgh
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
1.1
Reserve the company's business name, 
file the company's articles of 
organization, and adopt the company's 
operating agreement
2 2 $140
1.2 Apply for EIN for tax and employer purposes 2 2 $0
1.3
Register as an employer with the 
unemployment insurance division o f the 
state's department o f labor
1 1 $0
1.4
Comply with any local regulations, 
including registrations, licenses, and 
publication requirements
1 1 $0
TOTALS 6 6 $140
(Source: Pennsylvania State Department of State, at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/department_of_state/12405)
Table 5.5 below compares the procedures, time, cost, and index scores for starting 
a business in the three cities. Entrepreneurs have the most difficulty starting a business in 
Buffalo. It has the highest number o f procedures, takes the longest time, and is over 
$1,000 more expensive than either Cleveland or Pittsburgh. It received a score o f zero 
for procedures, time, and cost, which accordingly weighs to zero for the total score in 
starting a business. Cleveland, conversely, has the lowest number o f procedures, takes 
the shortest time, and is least expensive. It ranks highest in procedures, time, and cost, 
thus receiving a score o f 100. Pittsburgh finished in the middle for procedures, time, cost, 
and weighted score. Pittsburgh received a score o f 33.3 for procedures, 50.0 for time, 
and 98.8 for cost. Its weighted score for starting a business is 71.9.
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Table 5.5: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Starting a Business 
in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%) Time (35%) Cost (50%)
ScoreU of 
Procedures Score
# o f
Days Score Cost Score
Buffalo 7 0.0 8 0.0 $1,325 0.0 0.0
Cleveland 4 100.0 4 100.0 $125 100.0 100.0
Pittsburgh 6 33.3 6 50.0 $140 98.8 71.9
In terms of starting a business, Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden, 
Pittsburgh has the second lowest, and Buffalo has the highest. Buffalo entrepreneurs are 
burdened particularly by the state law on publishing an ad in the newspaper about the 
firm’s forthcoming opening. The main difference between Cleveland and Pittsburgh are 
the number of procedures and the time it takes to complete them. The next section 
evaluates the second area o f regulation: dealing with construction permits.
Dealing with Construction Permits
In building a new place o f business, entrepreneurs must navigate local and state 
permit processes. This second area o f regulation evaluates the procedures, time, and cost 
o f pre-construction and post-construction requirements. Pre-construction procedures 
include submitting zoning plans and environmental protection plans to the city planning 
department and submitting building code compliance forms to and requesting and 
obtaining building permits from local departments of buildings. These are typically 
lengthy procedures and have hefty per-square-foot fees for permits. The post­
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construction procedures include final on-site zoning inspections and approvals by the city 
planning department and final electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and grading inspections 
from the department o f buildings. As with scoring for starting a business, the procedures, 
time, and cost are added and normalized.
Table 5.6 shows the procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with construction 
permits in Buffalo. The pre-construction phase takes seven procedures over the span of 
52 days and costs $21,725. It takes two procedures and 11 days to develop and submit a 
zoning plan and an environmental protection form to the city planning department. The 
required fees total $1,350. To request and obtain approval and permits from the 
department o f buildings, it takes five procedures, 41 days, and $20,375. The post­
construction phase takes seven procedures over seven days and $220. There are seven 
required procedures for completing post-construction on-site inspections that take seven 
days and an inspector’s fee o f $220. In total, there are 14 procedures that take 59 days 
and $21,945.
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Table 5.6: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Buffalo
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
2.1 Pre-Construction 7 52 $21,725
2.1.1 Department o f Planning 2 11 $1,350
2.1.2 Department o f Buildings: Codes and Permits 5 41 $20,375
2.2 Post-Construction 7 7 $220
2.2.1 Department o f Planning 2 2 $220
2.2.2 Department o f Buildings: Inspections 5 5 $0
TOTALS 14 59 $21,945
(Source: City of Buffalo Department o f Permit and Inspection Services, at 
http://www.city-buffalo.com/Home/City_Departments/EDPIS)
The procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with construction permits in 
Cleveland are shown below in Table 5.7. Prior to construction, nine procedures, 51 days, 
and $33,150 are required. Submitting the zoning plan to the planning department 
requires two steps and takes two days. Submitting building code compliance forms and 
obtaining permits from the department o f buildings entails seven procedures, 49 days, 
and $33,000. The pre-construction fees cover much of the post-construction procedural 
costs. Post-construction inspections take an additional four procedures and eight days. 
An additional $125 fee per inspection is also due, totaling $500. In total, entrepreneurs 
engaging in new construction in Cleveland must navigate 13 different procedures over 59 
days at a cost o f $33,650.
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Table 5.7: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Cleveland
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
2.1 Pre-Construction 9 51 $33,150
2.1.1 Department o f Planning 2 2 $150
2.1.2 Department of Buildings: Codes and Permits 7 49 $33,000
2.2 Post-Construction 4 8 $500
2.2.1 Department o f Planning 0 0 $0
2.2.2 Department o f Buildings: Inspections 4 8 $500
TOTALS 13 59 $33,650
(Source: City o f Cleveland Department o f Building & Housing, at
http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Govemment/CityAgencies/Build
ingHousing)
Table 5.8 below details the procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with 
construction permits in Pittsburgh. The entire pre-construction process entails seven 
procedures, 81 days, and a cost o f $11,936. There is only one procedure to submit a 
zoning plan, but it takes about 45 days to obtain approval. It also costs $1,750. Further, 
obtaining the necessary permits sends entrepreneurs through six more procedures over 32 
days at a cost o f $ 10,186. The post-construction phase takes an additional four 
procedures over a span of four days. The fees for this inspection process are incorporated 
in the pre-construction cost. In total, entrepreneurs in Pittsburgh are required to fulfill 11 
procedures over 81 days at a cost o f $ 11,936.
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Table 5.8: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Pittsburgh
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
2.1 Pre-Construction 7 81 $11,936
2.1.1 Department o f Planning 1 45 $1,750
2.1.2 Department of Buildings: Codes and Permits 6 32 $10,186
2.2 Post-Construction 4 4 $0
2.2.1 Department o f Planning 1 1 $0
2.2.2 Department o f Buildings: Inspections 3 3 $0
TOTALS 11 81 $11,936
(Sources: City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Building Inspection, at 
http ://pittsburghpa. gov/bbi/permits)
The comparison of the three cities’ procedures, time, cost, and index scores is 
detailed in Table 5.9. Pittsburgh has the lowest number o f procedures in dealing with 
construction permits, receiving a score o f 100. Buffalo has the highest number of 
procedures, receiving a score of zero. Buffalo and Cleveland share the lowest number of 
days, each with 59. They both received a score of 100, and Pittsburgh, taking an extra 22 
days to complete procedures, received a score of zero. Cleveland has the highest cost in 
dealing with permits at $33,650, receiving a score of zero. Pittsburgh has the lowest cost 
at $11,936, receiving a score o f 100. For the final weighted scores in this area o f 
regulation, Pittsburgh has the best score at 65.0, Buffalo is next at 62.0, and Cleveland 
has the worst at 40.0. Pittsburgh, therefore, has the lowest regulatory burden in dealing 
with construction permits.
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Table 5.9: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Firms Dealing with 
Construction Permits in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%) Time (35%) Cost (50%)
Scoreft of 
Procedures Score ft of Days Score Cost Score
Buffalo 14 0.0 59 100.0 $21,945 53.9 62.0
Cleveland 13 33.3 59 100.0 $33,650 0.0 40.0
Pittsburgh 11 100.0 81 0.0 $11,936 100.0 65.0
This second area o f regulation has dealt with the permit procedure for building a 
structure for a new firm. The third area evaluates the burden associated with obtaining 
ownership o f pre-existing structures.
Registering Property
While the requirements associated with new construction can be onerous, buying 
and registering pre-existing physical structures and property can be just as difficult. The 
procedures involved in registering property include requesting and obtaining a title report, 
which often includes the requirement to purchase title insurance policies; transferring the 
title to the business owner, which often includes paying a sizable real estate transfer tax; 
title recording; and additional procedures such as paying supplementary fees and taxes 
and filing auxiliary forms. The procedures and time for registering property are often not 
as burdensome as the dollar cost o f doing so.
Table 5.10 below details the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering 
property in Buffalo. Obtaining a title report in Buffalo entails two procedures, three days,
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and $14,094. The large cost is associated with purchasing a title insurance policy. The 
title transfer takes only one procedure and one day, but it costs $16,000. Further, there 
are two procedures for title recording over a period o f two days at a cost o f $30,125. In 
total, registering property in Buffalo entails five procedures, six days, and a cost of 
$60,219.
Table 5.10: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in Buffalo
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
3.1 Obtain a Title Report 2 3 $14,094
3.2 Title Transferring 1 1 $16,000
3.3 Title Recording 2 2 $30,125
TOTALS 5 6 $60,219
{Source: Erie County Clerk’s Office, at
http ://www2. erie. go v/clerk/index.php?q-fees#notar)
Table 5.11 below shows the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering 
property in Cleveland. Obtaining a title report in Cleveland requires three procedures, 
two days, and $5,850. To transfer the title, there is one procedure that takes one day and 
a title transfer fee o f $16,000. For title recording, there is one procedure over one day 
and a recordation fee o f $60. In total, Cleveland entrepreneurs must navigate through 
five procedures over a span o f four days at a cost of $21,910.
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Table 5.11: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in 
Cleveland
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
3.1 Obtain a Title Report 3 2 $5,850
3.2 Title Transferring 1 1 $16,000
3.3 Title Recording 1 1 $60
TOTALS 5 4 $21,910
{Source: Cuyahoga County Office o f the Fiscal Officer, at 
http://fiscalofficer.cuyahogacounty.us/)
Finally, Table 5.12 details the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering 
property in Pittsburgh. Obtaining a title report takes two procedures, one day, and a fee 
o f $162. Transferring the title takes only one procedure and one day, but the title transfer 
tax is $120,000. Title recording entails one procedure, one day, and another $162 fee. In 
total, the process o f registering property in Pittsburgh takes four procedures, three days, 
and $120,324.
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Table 5.12: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in 
Pittsburgh
Phase Name of Procedure Procedures Time Cost
3.1 Obtain a Title Report 2 1 $162
3.2 Title Transferring 1 1 $120,000
3.3 Title Recording 1 1 $162
TOTALS 4 3 $120,324
{Source: Allegheny County Department o f Real Estate, at 
http://www.alleghenycounty.us/re/realtax.aspx)
The differences in procedures, time, cost, and index scores for firms registering 
property in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh are detailed in Table 5.13 below. It shows 
the relative uniformity o f procedures and time compared to the wide differences in cost. 
Pittsburgh has the lowest procedural burden at four, receiving a score o f 100. Meanwhile, 
Buffalo and Cleveland both entail five procedures in registering property, each receiving 
scores o f zero. The time it takes to register property in the three cities varies to a greater 
degree than the number o f procedures. It takes the longest in Buffalo at six days. 
Likewise, it received a score o f zero. Pittsburgh has the shortest time span in which to 
register at three days, receiving a score o f 100. The costs varied widely. Cleveland has 
the lowest cost at $21,910. Registering property in Pittsburgh is the most expensive, 
nearly $100,000 more than Cleveland at $120,324. Accordingly, it received a score of 
zero. Buffalo falls in the middle at $60,219 with a score o f 61.2. The wide margins in 
cost largely explain Cleveland’s position as least burdensome for registering property at 
73.3. Pittsburgh came next with 50.0, and Buffalo maintains the greatest regulatory
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burden for registering property with 30.6.
Table 5.13: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Firms Registering 
Property in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%) Time (35%) Cost (50%)
Score# o f
Procedures Score
U of 
Days Score Cost Score
Buffalo 5 0.0 6 0.0 $60,219 61.2 30.6
Cleveland 5 0.0 4 66.7 $21,910 100.0 73.3
Pittsburgh 4 100.0 3 100.0 $120,324 0.0 50.0
The previous three areas of regulation evaluated required procedures in starting a 
business and acquiring the physical property out of which the firm will operate, whether 
constructing a new building or purchasing it. The next section evaluates the final area of 
regulation, which assesses operational burdens in the form of taxation.
Paying Taxes
The final area o f regulation in the measure is paying taxes. Three general 
categories o f taxes affect local businesses: corporate income taxes at the local and state 
levels; employer-paid state unemployment and commuter transportation mobility taxes; 
and additional local taxes such as license, disability, employee expense, or franchise 
taxes, depending on the state and municipality.
In Buffalo, corporate income, unemployment, and disability taxes affect local 
businesses. Corporate taxes are paid each quarter for a total of $42,600 per year. Firms
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pay employment taxes monthly for an annual total of $32,800. And, a yearly payment of 
$624 is paid for a state disability insurance tax. Annually, firms make 17 total payments 
toward a tax obligation o f $76,024 in Buffalo.
Table 5.14: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Buffalo
Phase Name of Procedure Payments/Year
Statutory
Tax
4.1 Corporate Tax 4 $42,600
4.2 Employment Tax 12 $32,800
4.3 Additional Local Regulations & Procedures 1 $624
TOTALS 17 $76,024
(Source: New York State Department o f Taxation and Finance, at 
http://www.tax.ny.gov/; City of Buffalo Department of Assessment and Taxation, at 
https ://www.ci .buffalo. ny .us/home/c itydepartm ents/assessm entandtaxationdepartm e 
nt)
Table 5.15 details the procedures, payments, and cost for firms paying taxes in 
Cleveland. In Cleveland, only two taxes are o f significant relevance for firms: a 
commercial activity tax and an employment tax. Cleveland benefits from the absence of 
a corporate income tax in the State o f Ohio. Instead, a much more minimal commercial 
activity tax of $ 1,800 per year replaces it. In addition, the employment tax o f $21,600 is 
divided across 12 payments. The annual tax obligation in Cleveland involves 16 
payments for a total o f $23,400.
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Table 5.15: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Cleveland
Phase Name of Procedure Payments/Year
Statutory
Tax
4.1 Corporate Tax 4 $1,800
4.2 Employment Tax 12 $21,600
4.3 Additional Local Regulations & Procedures 0 $0
TOTALS 16 $23,400
(Source: Ohio State Department of Taxation, at http://www.tax.ohio.gov/; City of 
Cleveland Central Collection Agency, at http://www.ccatax.ci.cleveland.oh.us/)
Like Cleveland, firms in Pittsburgh have two significant tax burdens: corporate 
income tax and employment tax. Table 5.16 below shows the procedures, payments, and 
cost for firms paying taxes in Pittsburgh. The corporate income tax burden is $64,540 
annually, divided into four quarterly payments. Like the other cities, the employment tax 
is monthly, totaling $29,428. Over the course o f the year, there are 16 payments totaling 
$92,968 in tax obligations.
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Table 5.16: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Pittsburgh
Phase Name of Procedure Payments/Year
Statutory
Tax
4.1 Corporate Tax 4 $63,540
4.2 Employment Tax 12 $29,428
4.3 Additional Local Regulations & Procedures 0 $0
TOTALS 16 $92,968
{Source: Pennsylvania State Department o f Labor & Industry, at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=5278&mode-2; City of
Pittsburgh Department o f Finance, at http://pittsburghpa.gov/finance/home)
Table 5.17 below details the total cost, payments, and index scores for firms 
paying taxes in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. O f the three cities, Cleveland has the 
lowest tax obligation at $23,400, receiving a score o f 100. Buffalo has the second lowest 
at $76,024. And, Pittsburgh has the highest tax obligation at $92,968, receiving a score 
o f zero. Firms in both Cleveland and Pittsburgh have 16 payments throughout the year, 
tied for the lowest. These cities received scores of 100. Buffalo, with 17 payments, 
received a score o f zero. Overall, Cleveland has the lowest tax burden for businesses 
with a score o f 100.0, and Pittsburgh has the greatest with a score of 15.0. Buffalo falls 
in the middle with a score o f 20.7.
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Table 5.17: Total Cost, Payments, and Index Scores for Firms Paying Taxes in
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Total Tax (85%) Time (15%)
Score
Taxes Paid Score U of Payments Score
Buffalo $76,024 24.4 17 0 20.7
Cleveland $23,400 100 16 100 100.0
Pittsburgh $92,968 0 16 100 15.0
Tax regulations can be seen as the most burdensome intervention for the simple 
reason that they are ongoing, rather than single expenses. That Cleveland firms pay 
nearly $70,000 less per year in taxes than Pittsburgh makes higher taxation a significant 
barrier to entry. The next section will compare overall regulatory procedures, time, cost, 
and index scores to generate a ranking of regulatory climate.
Regulatory Climate
The overall regulatory climate in each city is the average of the index scores from 
each area o f regulation. Before evaluating the averaged index scores and to gain a clearer 
picture o f the costs of doing business in each city, the next three tables below compare 
the areas of regulation and determine the total burden in real figures for each city. Table 
5.18 details the total procedures, time, and dollar cost o f doing business in Buffalo.
Paying taxes requires the most procedures at 17, while registering property requires the 
least at five. Further, it takes nearly two months to advance through the permit process 
and less than a week to register property. In terms of dollar cost, starting a business is the
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least expensive area of regulation at $1,325 and paying taxes is the most expensive at 
$76,024. Among the four areas o f business regulation, firms must perform 44 procedures 
over a span o f 74 days at a total cost o f $ 159,513.
Table 5.18: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing 
Business in Buffalo
Area of Business 
Regulation
Number of 
Procedures Time (Days) Cost
Starting a Business 7 8 $1,325
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 14 59 $21,945
Registering Property 5 6 $60,219
Paying Taxes 17 - $76,024
TOTALS 43 73 $159,513
Table 5.19 below shows the total procedures, time, and dollar cost o f doing 
business in Cleveland. Like Buffalo, the most procedures come in paying taxes (16) and 
dealing with construction permits (14). Starting a business, however, requires the least 
number o f procedures at five. Dealing with construction permits, again like Buffalo, 
takes nearly two months, but registering property takes only four days. Unlike Buffalo, 
though, the highest dollar cost of doing business is in dealing with construction permits 
($33,650), not paying taxes ($23,400). Overall, in the first year it takes firms in 
Cleveland 38 procedures, 71 days, and $79,085.
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Table 5.19: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing
Business in Cleveland
Area of Business 
Regulation
Number of 
Procedures Time (Days) Cost
Starting a Business 4 8 $125
Dealing with Construction ' 
Permits 13 59 $33,650
Registering Property 5 4 $21,910
Paying Taxes 16 - $23,400
TOTALS 38 71 $79,085
Finally, Table 5.20 below details the total procedures, time, and cost o f doing 
business in Pittsburgh. Like Buffalo and Cleveland, paying taxes requires the most 
procedures (16). And like Buffalo, registering property requires the least (4). As with 
both cities above, dealing with construction permits requires the most time (81 days), and 
registering property requires the least (3). Unlike the other two cities, however, the 
greatest cost comes in registering property ($120,324), primarily because o f the high real 
estate transfer tax. Starting a business, accordingly, requires the least amount o f expenses 
($140). Overall, Pittsburgh firms need to navigate through 37 procedures over a period 
o f 90 days at a cost o f $225,368.
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Table 5.20: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing
Business in Pittsburgh
Area of Business 
Regulation
Number of 
Procedures Time (Days) Cost
Starting a Business 6 6 $140
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 11 81 $11,936
Registering Property 4 3 $120,324
Paying Taxes 16 - $92,968
TOTALS 37 90 $225,368
Among the three cities, all require the most procedures in paying taxes and the 
most time in dealing with construction permits. The least number o f procedures for 
Cleveland and Pittsburgh comes in registering property, but for Buffalo it comes in 
starting a business. For all o f the cities, the least number o f days comes in registering 
property. The greatest cost for each, however, differs. The greatest cost for Buffalo 
comes in paying taxes, while for Cleveland it is in dealing with construction permits. For 
Pittsburgh, the greatest cost comes in registering for property. For all o f the cities, the 
lowest dollar cost is in starting a business.
Table 5.21 below summarizes the total procedures, time, and cost o f doing 
business in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Overall, the number o f procedures in 
doing business is lowest in Pittsburgh at 37 and highest in Buffalo at 44. In terms of days 
spent fulfilling regulatory requirements, Pittsburgh is highest at 90 and Cleveland is 
lowest at 71. Finally, in terms o f dollar value o f regulatory cost, Cleveland has the 
lowest at $79,085, and Pittsburgh has the highest at $225,368.
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Table 5.21: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing
Business in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
City Number of Procedures Time (Days) Cost
Buffalo 44 74 $159,513
Cleveland 38 71 $79,085
Pittsburgh 37 90 $225,368
Table 5.22 below compares the total index scores among Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh. These numbers are the average o f the regulation area scores and represent the 
overall regulatory climate for each city. Cleveland has the top score in starting a business, 
registering property, and paying taxes, while Pittsburgh has the top score in dealing with 
construction permits. Buffalo has the second highest score in only one o f the areas of 
regulation: paying taxes. In the other three areas, it has the lowest score. The overall 
regulatory climate ranking has Cleveland at the top with a score o f 75.0 and Pittsburgh 
second with a score o f 61.0.
Table 5.22: Regulatory Climate: Total Index Scores
Starting a 
Business
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits
Registering
Property
Paying
Taxes Overall
Cleveland 100.0 40.0 73.3 100.0 78.3
Pittsburgh 71.9 65.0 50.0 15.0 50.5
Buffalo 0.0 62.0 30.6 20.7 28.3
As a note on clarity, it is worth mentioning that the real estate transfer tax
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measurement presents a limitation to the methodology o f the index. That Pittsburgh has 
the highest real estate transfer tax rates than Buffalo and Cleveland may simply reflect 
general market demand for property. Thus, the greater the demand for business real 
estate the higher the rates of taxation on that property and on transferring it to new 
proprietors. High real estate tax rates may, then, represent a burden, when they may 
signal a robust market for property. To account for this bias, I can remove the cost 
category from the measure “registering property.” Even when this is done, there is still no 
change in city ranking. Cleveland remains the lowest regulatory-burdened city.
Moreover, this section evaluates each city using data on current regulations. The 
absence o f a longitudinal look at the patterns of regulatory burden over the past ten years 
is another limitation to the regulatory index. Data simply do not exist to calculate index 
scores for this time period. But, the nature o f the procedures examined bear an 
unchanging nature. For example, under “starting a business,” it takes Pittsburgh two 
separate procedures to register a firm name with the Secretary of State. In Buffalo and 
Cleveland, this process is combined into one procedure. This difference is based on 
internal administrative procedure which is unlikely to change drastically from year to 
year. As an educated assumption, we can use this index measure as a relative constant 
for at least the past ten years.
The previous chapter demonstrated the post-industrial and economic superiority 
o f Pittsburgh, and this chapter has thus far shown the importance o f institutions and 
prudent, liberal public economic policy. Why then does Pittsburgh have the most 
advanced post-industrial economy despite Cleveland’s better regulatory climate? The 
answer may lie in other forms of public policy. Regulatory burden for firms is one side
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of the story. The other side evaluates the extent to which individuals as consumers find it 
easy to live in a particular city. The next section assesses the tax burden placed on 
individuals as well as the overall cost of living in each city.
TAX BURDEN AND COST OF LIVING
Public policies that make doing business easy in a city certainly aid economic 
development. But, it is not the whole picture o f governmental intervention. Individuals 
must have the disposable income to enjoy the goods and services produced in a particular 
locale. This section assesses the tax burden applied to individuals as well as the cost of 
living in each city. This measure explains the attraction or disincentive to live in a 
particular city.
The most significant tax burdens on individuals are income, property, and sales 
taxes. To calculate the total tax obligations, I make a few assumptions about income, 
property, and sales purchases. These assumptions are based on the annual Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Report.29 Household income is $75,000, property 
value is $250,000, and purchases subject to sales tax are $55,000 for Cleveland and 
Buffalo at $40,000 for Pittsburgh. The purchases subject to sales tax for Pittsburgh are 
lower because sales tax is not applied to general food, clothing, and shelter. Items 
exempt from the tax include “food (not ready-to-eat); candy and gum; most clothing; 
textbooks; computer services; pharmaceutical drugs; sales for resale; and residential
"Economic News Release: Consumer Expenditures—2013," U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cesan.nrO.htm.
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IDheating fuels such as oil, electricity, gas, coal, and firewood.” Otherwise, sales tax is 
applied to all other purchases as in New York and Ohio, such as tangible personal 
property and services. The taxes listed below do not include federal income taxes or 
deductions.
Table 5.23 below details the income, property, and sales taxes in Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Buffalo and Cleveland have similar income tax obligations at 
5.6% and 5.7%, respectively. Pittsburgh has a much lower income tax at 3.07%. Given 
the assumptions, households in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh are subject to annual 
tax obligations o f $4,185, $4,275, and $2,303, respectively. For property taxes, Buffalo 
has the lowest at 2.19% with an annual obligation o f $5,475. Pittsburgh has the next 
lowest at 2.219% with a burden of $5,548. Cleveland has the highest property tax rate of 
2.8%, making the tax obligation $7,000 for the year. Pittsburgh has the lowest sales tax 
rate at 7.0%. By law, the Pennsylvania sales tax rate is actually six percent, but an extra 
one percent is added to purchases made in Allegheny County.33 Thus, the yearly 
obligation is $2,800. Cleveland’s sales tax is 8.0% and Buffalo’s is 8.8%, each owing 
$4,400 and $4,813, respectively. Annually, Pittsburgh households pay the least in taxes, 
$10,650 for a 14.2% burden. Buffalo households pay the next lowest amount at $14,473
30 "Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax," Pennsylvania Department o f Revenue, at 
http://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Informati 
on/Pages/Sales-Use-and-Hotel-Occupancy-Tax.aspx#.VEZtv4vDVbN.
31 "Sales and Use Tax," New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, at 
http://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/st/stidx.htm.
32 "Sales & Use Tax," Ohio Department o f Taxation, at 
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/sales_and_use.aspx.
33 "Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax."
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for a 19.3% burden. Cleveland has the highest total burden at $15,675, paying 20.9% of 
total annual income.
Table 5.23: Individual Tax Burden: Income, Property, and Sales Taxes in Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
City
Income Property Sales Percent Total
Rate Burden Rate Burden Rate Burden Burden Burden
Buffalo 5.6% $4,185 2.19% $5,475 8.8% $4,813 19.3% $14,473
Cleveland 5.7% $4,275 2.8% $7,000 8.0% $4,400 20.9% $15,675
Pittsburgh 3.07% $2,303 2.219% $5,548 7.0% $2,800 14.2% $10,650
(Sources: “Sales & Use Tax,” Ohio Department o f Taxation, at 
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/sales_and_use.aspx; “Community Tax Rates,” Cuyahoga 
County Treasurer, at http://treasurer.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/community-tax- 
rates.aspx; “Village Tax Rates,” Erie County Real Property Tax Services, at 
http://www2.erie.gov/ecrpts/; “Property Tax Worksheet,” Office o f the Mayor, City o f 
Pittsburgh, at http://pittsburghpa.gov/property-tax-worksheet/; “Current Tax Rates,” 
Pennsylvania Department o f Revenue, at
http://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Current%20Tax%20Rates/Pages/def 
ault.aspx#.VEZrzIvDVbN; “State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2014,” Tax Foundation, 
at http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2014)
These tax rates offer at least a partial explanation for the dichotomy between 
economic development and regulatory burden. Pittsburgh has a 32.1% lower tax burden 
than Cleveland, indicating a less interventionist local government on individuals. The 
lower tax burden enables households to use more o f their incomes in ways they 
subjectively see fit.
Another measure that can offer a picture of the attraction o f residing in either 
Buffalo, Cleveland, or Pittsburgh is cost o f living. It does not directly evaluate
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governmental intervention or institutional capacity, but it does buttress the ease-of-living 
argument above. The cost o f living measure used below is the Cost o f Living Index 
published each quarter by the Council for Community and Economic Research. It 
measures relative price levels for consumer goods and services. The index is read as a 
percentage of the average o f all 302 metropolitan areas evaluated. Table 5.24 below 
shows the cost of living index for the second quarter of 2014, which is the most recent 
data available. The top row shows the weights given to each item. The heaviest weights 
go to miscellaneous goods and services and housing at 33.01% and 26.05%, respectively. 
The index shows Pittsburgh with the lowest cost o f living and Cleveland with the highest. 
Grocery items in Cleveland are well above the national average at 106.6, and grocery 
items in Buffalo are well below at 94.9. Further, housing is relatively expensive in 
Buffalo at 107.7 and relatively cheap in Pittsburgh at 84.7. Unfortunate for Cleveland 
and Pittsburgh is the high cost o f utilities at 105.9 and 107.7, respectively. Utilities in 
Buffalo, however, are well below the national average. Transportation is more expensive 
than the national average across the cities, Pittsburgh having the highest at 106.1. Health 
care expenses are notably inexpensive in Buffalo and Pittsburgh at 90.8 and 94.9, 
respectively, but exceptionally high in Cleveland at 111.3. For miscellaneous goods and 
services, Cleveland has slightly higher than average prices at 102.7, and Buffalo has 
slightly lower than average prices at 98.4. Pittsburgh is well below at 95.9. Overall, the 
Pittsburgh’s cost of living index score is well below the national average at 95.6,
Buffalo’s is just below at 97.2, and Cleveland’s is just above at 102.2.
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Table 5.24: Cost of Living Index, Second Quarter 2014
100% 13.48% 26.05% 9.95% 12.63% 4.89% 33.01%
MSA Index GroceryItems Housing Utilities
Trans­
portation
Health
Care
Misc.
Goods
and
Services
Buffalo 97.2 94.9 107.7 95.8 102.1 90.8 98.4
Cleveland 102.2 106.6 95.8 105.9 102.7 111.3 102.7
Pittsburgh 95.6 97.0 84.7 107.7 106.1 94.9 95.9
(Source: “Cost of Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, Second Quarter 
2014,” Council for Community and Economic Research)
These price indices, however, are only for the most recent quarter. To gain an 
understanding o f the long term changes in prices and cost o f living, Table 5.25 shows the 
average cost of living index per year from 2000 to 2014 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh. Figure 5.1 below gives a graphical representation of the patterns o f cost of 
living changes. In 2000 and 2001, Cleveland had the highest cost o f living at 109.9 and 
109.3 and Buffalo had the lowest at 100.2 and 103.7. Buffalo had the second lowest cost 
o f living between 2002 and 2004 and had the highest cost of living from 2005 to 2008. 
Since 2009, Buffalo has had the second lowest cost of living, with Cleveland having the 
highest. Buffalo’s average index score for the past five years is 98.5, and its ten-year 
average is 98.9, just below the national average.
With the exception o f 2005-2008, Cleveland has had the highest cost of living. It 
fell from 109.9 in 2000 to 97.9 in 2006, rose slightly in 2007 to 98.9, and fell to a 14-year 
low in 2008 at 96.2. Since then, Cleveland’s cost o f living rose to 101.1 in 2010 and has
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remained at that general level since. Cleveland’s average for the past five years is 101.0, 
and its ten-year average is 99.6, just below the national average.
Since 2002, Pittsburgh has had the lowest cost of living, tying Cleveland at 98.9 
in one year, 2007. There was a sharp drop in Pittsburgh’s cost o f living from 2000 to 
2005, from 107.7 to 93.0. From 2005 to 2007, Pittsburgh’s cost o f living rose in 
accordance with the housing boom from 93.0 to 98.9. It fell afterward until 2010, when it 
hit a 14-year low at 91.6. It rose slightly in 2011 to 94.8 and has hovered around this 
level since. Pittsburgh’s cost o f living has remained below the national average since 
2002. Its average for the past five years is 94.0, and the ten-year average is 94.2, both 
well below the national average.
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Table 5.25: Cost of Living Index, Average Per Year, 2000-2014
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
2000 100.2 109.9 107.7
2001 103.7 109.3 105.1
2002 100.2 104.8 98.0
2003 101.3 102.8 96.9
2004 98.8 105.6 96.7
2005 100.1 99.2 93.0
2006 102.2 97.9 96.0
2007 101.4 98.9 98.9
2008 96.4 96.2 92.6
2009 96.5 98.7 92.1
2010 96.6 101.1 91.6
2011 98.6 101.4 94.8
2012 98.5 101.6 94.5
2013 99.5 100.1 93.9
2014* 99.4 100.7 95.0
Avg 5 Yrs 98.5 101.0 94.0
Avg 10 Yrs 98.9 99.6 94.2
(Source: “Cost o f Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, 2000-2014,” 
Council for Community and Economic Research)
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Figure 5.1: Cost of Living Index, Average Per Year, 2000-2014
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(Source: “Cost of Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, 2000-2014,” 
Council for Community and Economic Research)
The above tax rates and cost o f living patterns demonstrate the financial benefits 
o f residing in Pittsburgh relative to Cleveland and Buffalo. The overall tax rates and 
overall cost o f living are significantly lower in Pittsburgh, even as the costs o f utilities 
and transportation remain well above the national average. The next section will explain 
the implications o f the tax burden and cost of living in relation to the findings o f the 
regulatory burden analysis above.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter began by hypothesizing that levels o f post-industrial development 
among Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh correlate positively with institutional 
regulatory burden. The null hypothesis, then, is that there is no positive correlation 
between levels o f post industrial development and institutional regulatory burden. Since 
Pittsburgh’s economy has been the greatest performing economy, outpacing Cleveland 
and Buffalo, I expected to find that the regulatory burden would be lowest in Pittsburgh 
and highest in Buffalo. The results were mixed. The regulatory index reveals Cleveland 
with the lowest regulatory burden, yet an analysis o f taxation and prices for goods and 
services for individuals reveals Pittsburgh as having the lowest cost o f living.
The analysis first discussed the liberal institutionalist interpretation o f the proper 
role o f government. The only legitimate and economically optimal functions of 
government are those absolutely necessary to protect private property rights.
Government intervention beyond this minimal requirement necessarily distorts 
production processes away from efficiency and serving the wants and needs of 
individuals. Two of the prominent ways in which local governments impede the market 
process are through regulation and taxation. Thus, the chapter has focused on examining 
the regulatory and tax burden that disincentivize doing business and living in the cities of 
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
The regulatory index measured the number o f procedures, time, and cost o f 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, and paying 
taxes. Cleveland received the highest score in starting a business, entailing the lowest 
number o f procedures, shortest time, and lowest cost. Buffalo had the lowest score.
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Under dealing with permits, Pittsburgh received the highest score. Even though dealing 
with permits takes the longest amount o f time in Pittsburgh, it entails the fewest number 
o f procedures and cost. Cleveland received the lowest score in this regulatory category. 
Pittsburgh had the second best score in registering property, as well, entailing the fewest 
procedures and days, but it proved to be much more expensive than either Buffalo or 
Cleveland. Cleveland had the best score, and Buffalo had the worst. Finally, under 
paying taxes, Cleveland has the lowest tax obligations, and Pittsburgh has the highest. 
Overall, the first year o f doing business for a firm is most expensive in Pittsburgh and 
least expensive in Cleveland. Cleveland also has the best regulatory index score, Buffalo 
has the worst, and Pittsburgh lies in the middle. According to the regulatory index, it is 
easiest doing business in Cleveland.
The regulatory index provides a useful framework for present burdens on 
businesses. In a world of full and perfect information, data would be available to conduct 
a longitudinal study o f index scores from 1990 until the present. Unfortunately, data 
limitations preclude this attempt. Instead, it can be reasonably assumed that these 
regulatory polices and levels of regulatory burden remained relatively steady in the past 
ten years.
The other side o f the story involves ease of living. To balance the study, I 
examined individual tax rates and overall cost o f living. When considering income, 
property, and sales taxes in each city, I found that Pittsburgh has the best individual tax 
environment and Cleveland has the worst. This same pattern exists in the cost o f living 
measure: Pittsburgh has the lowest cost o f living, and Cleveland has the highest. If the
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historical patterns remain constant, the cost o f living ranking will remain the same in the 
near future.
Given this evidence, the null hypothesis that there is no negative correlation 
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden can be 
rejected. Even though it seems Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden for firms, 
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden for individuals. Since there is no definitive 
evidence that rules out the hypothesis, the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation 
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden remains 
plausible.
Despite the ambiguous results o f this analysis, it remains clear that formal 
institutions play a role in development. Local governments enact policies that either 
attract or discourage entrepreneurial activity. In one sense, local and state governments 
make Cleveland a more lucrative place to do business. In another sense, it is relatively 
difficult to live there. Pittsburgh displays the opposite characteristics. That Pittsburgh 
has the greatest development than Cleveland points to alternative explanations than 
formal institutions. The next chapter posits the plausibility of path dependence and prior 
diversification as explanations for the differences in post-industrialization among 
metropolitan areas.
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CHAPTER VI
PATH DEPENDENCE AND POST-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION
Each o f the three metropolitan areas suffered industrial decline in the 1970s and 
1980s, characterized by a significant drop in manufacturing employment. Prior to decline, 
manufacturing employment made up a large proportion of each region’s total 
employment. Deindustrialization caused labor dislocation and a decrease in total 
employment. Not all cities, however, had the same dependence on industrial 
manufacturing. This chapter hypothesizes that a sizeable service sector serves as a 
foundation for post-industrialization and may mitigate the negative effects o f shocks to 
local economies in a path dependent way. If so, one should observe a positive correlation 
between the level of post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service 
sector prior to deindustrialization. Unemployed workers may be able to find jobs in the 
service sector and contribute to its growth. Given that Pittsburgh has the highest levels of 
post-industrialization and Buffalo has the lowest, I expect to find that Pittsburgh had the 
largest tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization and Buffalo had the smallest.
This expectation expresses the idea o f path dependence. This chapter begins with 
a short discussion o f path dependency. Next, to identify the period o f industrial decline, I 
analyze the manufacturing employment decline among the three cities. I then present the 
patterns o f tertiary employment as a percentage of total employment to determine the 
relationship between the size of the service sector before deindustrialization and the 
intensity and trajectory o f economic recovery. Finally, total employment and tertiary
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employment growth is evaluated to display the paths and trajectories o f post­
industrialism among the three cases. The analysis shows that a strong tertiary sector prior 
to deindustrialization coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and 
higher tertiary sector employment growth. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the null 
hypothesis— there is no correlation between the size o f the service sector prior to 
deindustrialization and levels o f post-industrial redevelopment— can be rejected.
PATH DEPENDENCE
The reasoning behind the hypothesis that the size o f the service sector prior to
deindustrialization will be correlated with a better post-industrial recovery takes its logic
from the insights o f path dependency. Path dependence can explain how a set of
circumstances has come about because of decisions made in the past. In other words,
history matters. Margaret Levi put forth a more precise definition than the broad
conception that in some undefined and vague sense that “history matters”:
Path dependence has to mean, if  it is to mean anything, that once a country 
or region has started down a track, the costs o f reversal are very high.
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments o f certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal o f the initial choice.
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same 
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although 
it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other—and 
essential if  the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a climber begins 
is the one she tends to follow.1
One pays special attention to five characteristics o f path dependence:
1 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
Historical Analysis," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. 
Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 28.
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1. Lock-in: One choice or action becomes better than any other because a 
sufficient number o f people have already made that choice.
2. High switching costs: Once a pattern o f behavior begins on a path, changing 
to another pattern or path entails increasing costs.
3. Positive returns: The more a choice is made or an action is taken, the greater 
its benefits.2
4. Asset/labor specificity: Capital goods, including labor, is produced for a 
narrow purpose. Transitioning capital to another purpose is difficult and 
costly.
5. Sequencing: Initial events cause temporally-linked and causally-tight 
deterministic chains o f events that are nearly uninterruptible.
Using path dependence as a causal explanation requires the presence of at least some of
these processes in the rise o f the tertiary sector in Pittsburgh and their relative absence in
Cleveland and Buffalo.3
There are also different degrees o f path dependence. The first and most simple
form of path dependence exists when there is a basic assertion o f an intertemporal
relationship between present conditions and past actions. Margolis and Liebowitz term
this “first degree path dependence:
For example, an individual does not alter his consumption o f housing 
services every day in response to changes income or relative prices. Since 
one’s exact consumption of housing is largely determined by a rental or 
purchase decision made some time in the past, an observer could not 
expect to determine the values o f a consumer's housing consumption today
•y
Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, 112-13.
3 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," 
American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 253.
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even with full knowledge of the current values that enter that consumer's 
optimization problem. So here we have something that could be called 
path dependence. What we have today depends critically on conditions 
that prevailed and decisions taken at some time in the past. The 
observation that the consumer’s bundle is narrowly wrong, given today’s 
income and prices, would not, however, prompt anyone to claim that the 
consumer is irrational, nor would it prompt us to discard consumer 
rationality as a basis for analysis. In any practical approach to modeling 
the consumer’s choice problem, we would recognize the presence o f some 
fixed or quasi-fixed factors and the presence of transaction costs, and 
examine the consumer’s action as a rational pursuit o f his interests. Here 
we have persistence and perhaps nothing else. The consumer may well 
have properly predicted all future prices, incomes, family size 
developments, and so on. If so, there is no error or inefficiency.4
The second form details a path dependent process rooted in some imperfect prediction at
some time in the past that resulted in a regrettable state of affairs in the present. This
“second degree path dependence” occurs when
individuals fail to predict the future perfectly, it is likely that ex 
ante efficient decisions may not turn out to be efficient in retrospect. You 
may build a house without knowing that five years hence a sewage 
treatment plant will be built nearby, lowering property values and the 
neighbourhood amenities available. Here the inferiority o f a chosen path is 
unknowable at the time a choice is made, but we later recognize that some 
alternative path would have yielded greater wealth. In such a situation, 
which we have termed second-degree path dependence, there is a 
dependence on past conditions that leads to outcomes that are regrettable 
and costly to change. We would not have built the house had we known 
what was going to transpire. This dependence is not, however, inefficient 
in any meaningful sense, given the assumed limitations on knowledge.5
The third form makes the strongest claims. It posits an intertemporal process with
inefficiencies in the path chosen. These inefficiencies could have been remedied by
choosing another path. For example, “You know a sewage plant is going to be built but
build a house nearby anyway since all o f your friends are buying houses there and you
4 Stephen E. Margolis and S.J. Liebowitz, "Path Dependence," University o f Texas 
Dallas, at https://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/palgrave/palpd.html.
5 Ibid.
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value being part o f that neighbourhood. You would rather buy a house away from the 
sewage plant, and so would your friends, but you and your friends are somehow unable to 
coordinate your actions.”6
The form o f path dependence examined in this chapter is the first and most basic 
one, claiming broadly that “history matters.” The data below represent a certain 
durability in the patterns of tertiary sector employment since deindustrialization.
MANUFACTURING AND TERTIARY EMPLOYMENT BEFORE AND AFTER 
INDUSTRIAL DECLINE
To evaluate the correlation between the size o f pre-decline tertiary sector and 
post-industrial revitalization, I analyze the data on sectoral full- and part-time 
employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. This section will determine the status 
o f tertiary and manufacturing employment prior to and after industrial decline. Figure
6.1 below shows manufacturing jobs as a percentage o f total employment for the three 
metropolitan areas and metropolitan United States from 1969 to 2012. Throughout the 
period, Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f manufacturing employment, and 
Cleveland had the highest. In 1969, Pittsburgh manufacturing jobs made up 28.4% of 
total employment. That same year, Buffalo’s manufacturing employment made up 31.3%, 
and Cleveland’s made up 32.6%. The US average was 23.0%. While manufacturing fell 
throughout the period, substantial drops for all three cities began in 1979. The figure 
shows a general trend common among the three cases. From 1979 to 1987 a sharp 
decline o f manufacturing employment occurred. A slight leveling off occurred in 1987,
6 Ibid.
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followed by a slower decline. After 2000, manufacturing employment dropped 
significantly again. In 2012, Pittsburgh’s manufacturing sector made up 6.5% of total 
full- and part-time employment, matching the national metropolitan average. Buffalo’s 
was 8.1% and Cleveland’s was 10.0%.
The slight drop between 2000 and 2012 may reflect changes in the ways industrial 
employment was calculated and sorted. Beginning in 2001, the Bureau o f Economic 
Analysis began classifying industrial sectors using the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) to replace the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system before 2001. Whereas SIC “manufacturing” roughly translates into the same 
NAICS “manufacturing” occupations and industries, not all SIC service-sector 
classifications translate precisely. Thus, the statistical evidence between 2000 and 2012 
must be interpreted loosely to reflect changes in the bureaucratic management o f labor 
statistics. The table in Appendix I details the translations between SIC divisions and 
NAICS sectors.
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Figure 6.1: Manufacturing Jobs as Percentage of Total Employment for Buffalo, 
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Metropolitan US, 1969-2012
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(<Source: “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by SIC Industry, 
1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS 
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
Figure 6.1 above placed the beginning o f rapid industrial decline in 1979. Figure
6.2 below shows tertiary jobs as a percentage o f total employment before and after 1979. 
Throughout both periods, Pittsburgh had the highest percentage o f total employment in 
the tertiary sector. For most o f the period prior to 1979, Buffalo had the lowest 
proportion o f tertiary jobs. In 1979, Buffalo’s tertiary sector made up 55.3% of total
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employment and Cleveland’s made up 55.5%. That same year, Pittsburgh’s tertiary 
sector was 56.7% of the total. After 1979, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector soared to well 
above the national average, while Buffalo and Cleveland followed it closely. Another 
surge in 2000 saw Cleveland’s tertiary sector rise above the national average and then 
even out by 2002. Again, this surge after 2000 may be a result o f the change from SIC to 
NAICS industrial classifications. But notably, Buffalo’s increase from 2000 to 2012 was 
not as pronounced as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, or the national average. Table 6.2 shows, 
then, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector strength relative to the other cities prior to 
deindustrialization and the blossoming o f it after 1979. Cleveland and Buffalo traded 
positions numerous times after 1979. But from 2000 to 2012, Cleveland’s tertiary sector 
made up a greater proportion o f total employment than Buffalo’s, which is in line with 
levels o f post-industrialization. In 2012, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector made up 77.4% of 
total full- and part-time employment. Cleveland’s was 73.8%, and Buffalo’s was 73.4%. 
These proportions are compared to the national metropolitan average of 74.0%.
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Figure 6.2: Tertiary Jobs as Percentage of Total Employment for Buffalo, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, and Metropolitan US, 1969-2012
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(Source: “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by SIC Industry, 
1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS 
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 above showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest proportion of 
manufacturing full- and part-time employment prior to deindustrialization and maintained 
that trend throughout the post-industrial period. While Cleveland has maintained the 
largest proportion o f manufacturing jobs, it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo in 
1979 and has retained that position since 2000. This cursory connection between tertiary 
sector robustness and post-industrial development invites further analysis on the
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cushioning effect o f a large tertiary sector on the eve of industrial decline. The next 
section will explore the effects of a burgeoning tertiary sector on post-industrial 
employment recovery.
TERTIARY SECTOR EFFECTS ON POST-INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY
The size o f each region’s tertiary sector prior to industrial decline served as a 
foundation for the trajectory of post-industrial development. Figure 6.3 below shows the 
percent employment change since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Two 
patterns are noticeable in this graph. First, the size o f tertiary sectors prior to 
deindustrialization is correlated with employment growth. From 1969 to 2012, 
Pittsburgh’s employment grew 26.25%, whereas Cleveland’s grew 17.28%, and 
Buffalo’s grew 13.27%. The figure also shows generally the highest peaks for Pittsburgh 
and the lowest for Buffalo. Second, a correlation exists between the size o f tertiary 
sectors prior to deindustrialization and the severity o f economic downturns. All three 
cities saw employment plummet from 1979 to 1983. Pittsburgh’s employment fell to 
-1.44% of the 1969 level. Cleveland’s fell to -3.01%. And Buffalo’s fell to -5.79% in 
1983. Pittsburgh shows a slower recovery after 1983, but it was smoother and less 
interrupted. Buffalo’s recovery was steady from 1986 until around 1989, in line with 
Pittsburgh’s. Buffalo’s employment level, however, relatively stagnated from 1990 until 
2012. Cleveland had the most robust recovery from 1983 to 1990. In the early 1990s, 
however, the figure shows a relatively minor decline for Pittsburgh and a more 
pronounced one for Cleveland. This same trend occurs in the early 2000s and from 2008 
to 2010. Cleveland’s employment figures throughout the period show rapid growth but
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sharp declines during economic downturns. Pittsburgh’s employment pattern is 
characterized by relatively slower but steadier growth and greater insulation from 
employment declines. Buffalo’s post-industrial recovery from 1983 to 1990 showed 
strong growth in line with Pittsburgh’s and Cleveland’s, but from 1990 to 2012, job 
growth was only 3.82%. Figure 6.3 therefore displays the correlation between size of 
tertiary sectors in 1969 among the cities and the measures o f employment growth and 
economic shock insulation.
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Figure 6.3: Percent Employment Change Since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Pittsburgh
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1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS 
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
The size o f tertiary sectors in 1969 also initiated a path dependent positive 
feedback mechanism. The tertiary sector assumes a higher trajectory the larger the sector 
is prior to deindustrialization, and a lower trajectory characterizes the smaller the sector 
in 1969. Figure 6.4 below shows the change in total tertiary employment since 1969 for 
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. From 1969 until 1979, tertiary sectors across the 
cities grew at similar intensities. During this time, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector grew
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18.36%, Cleveland’s grew 17.53%, and Buffalo’s grew 18.65%. Pittsburgh, however, 
was the only city to grow its tertiary sector during the sharp manufacturing decline in 
1979-1983. Pittsburgh’s tertiary employment grew 1.77% during this time. Buffalo and 
Cleveland had tertiary job growth o f -2.22% and -1.83%, respectively. From 1979 until 
2012, Pittsburgh maintained the highest rates of tertiary job growth. From 1979 until 
1995, Cleveland had the lowest rates o f tertiary job growth. Buffalo maintained the 
lowest from 1995 until 2012, with the exceptions o f 2010 and 2011. Like the total 
employment figures above in Figure 6.3, Buffalo experienced steady tertiary job growth 
from 1983 until 1990, when it began to slow. Cleveland’s tertiary job growth stagnated 
beginning in 2001, continuing until 2012 and allowing Buffalo’s trend to catch up.
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Figure 6.4: Change in Total Tertiary Employment Since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland, 
and Pittsburgh
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(Source: “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by SIC Industry, 
1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS 
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
To gain a clearer understanding of the path dependent trajectory o f tertiary sector 
growth, Figure 6.5 below shows the same tertiary patterns with linear regression lines. 
Even though Buffalo’s and Cleveland’s tertiary growth patterns interweave throughout 
the period, the figure shows Cleveland on a higher trajectory o f growth than Buffalo. On 
average Cleveland’s yearly tertiary job growth throughout the period is 1.9%, and 
Buffalo’s is 1.7%. Pittsburgh’s average annual tertiary job growth since 1969 is the
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highest at 2.2%. These trajectories o f tertiary job growth correlate with the size of 
tertiary sectors prior to manufacturing decline.
Figure 6.5: Percent of Total Tertiary Employment Change Since 1969 for Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh with Trend Lines
90.0
80.0
70.0
/  /V v
40.0
20.0
1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002  2005  2008  2011
.. . . . . . . .  Bujfa]0 — “ ""Cleveland “ “ Pittsburgh
(Source: “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by SIC Industry, 
1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS 
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
At least one causal explanation for the resilience o f the Pittsburgh economy in the 
post-industrial era is its ability to maintain its steel-making expertise despite losing its 
steel-making capacity. Treado (2010) demonstrated that this expertise formed the 
foundation o f Pittsburgh’s post-industrial role as a prime participant in the global steel 
value chain. Treado argued, “Pittsburgh’s ability to maintain a key position within the 
global steel industry, without maintaining a sizeable base of steel productive capacity, 
provides a valuable case study o f the complex relationship between path dependence and 
regional resilience.”7 Where as Chinitz suggested that Pittsburgh’s lock-in path 
dependence o f steel-making would spell disaster o f steel left the region,8 Martin and 
Sunley demonstrated that a traditional regional industrial path can be beneficial and serve 
as a basis for successful economic transformation.9 Thus, an industrial past can create 
conditions for regional resilience.
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh shared in their dependencies on the steel 
industry, but Pittsburgh was more successful in rescuing “several key elements o f its 
traditional industrial base in order to become a global player in technology-based industry. 
The case of the Pittsburgh region represents a particularly striking example of regional 
resilience in that Pittsburgh has been able to maintain its participation in the global steel 
value chain despite suffering the most dramatic losses of steel-making capacity in the
7 Carey Durkin Treado, "Pittsburgh's Evolving Steel Legacy and the Steel Technology 
Cluster," Cambridge Journal o f  Regions, Economy and Society 3 (2010): 105.
8 Benjamin Chinitz, "Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh," Papers and 
Proceedings o f  the American Economic Association (1961).
9 Martin and Sunley, "Path Dependence and Regional Economic Evolution."
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United States.”10 In addition, Pittsburgh excels at producing steel technology and is the
center o f steel technology supply. Treado observed the largest concentration of
intermediate supplier firms in Pittsburgh. The metropolitan area even has more suppliers
to the steel industry than the Chicago-Gary and Cleveland regions combined.11 The
products and services offered include production machinery and equipment; engineering
and consulting services that assist mills in the selection, design, and upgrading of that
equipment; operating supplies and services needed to maintain production; and,
minimally, the raw material inputs o f steel production. The knowledge necessary to
produce steel carried over into the post-industrial era.
Co-location also plays a role in post-industrial resilience. Treado notes,
the Mitsubishi-Hitachi join venture established its America[n] 
headquarters (and only overseas headquarters) in the Pittsburgh region in 
2004, despite having North American headquarters for both Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industry and Hitachi, Ltd. in New York City and numerous other 
divisions scattered throughout the United States. Company 
representatives explained that the Pittsburgh location was chosen to access 
secondary supplies and to co-locate with other major mill builders.12
Pittsburgh, as a centralized source of steel technology, provides two important
advantages to firms:
First, the mill builders serve a coordinating function for other cluster 
participants by organizing several different types o f firms in order to 
complete large-scale projects for steel producers. Second, the US steel 
producers are also able to collect bids for a project with a visit to one US 
location. In this way, access to customers through the steel value chain is 
part o f the advantage of Pittsburgh’s cluster, even though the majority o f 
steel production occurs elsewhere.13
10 Treado, "Pittsburgh's Evolving Steel Legacy and the Steel Technology Cluster," 106.
11 Ibid., 109.
12 Ibid., 110.
13 Ibid., 111.
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The combination of industrial expertise, university knowledge in materials engineering, 
and corporate research and development reinforces the cluster o f steel technological 
knowledge.
In the broad sense o f path dependence, Treado demonstrates, “the presence o f the 
steel technology cluster is more consistent with its legacy.”14 The preeminence of the 
steel industry in Pittsburgh, in other words, formed the foundation for post-industrial 
specialization in industrial technological expertise. Positive returns through clustering 
and labor specificity in steel expertise account for this path dependent process.
The chapter began by hypothesizing a positive correlation between level o f post­
industrial development and size of tertiary sector before deindustrialization. Given the 
ranking o f post-industrial economies detailed in chapter four, I expected to find that 
Pittsburgh had the most robust tertiary sector prior to industrial decline, and Buffalo had 
the least.
Path dependence theory informs this hypothesis. At the most basic level, path 
dependence processes reflect the idea that history matters. Path dependency scholars 
posit different definitions of what constitutes a path dependent process. The first and 
most popular claim details an intertemporal durability between past actions and present 
conditions. The second construction emphasizes a path that is eventually regrettable but 
not necessarily inefficient. The third conception underscores a path that propagates error, 
but also that the error is avoidable. This hypothesis uses the most basic and broad 
formation of path dependence, which is characterized by positive returns and labor 
specificity.
14 Ibid., 113.
The analysis above showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f full- and 
part-time manufacturing employment prior to industrial decline and maintained that trend 
until 2012. Cleveland has maintained the largest percentage o f manufacturing jobs from 
1969 to 2012, and it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo prior to deindustrialization 
and since 2000. Additional figures showed that Pittsburgh exhibited the highest rates o f 
overall employment growth from 1969 to 2012, and Buffalo showed the lowest. Further, 
Pittsburgh’s overall employment levels were highest in the crisis years o f 1979-1983, and 
Buffalo’s were the lowest. This pattern of relative insulation from economic downturns 
exists throughout the 1969-2012 period. In addition, Pittsburgh had the greatest 
trajectory o f tertiary sector growth over the same period, and Buffalo had the lowest. 
Overall, this chapter reveals that a strong tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization 
coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and higher tertiary sector 
employment growth. One reason for this pattern is the maintenance o f steel expertise in 
the post-industrial era. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between 
level o f post-industrial redevelopment and size o f tertiary sector prior to industrial decline 
thus can be rejected.
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CHAPTER VII 
CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT
[T]here will almost always exist potential but unused 
resources which could be made to yield a useful return, but 
only after some time; and that the exploitation o f such 
resources will usually require that [other] resources, which 
could yield a return immediately or in the near future, have 
to be used in order to make these other resources yield any 
return at all. This simple fact fully suffices to explain why 
there will always be possibilities o f increasing the output 
obtained from the available resources by investing some of 
them for longer periods.
- F.A. Hayek1
INTRODUCTION
Capital accumulation is especially important in post-industrial development. At 
the most basic level, individual saving allocates resources for the structure o f production, 
for future consumption. Without individuals foregoing consumption to save, no 
production is possible. It is only with production that innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
economic expansion occurs. The greater the availability of capital, the more productive 
an economy can become. Accordingly, this chapter hypothesizes the highest capital 
accumulation occurred in Pittsburgh and the lowest in Buffalo. Thus, I expect to find a 
positive correlation between levels of capital accumulation and post-industrial 
revitalization. Ultimately, I find the highest levels o f capital accumulation and 
investment income in Pittsburgh, while Buffalo and Cleveland have mixed results.
1 F.A. Hayek, The Pure Theory o f  Capital (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009 
[1941]), 332.
218
Buffalo has had the lowest levels of venture capital and higher levels o f investment 
income than Cleveland. Cleveland, however, has had the lowest investment income and 
higher levels o f investment income than Buffalo. The null hypothesis that there is no 
positive correlation between levels o f capital accumulation and post-industrial 
revitalization, however, can be rejected.
This chapter first describes the importance o f savings in the structure of 
production and economic expansion. It then analyzes two available measures of capital 
in metropolitan areas: PwC-MoneyTree data on venture capital and Bureau o f Economic 
Analysis data on dividends, interest, and rent. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion 
on the inferences this data offers for the cities in this study.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN PRODUCTION
Investment capital is at the center o f post-industrial production.2 Even though
there has been a fundamental shift from manufacturing to service-oriented labor in these
three metropolitan areas, the analytical framework for describing capital in the structure
of production is no different than in the production o f physical goods. In producing both
goods and services, producers transform scarce elements of nature using capital goods.
To accumulate capital and capital goods, individuals must restrict consumption in the
present to save for consumption in the future. This saving can involve physical resources
or currency, which serves as a proxy for resources. Capital goods are not immediately
useful in satisfying consumer desires. They must be transformed into consumer goods
using labor. With few capital goods, only the most immediate goods and services and
2 For purposes o f this chapter, the term “capital” refers to capital investment. When 
referring to capital goods, I use the term “capital goods.”
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those in the lowest stages of production can be available for consumption. Production,
then, must precede consumption.3
Individuals cannot consume what has not been produced on some level. Even in
the most basic example, such as picking berries, the production process involves manual
labor prior to eating the berries. In more complex, intricate, and time consuming
processes, such as semiconductor innovation, greater amounts o f capital are necessary.
With greater amounts o f capital come longer and more complex processes o f production.
There are two ways in which these longer processes of production increase productivity:
by providing a greater production of the same good per unit o f time or by producing
consumer goods and services that are not at all available with shorter processes of
production.4 Thus, with longer processes, productivity either becomes more efficient or
creates new goods or services for consumption.
Longer processes and higher stages o f production require greater amounts o f
capital. Murray Rothbard explained:
Allowing for the relative urgency o f wants, m an.. .tends to invest first in 
those consumers’ goods with the shortest processes o f production.
Therefore, any given saving will be invested either in maintaining the 
present capital structure or in adding to it capital in more and more remote 
stages o f production, i.e., in longer processes of production. Thus, any 
new saving (beyond maintaining the structure) will tend to lengthen 
production processes and invest in higher and higher orders o f capital 
goods. In a modem economy, the capital structure contains goods of 
almost infinite remoteness from the eventual consumers’ goods.5
3 Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 47.
4 Ibid., 48.
5 Italics are original. Ibid., 57.
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In a regional post-industrial economy, especially, greater capital availability creates
increasing stages o f production to increase efficiency and productivity.
With greater capital accumulation comes greater saving and less relative
consumption. A common criticism of savings is the “paradox o f thrift” theory, developed
by John Maynard Keynes.6 This theory implies that a reduction o f consumption leads to
less revenues and can be deleterious to the macroeconomy. Spending and consumption,
in other words, drive the economy. Other economists, including F.A. Hayek, have
disputed this claim.7 The answer to the Keynesian assertion that a reduction in
consumption cannot support an increase in investment in production lies in
shifting investment further up the ladder to the higher-order production 
stages. Simple investigation will reveal that the only way that so much 
investment can be shifted from the lower to the higher stages, while 
preserving uniform (lowered) interest differentials (cumulative price 
spreads) at each stage, is to increase the number o f  productive stages in 
the economy, i.e., to lengthen the structure of production. The impact of 
net saving on the economy, i.e., o f increased total savings, is to lengthen 
and narrow the structure o f production, and this procedure is viable and 
self-supporting, since it preserves essential price spreads from stage to 
stage.8
Instead of the Keynesian assumption that spending drives the economy, it is actually 
savings that increase productivity and provides for the expansion of production processes.
Because o f uncertainty, investment in capital goods and the production o f future 
consumers goods involve risk. Entrepreneurs must manipulate capital toward producing 
goods or services that are speculated to be demanded. The longer the production process,
6 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f  Employment, Interest, and Money 
(London: Macmillan, 1936).
7 F.A. Hayek, "The "Paradox" o f Saving," Economica 32 (May 1931).
8 Italics are original. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 519.
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the more risk that is entailed, because future conditions cannot be precisely known.
Individuals provide capital to entrepreneurs in hopes o f greater return.9
The benefits o f capital investment can fall to investors, new employees o f startups,
and the entrepreneurs themselves. The main benefits to investors are entrepreneurial
profits in the short term. Profits are
earned by investors who see a profit to be gained by investing in a certain 
area. After a while, the profits tend to disappear as more investors enter 
this field, although changing data are always presenting new profit 
opportunities to enterprising investors. But the short-run benefits earned 
by the workers and landowners are more certain. The entrepreneur- 
capitalists take the risks o f speculating on the uncertain market; their 
investment may result in profits, in breaking even with no profits at all, or 
in suffering outright losses. No one can guarantee profits to them.
Aggregate new investment will result in aggregate net profits, to be sure, 
but no one can predict with certainty in what areas the profits will appear.
On the other hand, the workers and landowners in the fields o f new 
investment gain immediately, as new investment bids up wages and rents 
in the longer processes. They gain even if the investment turns out to have 
been uneconomic and unprofitable. For in that case, the error in satisfying 
consumers is borne by the heavy losses of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. In 
the meanwhile, the workers and landowners have reaped a gain. This is 
hardly a clear gain, however, since consumers have, as a whole, suffered 
in real income through entrepreneurial error in producing the wrong kind 
o f goods. Yet it is obvious that the brunt o f the loss from making the error 
is suffered by the entrepreneurs.10
Thus, entrepreneurs must accurately predict future conditions to make efficient
and productive use of capital.
Capital forms the bases of productive activity and the growth of
economies, especially post-industrial ones. This brief discussion has
demonstrated the interaction among capital, productivity, and economic
expansion. Capital is difficult to measure. The two indicators used below to
9 Ibid., 60.
10 Italics are original. Ibid., 548-49.
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evaluate the availability o f capital are venture capital and return on investment. 
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers collaborates with MoneyTree to provide quarterly data 
on venture capital investment activity in major metropolitan areas and regions in 
the United States. The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides data on 
“Dividends, Interest, and Rent,” which describes individual investment income. 
These two indicators approximate the availability and efficiency of capital in each 
metropolitan area.
VENTURE CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT INCOME 
Venture Capital
To measure capital accumulation in each metropolitan area, venture capital and 
returns on investment are analyzed. Patterns of the availability o f venture capital are 
evaluated first. Included in Pricewaterhouse-Coopers-MoneyTree data are
[qjualifying transactions [that] include cash investments by these entities 
either directly or by participation in various forms o f private placement.
All recipient companies are private, and may have been newly-created or 
spun-out o f existing companies... The report excludes debt, buyouts, 
recapitalizations, secondary purchases, IPOs, investments in public 
companies such as PIPES (private investments in public entities), 
investments for which the proceeds are primarily intended for acquisition 
such as roll-ups, change of ownership, and other forms o f private equity 
that do not involve cash such as services-in-kind and venture leasing.11
Accordingly, venture capital is aimed at start-ups and reflects the desire and risk
individuals take on in hopes of supporting a profitable enterprise.
11 PwC-MoneyTree, "MoneyTree Definitions," at 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.eom/Definitions/Definitions#Report.
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The available data show the patterns o f venture capital in the past decade and a 
half. Table 7.1 below shows the total annual venture capital investment for Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh from 1997 to 2013. Figure 7.1 gives a graphical representation 
o f the data. From 1999 until 2012, Pittsburgh had the greatest aggregate venture capital 
accumulation, surpassed by Cleveland in 2013. Except for 1997, 1998, and 2013, 
Cleveland had lower venture capital investment than Pittsburgh, but higher than Buffalo. 
In every year during this period, Buffalo had the lowest. Venture capital peaked for all 
cities in 2000, immediately preceding the burst o f the dot-com bubble. In 2000, venture 
capital in Pittsburgh was $877.53 million. Cleveland had $329.37 million, and Buffalo 
had $157.35 million. A minor peak for Pittsburgh occurred in 2006, when $242.72 
million of venture capital was available. Whereas Pittsburgh fell in 2013 below its 2011 
level by over $4 million, Cleveland’s venture capital accumulation more than doubled to 
$190.77 million. It remains to be seen how 2014 will fair for the two metropolitan areas. 
But, in the past decade and a half, venture capital in Pittsburgh, as an aggregate total, has 
surpassed Cleveland and Buffalo.
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Table 7.1: Total Annual Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh in Real Dollars (millions), 1997-2013
Buffalo12 Cleveland Pittsburgh
1997 50.30 43.17 33.40
1998 103.52 122.50 83.81
1999 88.64 141.42 249.34
2000 157.35 329.37 877.53
2001 32.90 56.89 312.27
2002 61.25 112.84 251.74
2003 52.43 126.06 224.00
2004 25.46 33.74 155.41
2005 31.89 71.98 127.85
2006 39.02 40.02 242.72
2007 67.42 127.46 206.89
2008 62.46 125.55 156.98
2009 26.88 75.27 94.15
2010 44.77 130.50 160.78
2011 47.72 94.51 142.50
2012 47.44 143.36 163.64
2013 54.79 190.77 138.28
{Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)
12 Buffalo venture capital is estimated. The closest measure for Buffalo metropolitan area 
is for Upstate New York as an aggregate.
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Figure 7.1: Total Annual Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh in Real Dollars (millions), 1997-2013
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(Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)
To provide a more accurate comparison, Table 7.2 shows the annual per capita 
venture capital investment for the three metropolitan areas from 1997 to 2013. Figure 7.2 
graphs these data. Like the aggregate measure, the per capita pattern shows Pittsburgh 
with the highest venture capital throughout the period and Buffalo with the least. In 
1997 and 1998, however, the ranking was reversed, with Buffalo having the highest.
From 1999 to 2011, Pittsburgh had the highest per capita venture capital investment. 
Buffalo and Cleveland shared similar paths o f investment during this same period. After
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2011, Cleveland’s pattern o f investment grew, surpassing Pittsburgh in 2012 and 2013. 
Again, the data show peaks for all metropolitan areas in 2000. From 1998 to 2000, 
Pittsburgh’s venture capital investment rose 956% from $34.21 to $361.38 per capita. 
During that same period, Cleveland’s rose 169% from $56.94 to $153.37. Buffalo’s 
declined from 1998 to 1999 to $75.56 then rose 78% in 2000 from $75.56 to $134.60. 
These regions also saw precipitous drops after 2000, and the patterns for Buffalo and 
Cleveland relatively leveled off for the rest of the period. Pittsburgh had another small 
peak in 2006 at $102.67, rising to just above the 1999 value. The aggregate data show 
similar trends, with Pittsburgh displaying the highest venture capital investment for most 
o f the period between 1997 and 2013.
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Table 7.2: Annual Per Capita Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1997-2013
Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
1997 42.41 20.05 13.58
1998 87.84 56.94 34.21
1999 75.56 65.78 102.25
2000 134.60 153.37 361.38
2001 28.24 26.56 129.17
2002 52.73 52.82 104.53
2003 45.20 59.15 93.29
2004 22.02 15.89 65.05
2005 27.77 34.09 53.84
2006 34.18 19.06 102.67
2007 59.26 60.94 87.71
2008 54.96 60.21 66.61
2009 23.67 36.17 39.97
2010 39.43 62.87 68.22
2011 42.05 45.69 60.39
2012 41.84 69.43 69.31
2013 48.31 92.39 58.57
{Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)
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Figure 7.2: Annual Per Capita Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1997-2013
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{Source; “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)
In line with the rankings o f post-industrial revitalization, the above patterns show 
the Pittsburgh metropolitan area with the highest venture capital investment, Cleveland 
with the second highest, and Buffalo with the lowest. Given the measure on venture 
capital, one sees a preliminary correlation between capital and post-industrial 
revitalization. To gain greater insight into these patterns, the next section will look at the 
returns o f capital investment: investment income.
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Investment Income
Another way to measure capital investment is the success o f investment, 
measured by investment income. The Bureau o f Economic Analysis data measure 
personal dividend income, personal interest income, and rental income. This dividends, 
interest, and rent (DIR) measure is a primary category o f personal income from 
investments. These include stocks, savings accounts, income from rental properties, and 
other income such as royalties from patents. The BEA’s definitions for the three terms 
are:
Dividends: This component o f personal income consists o f the payments 
in cash or other assets, excluding the corporation’s own stock, made by 
corporations located in the United States or abroad to persons who are U.S. 
residents. It excludes that portion o f dividends paid by regulated 
investment companies (mutual funds) related to capital gains distributions.
Interest: This component o f personal income is the interest income 
(monetary and imputed) of persons from all sources.
Rent: Rental income is the net income o f persons from the rental o f real 
property except for the income o f persons primarily engaged in the real 
estate business; the imputed net rental income of the owner-occupants of 
nonfarm dwellings; and the royalties received from patents, copyrights, 
and the right to natural resources.13
The DIR data serve as a reflection of the efficiency of capital use in the production of
goods and services. The higher the returns are, the greater the profits, and the more
useful the original capital investment.
A drawback in using the DIR data comes in the form of an ecological inference
problem. Whereas the venture capital data above measures investment from various
locations into a specific metropolitan area, the DIR data reflects investment from specific
13 B.E.A., "V. Dividends, Interest, and Rent," Bureau of Economic Analysis, at 
https://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2004/divintrr.pdf.
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metropolitan areas into various locations. Capital accumulation for individual locations 
is difficult to measure because capital markets are national and international, not regional 
and metropolitan. Nonetheless, the DIR data is important for describing the success of 
investments o f the populations o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
Data for DIR exist for the years 1969-2013. Table 7.3 shows the annual per 
capita dividends, interest, and rent for Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and U.S. 
metropolitan areas in real dollars from 1970 to 2013. The data shown from 1970 to 2000 
are quinquennial. Figure 7.3 graphs the annual data from 1969 to 2013. From 1969 to 
2002, Cleveland had the highest per capita DIR and followed the US metro average.
From 2003 to 2013, Pittsburgh had the highest, only relinquishing the top spot in 2005. 
From 1969 to 1987, Buffalo and Pittsburgh shared a similar pattern o f returns, after 
which Buffalo slowed. From 2009 to 2013, however, Buffalo surpassed Cleveland in 
DIR income. Notable spikes in the patterns for all three cities occurred immediately 
preceding economic downturns: 1990, 2000, and 2007-2008. The 2013 DIR income for 
each metropolitan area remained below the US average. Pittsburgh’s per capita DIR 
income was $8,326. Buffalo’s was $8,176, Cleveland’s was $7,441, and the US average 
was $8,734. For a more focused view of the data, Figure 7.4 below shows the patterns of 
DIR investment from 1983 to 2013.
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Table 7.3: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1970-2013
US
Metro Buffalo Cleveland Pittsburgh
1970 684 578 665 541
1975 1,048 870 1,023 824
1980 1,842 1,556 1,802 1,572
1985 3,220 2,803 3,176 2,940
1990 4,272 3,452 4,365 4,017
1995 4,872 3,846 4,784 4,413
2000 6,066 4,652 5,966 5,666
2001 5,998 4,863 5,837 5,617
2002 5,811 4,568 5,692 5,487
2003 5,944 4,874 5,366 5,563
2004 6,260 4,925 5,562 5,685
2005 6,764 5,235 5,990 5,700
2006 7,588 5,593 6,620 6,680
2007 8,211 6,495 7,110 7,369
2008 8,322 6,721 7,099 7,368
2009 7,263 6,084 6,125 6,530
2010 7,171 6,151 5,894 6,495
2011 7,965 6,902 6,600 7,248
2012 8,634 7,983 7,328 8,163
2013 8,734 8,176 7,441 8,326
{Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 1970-
2013,” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
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Figure 7.3: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1970-2013
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{Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 1979-
2013,” Bureau of Economic Analysis)
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Figure 7.4: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1983-2013
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(Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 1979- 
2013,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)
The data show Pittsburgh with the highest per capita DIR income in the past 
decade and Cleveland recently falling below Buffalo. Buffalo had been far behind until 
2010, when it surpassed Cleveland. Nevertheless, all three cities remain below the 
national metropolitan average.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Capital is necessary for production. Higher amounts o f capital expand the 
structure o f production and enable longer and more complex production processes. 
Venture capital, in particular, increases entrepreneurial activity and leads to more start­
ups. One difficulty in analyzing the relationship between capital and economic activity is 
the endogeneity in the causation. Entrepreneurs see the increases in the availability of 
capital and engage in productive activity as a result. The causation, however, can also be 
reversed. Current and potential investors see increased productivity and profit-making, 
which further attracts more capital. The agglomeration effects o f capital accumulation 
create positive expectations for both entrepreneurs and investors in a reciprocal pattern of 
causation.
This process informs the cases o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in venture 
capital and investment income. The data above show Pittsburgh with the highest levels 
o f capital accumulation in the past ten years. In this same period, Cleveland has had 
higher levels of venture capital than Buffalo, but Buffalo more recently has had higher 
levels of per capita investment income. Investors in Pittsburgh see greater returns, which 
begets greater investment in the future. In Cleveland, investors have not seen as high of 
returns on investment, which signals to entrepreneurs that productive ventures are not as 
profitable. In Buffalo, higher returns do not seem to be leading to higher levels o f 
venture capital. Pittsburgh sees a reciprocal causation between capital investment and 
returns, while Buffalo and Cleveland do not.
This chapter has described the importance o f savings in the structure of 
production and economic expansion and analyzed the two available measures o f capital
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in metropolitan areas: venture capital and investment income. I hypothesized the highest 
capital accumulation in Pittsburgh and the lowest in Buffalo. Thus, I expected to find a 
positive correlation between levels of capital accumulation and post-industrial 
revitalization. While Pittsburgh had the highest levels o f both venture capital and 
investment income in the past ten years, Cleveland and Buffalo had mixed results. 
Cleveland had the lowest levels o f investment income and Buffalo had the lowest levels 
of venture capital. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between levels 
of capital accumulation and post-industrial revitalization can be rejected.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study sought to understand the differences in post-industrial revitalization 
among Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. These three cities, located in the “rust belt” of 
the United States, experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through the 1980s, 
largely as a result of the economic globalization o f the steel industry. Intensive 
manufacturing and output declined quickly and harshly. Unemployment spiked, 
outmigration ensued, and the cities fought for survival. The past twenty years saw these 
regions attempt to redevelop. This occurred unevenly, with Pittsburgh appearing to be 
more successful than its rust belt counterparts.
Comparing the cities using insights from previous studies as well as political- 
economic theory, this study was inherently interdisciplinary. The literature review 
explored the wide range o f themes that interconnect and underlie the study o f post­
industrialism in metropolitan areas. It addressed the key empirical investigations and 
theoretical discourses of the market-driven phenomena o f post-industrialism and 
globalization; local and regional development; economic geography; endogenous growth 
and entrepreneurship; and institutions and economic growth. Studies on public policy 
and the role o f local governments in urban development followed these works. The 
literature review discovered the dearth o f research on post-industrial metropolitan 
redevelopment.
The first step was to examine the degree of post-industrial transformation each 
metropolitan area experienced. To do this, I compared the cities in each o f the four
characteristics of post-industrialism: change from a goods-producing to service economy; 
the growing importance o f human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar work and 
increase in importance o f professional labor; and the centrality o f ideas in economic 
growth. Numerous indicators were examined for each characteristic, ultimately revealing 
that Pittsburgh has performed best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo performed worst 
in most. In addition, the Pittsburgh metropolitan area shows the healthiest economy 
when looking at standard economic indicators, and Buffalo shows the worst. First, 
Pittsburgh shows the greatest divergence in emphasis on secondary employment versus 
tertiary employment, showing the largest shift from a goods-producing economy to a 
service economy. Second, even though Buffalo shows the greatest percentage of the 25 
and older population with a graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads on the rest 
o f the human capital indicators, including greatest percentage o f individuals with a 
bachelor’s degree only; greatest percentage of individuals with at least a bachelor’s 
degree; and highest population and percentage of individuals holding a degree in business, 
computers, mathematics, statistics, or communications. Third, despite Buffalo having a 
lower percentage of blue-collar jobs in recent years, Pittsburgh has had the greatest 
proportion o f STEM-bachelor’s degrees awarded. There are more science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than in the other areas, 
which is reflected in employment numbers. And fourth, Cleveland has been the leader in 
patenting in the past decade, but in terms o f major universities spending money on 
research and development, Pittsburgh leads by far, showing greater emphasis on ideas as 
a central way to grow the economy.
In comparison, the characteristics of the post-industrial economy as well as
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standard economic indicators show Pittsburgh on top, Cleveland next, and Buffalo at the 
bottom. The next step was to determine why Pittsburgh is ahead of the game. Why are 
there such differences among the three regions, given their similar histories o f decline?
To partly explain this phenomenon, I posited three hypotheses, which were then 
individually tested. The first hypothesized a negative correlation between the level of 
post-industrial redevelopment and regulatory burden. Differences in post-industrial 
revitalization can be explained by favorable policies that attract firms and allow them to 
thrive. A more developed post-industrial city will have a better reputation for ease of 
doing business. The second hypothesized a positive correlation between the level of 
post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service sector prior to 
deindustrialization. If a region had a substantial service sector before the decline of 
heavy industry, the brunt o f deindustrialization would not be as bad and the foundation 
for post-industrialization would have already been laid. The larger the service sector is in 
an economy, the easier it is to recover from industrial decline. The third hypothesized a 
positive correlation between post-industrial redevelopment and capital accumulation. 
Capital is necessary for production, which must precede consumption. Increased levels 
o f capital accumulation lead to more complex production processes and economic 
expansion.
I tested these hypotheses in the framework o f liberal institutionalism. This school 
of thought posits that production can only be a driver of economic expansion if it 
correctly reflects consumer desires. This is possible through limited coercive 
intervention into the market economy. Otherwise, the price signals which tell producers 
what to produce and how much o f it become distorted, inefficiencies result, and some
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groups o f individuals benefit at the expense of others. This framework concludes that 
growth is a phenomenon that is driven by individuals acting in their own subjective 
interests. It occurs in an environment free o f government interference, yet with 
protection o f private property.
I tested the first hypothesis in specific reference to the institutional regulatory 
burden governments place on particular locales. The ability for local governments to 
provide an institutional setting in which market processes can work efficiently is pivotal 
to economic expansion and post-industrial development. This liberal setting includes the 
provision o f basic public goods and the strengthening of property rights. The protection 
of property rights presupposes an environment of low taxation and few obstacles to 
engaging in business operations. Liberal formal institutions open the potential for 
economic gains. Since Pittsburgh’s post-industrial economy outperforms Cleveland’s 
and Buffalo’s, I expected to find that Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden o f the 
three. To measure the regulatory climates in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I 
created an index that examined the ease o f starting a business, dealing with construction 
permits, registering property, and the corporate tax burden. In addition, I evaluated the 
individual tax burdens and overall cost o f living as reflections o f the economic 
attractiveness o f each city. These measures describe the overall regulatory burden in 
each city.
The results were mixed. The regulatory index measured the number of 
procedures, time, and cost of starting a business, dealing with construction permits, 
registering property, and paying taxes. Cleveland receives the highest score in starting a 
business, entailing the lowest number o f procedures, shortest time, and lowest cost.
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Buffalo has the lowest score. Under dealing with permits, Pittsburgh receives the highest 
score. Even though dealing with permits takes the longest amount o f time in Pittsburgh, 
it entails the fewest number o f procedures and cost. Cleveland receives the lowest score 
in this regulatory category. Pittsburgh has the second best score in registering property as 
well as entailing the fewest procedures and days, but it proves to be much more 
expensive than either Buffalo or Cleveland. Cleveland had the best score, and Buffalo 
had the worst. Finally, under paying taxes, Cleveland has the lowest tax obligations, and 
Pittsburgh has the highest. Overall, the first year of doing business for a firm is most 
expensive in Pittsburgh and least expensive in Cleveland. Cleveland also has the best 
regulatory index score, Buffalo has the worst, and Pittsburgh lies in the middle.
According to the regulatory index, it is easiest doing business in Cleveland.
The other side o f the story involves ease o f living. To balance the study, I 
examined individual tax rates and overall cost o f living. When considering income, 
property, and sales taxes in each city, I found that Pittsburgh has the best individual tax 
environment and Cleveland has the worst. This same pattern exists in the cost o f living 
measure: Pittsburgh has the lowest cost of living, and Cleveland has the highest. If the 
historical patterns remain constant, the cost o f living ranking will remain the same in the 
near future.
Given this evidence, the null hypothesis that there is no negative correlation 
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden can be 
rejected. Even though it seems that Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden for firms, 
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden for individuals. Since there is no definitive 
evidence that rules out the hypothesis, the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation
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between levels of post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden holds 
weight.
The second hypothesis tested path dependence as a factor in post-industrialization. 
Each o f the three metropolitan areas suffered industrial decline in the 1970s and 1980s, 
characterized by a significant drop in manufacturing employment. Prior to decline, 
manufacturing employment made up a large proportion o f each region’s total 
employment. Deindustrialization caused labor dislocation and a decrease in total 
employment. Not all cities, however, had the same dependence on industrial 
manufacturing. Unemployed workers may have been able to find jobs in the service 
sector and contribute to its growth. Given that Pittsburgh has the highest levels o f post­
industrialization and Buffalo has the lowest, I expected to find that Pittsburgh had the 
largest tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization and Buffalo had the smallest. I expected 
to observe a positive correlation between the level of post-industrial redevelopment and 
the robustness of the service sector prior to deindustrialization.
Path dependence theory informs this hypothesis. At the most basic level, path 
dependence processes reflect the idea that history matters. Path dependency scholars 
posit different definitions o f what constitutes a path dependent process. The first and 
most popular claim details an intertemporal durability between past actions and present 
conditions. The second construction emphasizes a path that is eventually regrettable but 
not necessarily inefficient. The third conception underscores a path that propagates error, 
but also that the error is avoidable. This hypothesis used the most basic and broad 
formation o f path dependence, which is characterized by positive returns and labor 
specificity.
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This analysis showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f lull- and part- 
time manufacturing employment prior to industrial decline and maintained that trend 
until 2012. Cleveland has maintained the largest percentage o f manufacturing jobs from 
1969 to 2012, and it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo prior to deindustrialization 
and since 2000. Additional figures showed that Pittsburgh exhibited the highest rates of 
overall employment growth from 1969 to 2012, and Buffalo showed the lowest. Further, 
Pittsburgh’s overall employment levels were highest in the crisis years o f 1979-1983, and 
Buffalo’s were the lowest. This pattern o f relative insulation from economic downturns 
exists throughout the 1969-2012 period. In addition, Pittsburgh had the greatest 
trajectory o f tertiary sector growth over the same period, and Buffalo had the lowest. 
Overall, this chapter reveals that a strong tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization 
coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and higher tertiary sector 
employment growth. One reason for this pattern is the maintenance o f steel expertise in 
the post-industrial era. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between 
level o f post-industrial redevelopment and size of tertiary sector prior to industrial decline 
was rejected.
The third hypothesis dealt with capital accumulation, which is especially 
important in post-industrial development. At the most basic level, individual saving 
allocates resources for the structure o f production, for future consumption. Without 
individuals foregoing consumption to save, no production is possible. It is only with 
production that innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic expansion occurs. The 
greater the availability o f capital, the more productive an economy can become. 
Accordingly, I hypothesized the highest capital accumulation in Pittsburgh and the lowest
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in Buffalo. Thus, I expected to find a positive correlation between levels o f capital 
accumulation and post-industrial revitalization.
The data showed Pittsburgh with the highest levels o f capital accumulation in the 
past ten years. In this same period, Cleveland has had higher levels o f venture capital 
than Buffalo, but Buffalo more recently has had higher levels o f per capita investment 
income. Investors in Pittsburgh see greater returns, which begets greater investment in 
the future. In Cleveland, investors have not seen as high of returns on investment, which 
signals to entrepreneurs that productive ventures are not as profitable. In Buffalo, higher 
returns do not seem to be leading to higher levels o f venture capital. Pittsburgh sees a 
reciprocal causation between capital investment and returns, while Buffalo and Cleveland 
do not. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between levels o f capital 
accumulation and post-industrial revitalization was rejected.
These results provide important insights for city managers and development 
directors in urban areas. First, capital accumulation is important. The ability for 
entrepreneurs to find investment funds for startups and continuing projects is a necessary 
condition for the expansion o f production. Second, a low regulatory burden attracts 
capital, individuals, and firms to a particular region, creating a competitive advantage 
over other cities. Urban municipalities must create an atmosphere which is fertile for 
economic growth. In conditions o f low regulatory burden, firms are better able to adjust 
to competition and the demands o f consumers as well as create knowledge clusters where 
productive spillovers can occur.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
These three cities were chosen because they form an important core o f the rust 
belt region, which had once driven the American, and arguably the global, economy.
They have differing levels of economic redevelopment yet are similar in several respects. 
First, their heavy industrial bases began to see a steady decline after World War II, which 
coincided with population drain. Second, their proximities to water resources and 
resource endowments helped them industrialize, but their geographic locations are not as 
important as they once were. Third, they have similar European immigrant backgrounds, 
which weigh heavily on their local cultures. And fourth, one o f the most beneficial 
aspects o f these three cities is institutional and governmental uniformity. While they 
have different municipal ordinances and state laws, they are all subject to federal laws 
and are, for the most part, equally affected by national legislation or monetary changes. 
While their respective histories are not uniform, their similarities help identify the general 
patterns of post-industrial redevelopment. It is more difficult to analyze cities that have 
completely divergent historical paths. By choosing more similar cities that face similar 
problems, yet with differing economic results, it is easier to identify causal factors 
without having to control for cultural or institutional differences. Thus, I am able to 
control for certain variables.
That the three cities are medium-sized cities is also significant. The global cities 
literature tends to focus exclusively on large cities such as Tokyo, New York, Paris, and 
London. There is a presumption that only large cities play significant roles in 
international governance and provide useful cases for the study o f political economy. But, 
large cities do not provide the appropriate historical cases for post-industrial studies that
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small- and medium-sized cities do. Whereas larger cities such as Chicago have gone 
through a post-industrial transition, its commercial diversification insulated the region 
from the devastating o f effects o f deindustrialization that were experienced in Buffalo, 
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which had been reliant on heavy industry. Best practices for 
post-industrial redevelopment can only be discovered, then, through the examination of 
cases like these types o f metropolitan areas. In this sense, these cities became “global” 
because of the examples they provide for international cases with similar economic 
histories.
This study focused on three independent variables, which account for an 
incomplete explanation for the differences in post-industrial development. In addition to 
testing the effects o f the independent variables regulatory burden, path dependence, and 
capital accumulation, future research can evaluate the roles o f the following variables:
Brownfield revitalization: Brownfields are visual reminders o f economic 
prosperity that once was. Abandoned factories, slag dumps, and other former 
industrial sites contribute little to local economies and serve as eye-sores to 
residents and visitors. Converting these locations into wealth-creating or urban 
heritage sites adds value and aesthetic attraction to the region.
Diversification: Although the agglomeration effects of economic concentration 
can spur economic expansion, having multiple types o f industry in a particular 
geographic area may be more sustainable in the long-term than cities with a single 
type o f industry. This variable can also be a predictor of the stability o f each
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region against future shocks. One of the reasons these cities declined so rapidly 
was the absence o f a diversified economy. Multiple healthy sectors are necessary 
for a local economy to survive and withstand outside shocks.
Social capital: Preferential treatment and cooperation among individuals and 
groups within a geographic area can increase productivity among the social 
networks. Greater levels of social capital in metropolitan areas can then be a 
determinant o f post-industrial redevelopment. Indeed, simple observation reveals 
differences in levels o f social capital among the cities. These social bonds 
increase cooperation among urban residents, lessening free rider problems 
associated with the public good which is city survival.
I focused on American cities to eventually extrapolate the findings to international 
cases of post-industrial redevelopment. Similar non-American metropolitan areas include 
Sheffield, England; Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia; and Hamilton, Ontario, 
Canada. The conclusions drawn from this study imply that regulatory burden, size o f 
service sector, and capital accumulation have played significant roles in the post­
industrialization o f these three cities.
Like the examples of Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, Sheffield became a 
center for steel production in the nineteenth century and faced industrial decline in the 
1970s and 1980s. Since 1997, however, the gross value-added o f Sheffield’s economy
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increased by nearly 60%. The local economy averages 5% growth annually.1 At one 
point, it became the fastest-growing British city outside o f London for office and 
residential space and rents.2 Sheffield’s post-industrial economy is characterized by steel 
technology research, banking, health care, and retail.
Newcastle’s steel industry suffered a similar fate. The downfall o f heavy industry 
began in the 1970s and continued until 1999, when the Newcastle steelworks closed.3 
Coincidentally, the steelworks closure occurred during a period o f economic 
diversification and expansion in Australia. The region’s post-industrial economy is based 
on health care, education, and finance: it hosts the National Stock Exchange of Australia.
Hamilton is an outlier in the group. While the region’s economy has shifted more 
toward service sectors such as transportation, education, and health services, Hamilton is 
still heavily industrialized and produces 60% of Canada’s steel.4 The city also has a 30- 
year growth plan, which includes the development of its airport into an aerotropolis 
industrial park. This case o f post-industrial development combines the move toward 
service sector employment as well as the ability to maintain a manufacturing presence.
One non-American case plausibly challenges some o f the findings o f this study: 
Birmingham, England. In contrast to my findings, that post-industrialism has been aided
1 City Council o f Sheffield, "Income & Wealth: Gross Value Added (GVA) in Sheffield," 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20100521085049/http://www.sheffield.gov.uk/your-city- 
council/sheffield-facts-figures/sheffield-economy/income-wealth.
2 BBC News, "Sheffield 'Hotbed' For Investment," at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/south_yorkshire/4314628.stm.
3 ABC Online, "Steel City Without the Big Australian," at 
http://www.abc.net.aU/7.30/stories/s55787.htm.
4 Canada's Digital Collections, Industrial Hamilton: A Trail to the Future (2011).
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by liberal institutions, Birmingham has recuperated from its 1970s industrial downfall 
with heavy public spending at both the civic and national levels. Many initiatives were 
undertaken to diversify the local economy and make the city more appealing to tourists. 
Public works also substantially regenerated housing slums and initiated massive public- 
use projects. The role o f government intervention has gone beyond infrastructure 
planning and seems to have been integral to post-industrial revival in the city. Whether 
heavy government involvement in development is sustainable in the region is the subject 
o f future research.5
This study has demonstrated the importance of formal institutions in restraining 
intervention in the market to provide a setting in which entrepreneurs and individuals can 
act freely and engage in economic exchange. At the same time, it has underscored the 
influence o f history in the development of local economies. Post-industrial recovery is 
often a function o f the size o f the service sector at the time of deindustrialization. Finally, 
capital accumulation is crucial. As capital becomes more available, the production 
structure expands, and the economy grows. At the very least, these three variables 
affected the revitalization of Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
This study has also underscored the process of post-industrialism in developed 
countries as a result o f the processes of globalization. Increased and intensified economic, 
social, and cultural flows across borders relocate industry and supply chains to more 
efficient locations. As lesser developed countries industrialize, many industrialized 
economies post-industrialize. This process does not always occur smoothly. Cities either 
find a way to thrive or they fail. These cases demonstrate local economies which have
5 See Liam Kennedy, ed. Remaking Birmingham: The Visual Culture o f  Urban 
Regeneration (New York: Routledge,2013).
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transitioned into the post-industrial model at differing rates and have used lessons from 
economic geography to varying extents. Cities are always evolving and in a state of 
becoming as the processes o f globalization increasingly interact with urban locales.
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APPENDIX
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION (SIC) TO NORTH AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (NAICS) TRANSLATION
NAICS Sectors SIC Divisions
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing
Mining Mining
Construction Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Utilities Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities
Transportation & Warehousing Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities
Wholesale Trade Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade Retail Trade
Accommodation & Food Services Retail Trade
Finance & Insurance Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Real Estate & Rental & Leasing Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
Information Services
Professional, Scientific & Technical 
Services Services
Administrative & Support & Waste 
Management & Remediation Services Services
Education Services Services
Health Care & Social Assistance Services
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation Services
Other Services (except Public 
Administration) Services
Public Administration Public Administration
Management of Companies & Enterprises (parts o f all divisions)
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